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Abstract
Most of economics is equilibrium economics of one sort or another. The study of out-
of-equilibrium economics has largely been neglected. This thesis, engaging with ideas and
techniques from complexity science, develops frameworks and tools for out-of-equilibrium
modelling. We initially focus our attention on models of exchange before examining methods
of agent-based modelling. Finally we look at a set of models for social dynamics with non-
trivial micro-macro interrelationships.
Chapter 2 introduces complexity science and relevant economic concepts. In par-
ticular we examine the idea of complex adaptive systems, the application of complexity
to economics, some key ideas from microeconomics, agent-based modelling and models of
segregation and/or polarisation.
Chapter 3 develops an out-of-equilibrium, fully decentralised model of bilateral ex-
change. Initially we study the limiting properties of our out-of-equilibrium dynamic, char-
acterising the conditions required for convergence to pairwise and Pareto optimal allocation
sets. We illustrate problems that can arise for a rigid version of the model and show how
even a small amount of experimentation can overcome these. We investigate the model
numerically characterising the speed of convergence and changes in ex post wealth.
In chapter 4 we now explicitly model the trading structure on a network. We derive
analytical results for this general network case. We investigate the effect of network structure
on outcomes numerically and contrast the results with the fully connected case of chapter
3. We look at extensions of the model including a version with an endogenous network
structure and a versions where agents can learn to accept a ‘worthless’ but widely available
good in exchanges.
Chapter 5 outlines and demonstrates a new approach to agent-based modelling
which draws on a number techniques from contemporary software engineering. We develop
a prototype framework to illustrate how the ideas might be applied in practice in order to
address methodological gaps in many current approaches. We develop example agent-based
models and contrast the approach with existing agent-based modelling approaches and the
kind of purpose built models which were used for the numerical results in chapters 3 and 4.
Chapter 6 develops a new set of models for thinking about a wide range of social
dynamics issues including human capital acquisition and migration. We analyse the models
initially from a Nash equilibrium perspective. Both continuum and finite versions of the
model are developed and related. Using the criterion of stochastic stability we think about
the long run behaviour of a version of the model. We introduce agent heterogeneity into
the model. We conclude with a fully dynamic version of the model (using techniques from
chapter 5) which looks at endogenous segregation.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Most of economic theory is equilibrium economics of one sort or another. An eco-
nomic equilibrium is not necessarily, as might be assumed from a mathematics or
physics viewpoint, a stationary point of a dynamical system (or even a stationary
distribution) but is (roughly) a state of affairs where people know what to expect,
where demand and supply meet, where prices are stable and so on. But even after
we make such allowances we are still left with the conclusion that this is clearly not
the only or perhaps even the typical state of affairs in a “real” economy.
This thesis takes a number of steps towards thinking about economics in a
more dynamic way. I look at decentralised versions of economic models of exchange,
which do not require many of the typical strong assumptions of standard models,
particularly with respect to information. I identify several key ideas which I argue
should be included within agent-based modelling frameworks and create a prototype
framework which demonstrates the feasibility and effectiveness of these ideas. Fi-
nally I create a set of economic models for thinking about certain kinds of complex
social dynamic issues.
In the next chapter I introduce complexity science in a very broad sense.
I look at the key idea of a complex adaptive system and some of the key work
in applying this idea to economics (I return to several of the ideas in more detail
later on). Next, I look at more work which connects complexity to economics from
economists and from other researchers such as physicists, including for example
Axtell [2005]; Kirman [2010].
I then take a different angle, examining a few key pieces of work related to
ideas of out-of-equilibrium economics. These include some of the work of Fisher
[1983] in his attempt to formulate an out-of-equilibrium framework, rational expec-
tations and rationalisability via Guesnerie [1992] and some contemporary accounts
1
of microeconomics including Bowles [2006] which formulates a general approach to
microeconomics which is more in keeping with dynamical approaches. Focusing on
these three strands of work is obviously not an attempt at a comprehensive survey,
which would be impossibly broad, but hopefully gives the reader some sense of the
context in which this PhD is situated.
Following these introductory accounts I examine key topics in microeco-
nomics which are either directly utilised by this thesis or which are alternative
methods to, or context for, the work contained here. Included here is an overview
of bargaining, fictitious play and adaptive heuristics. I examine in detail a foun-
dational strategic model of general equilibrium Gale [2000] for which this thesis in
part provides an alternative. The final topic in this microeconomic section is the
idea of conventions and related solution concept of stochastic stability, a method I
will use in chapter 6.
Continuing on from these microeconomic concepts I survey work in agent-
based modelling in economics and other contexts (though the most directly relevant
background for this topic can be found in chapter 5). I then bring together the
strands of economic theory and complexity and/or agent-based modelling, looking
at Gintis [2007a] and other works.
The final part of the literature review surveys conceptual issues, particularly
in microeconomics, of relevance to social dynamics, in particular to models of cul-
ture, aspirations, polarisation and decision making. I pick up on many of these
themes in chapter 6.
In chapter 3 I look at a dynamic model of pairwise exchange which jetti-
sons many of the typical assumptions such as global knowledge, foresight and agent
homogeneity. I consider a model with agents, an arbitrary number of goods, het-
erogeneous utility functions and random matching of pairs for exchange. One agent
makes an offer. This offer can then either be accepted, if it is improving, or re-
jected, if it is not. I examine this initially analytically, showing that under certain
conditions we will asymptotically obtain an outcome which is Pareto efficient. I al-
low for a weakening of the initial formulation, in particular for experimentation (or
noise) and show that we can still asymptotically obtain the same outcomes, subject
to restrictions on the form of experimentation or noise. The model is extended to
production using the process of Rader [1976].
I then examine the model numerically using standard models of preferences
(the focus is mostly on Cobb-Douglas preferences, though more awkward cases are
considered). The numerical results obtained show that convergence in this kind of
model is surprisingly rapid given the lack of knowledge on the part of the agents.
2
I also look numerically at an ex post measure of wealth change which shows an
approximately linear relationship between initial and final wealth, but with consid-
erable noise. I show, numerically, how noise can both improve or dis-improve the
speed of convergence and how for certain cases it makes convergence possible at all.
In chapter 4 I extend the model from chapter 3 to an explicit market struc-
ture. Each agent is connected to some subset of the entire economy and we assume
that there is some path from each agent to every other agent. Versions of the ana-
lytical results presented in the previous chapter are derived which take into account
the network structure (essentially the previous chapter assumed the case of a fully
connected network).
Numerically I show that for random networks, beyond a certain (surprisingly
low) threshold level of connectivity the results are very similar to those for the fully
connected network of chapter 3. When I re-examine wealth changes I show that the
wealth changes may be highly dependent on network structure and that even for a
simple model where more central agents are making no explicit attempt to exploit
their position, they may end up, probabilistically, with a disproportionately high
wealth level.
This framework is extended in two ways. Firstly, I consider how making the
network formation endogenous (via selection of neighbours based on past perfor-
mance) changes the network structure. Secondly, I consider a version of the model
with a ‘worthless’ good which all agents have access to; this can play the part of
money as agents learn to value this and use it to trade where they may not otherwise
have a mutual co-incidence of wants.
Chapter 5 surveys some of the major general approaches to agent-based mod-
elling which are popular in the socio-economic agent-based modelling community.
I look at some of the most popular general purpose frameworks such as SWARM,
Repast and Netlogo and split approaches into roughly three groups: those which
provide a full agent-based modelling language; those which provide libraries, exten-
sions or frameworks for existing general purpose languages; and finally visual tools.
I argue that visual tools, while being ideal for many particular tasks, haven’t really
established themselves for more general purpose tasks. Setting those aside leaves
two major approaches.
I develop an alternative to these two major branches which draws on the idea
of an internal domain specific language from Fowler [2005], that is customising and
building a framework for a general purpose language for a specific task, in this case
agent-based modelling. I apply this idea of an internal domain specific language
to a multi-levelled conception of agent-based modelling which provides a kind of
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scaffolding for four level agent-based models including an ‘agent level’ at which
individual classes of agents are specified, a ‘world level’ in which agent instances
exists and carry out actions in time periods, a ‘simulation level’ at which runs of
the world can be specified and finally an ‘experiment’ level at which we specify the
investigation we want to carry out (parameters to be varied or simulations to be
compared).
I also incorporate a number of ideas from contemporary software engineer-
ing practice which, while can be (and to some extent are) utilised in agent-based
modelling, do not seem to have established themselves. In particular I focus on
automated testing and version control. While these could be utilised by anyone
developing agent-based models in general purpose languages there seems to little
existing emphasis or expectation of doing so. The framework which I developed for
this chapter both facilitates version control and includes tests for its basic function-
ality (while allowing users to easily add their own).
Projects such as Netlogo have some support for the idea of agent-based mod-
elling within an explicitly broader context of a ’project’. I extend the scope of this
beyond documentation and model to include output generation: the framework I
implement generates a number of outputs such as LaTeX files, HTML files (which
can be imported into Word, Pages and so on) visualisations, tables and a simple pre-
sentation ready form. This can greatly accelerate work by automatically generating
at least an early version of the final outputs.
The framework is illustrated through examples including a simple example
model, a model of an App Store and through a recreation of a model from earlier
in the thesis within the framework. I evaluate the framework considering issues
such as performance and ease of use. I conclude by outlining the lessons learned
for agent-based modelling and the next steps that could be taken to build a full
framework based on this prototype (it is currently capable of substantial real work
but probably requires too much technical expertise for general use).
In chapter 6 I explore a set of strategic models of social dynamics which take
into account both the complementarity and competitive effects of agents action on
one another. I consider an economy in which agents make a choice of whether to
put in effort, with some cost, or not. If they put in effort then there is a probability
of success which depends on how many other agents put in effort. I analyse purely
competitive and complementary version of this model (where increasing the pro-
portion of agents who put in effort strictly decreases or increases the probability of
success) along with a benchmark case which includes elements of both competition
and cooperation.
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I look at the finite version of the model and characterise the long run be-
haviour of the economy with a simple dynamic using the criteria of stochastic stabil-
ity. I extend the model to a case with heterogeneous agents, that is each agent has
a skill level (or cost of human capital acquisition) which determines their individual
expected utility upon effort. Finally, I explore the issue of persistent endogenous
segregation in human capital acquisition via an agent-based model based on this
framework.
Chapter 7 brings together the conclusions of preceding chapters and sum-
marises some possibilities for future work building on this thesis. Hopefully this
has given you a good idea of the contents of this thesis. Most of the major chap-
ters, with the exception of chapter 4 which follows on directly from 3, are relatively
self-contained.
5
Chapter 2
Background and Literature
Review
This chapter gives a broad introduction to complexity science before focusing on
complex adaptive systems, and in particular some research looking at economies
as complex adaptive systems. We then look in more detail at economically focused
research from complexity science and research from economists and physicists which
link complexity to economics.
We then look at a highly selective historical account of some economic topics
of relevance to the thesis looking at three key areas: early attempts at out-of-
equilibrium economics, the alternative approach of rational expectations and ratio-
nalisability and finally the general subject of microeconomic research. In each case
the focus is on a key piece of work. This should give a flavour of the research that
has been undertaken for those not familiar with the fields.
The focus then turns to surveying microeconomic approaches and models
of relevance to the thesis, such as bargaining and fictitious play. We then look at
some agent-based modelling work, before concluding with a survey of work relating
economics and complexity science. Later chapters give additional background as
appropriate.
2.1 Complexity Science
2.1.1 Introduction
Complexity Science is an imprecise term, covering an array of disciplines, methodolo-
gies and ideas. Defining it along the lines of the scientific study of complex systems
still leaves one with an impossibly wide range of topics to cover. One can charac-
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terise a complex systems as one featuring some or all of the following properties:
interconnected components, nonlinearity, self-organisation/self-organised criticality,
adaptive agents, evolution and emergent properties.
A system is complex if it has many interacting components; so one cannot
understand it as merely the sum of its parts and study each part in isolation one
must pay attention to the way in which different components interact. Furthermore
these interactions may be nonlinear: given inputs to a system the output may not
simply be the sum of some linear scaling of inputs, but some more sensitive process
based on the input. But while this process may be more sensitive to input it may
also be more robust, self-organising to classes or states; that is states with particular
overall qualitative properties, without fine tuning of inputs to the process or initial
conditions. But it may self-organise to a critical state; one where a small change
in a particular input may have dramatic outcomes. Clear examples of this kind of
phenomenon are avalanches or earthquakes, in both these cases the system slowly
changes over time, but the overall state is apparently stable until a catastrophic
event occurs, as the result of a small change in input.
There may be adaptive agents whose behaviour changes depending on their
local environment and in doing so may regulate the overall behaviour of a system.
This system may evolve over time, perhaps with co-evolution of individual compo-
nents. And these various behaviours may result in the emergence of an outcome at
a higher level that was not intended or explicitly aimed for at a lower level.
In general for systems with the above properties exact mathematical solu-
tions are impossible to obtain, so one must utilise other techniques. Complexity
science draws on and combines a range of methodologies from disparate disciplines
including physics, ecology, mathematics, computer science, economics and others.
These include nonlinear dynamics, stochastic processes, statistical physics, agent-
based modelling, evolutionary game theory, machine learning/statistical inference
and decision theory.
In calling a piece of work complexity science, in contrast to just pursuing
say evolutionary game theory within a biological context, one is typically doing two
things:
1. Emphasising the interdisciplinary aspects of the work. That is to say, applying
work from one field to a seemingly unrelated field.
2. Emphasising the complex nature of the problem one is facing as work in each
of the above fields could be split, albeit imprecisely, into complex and non-
complex.
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There are also a wide variety of general introductions to complexity science
for a general audience, such as Strogatz [2003] and for a more technical audience
Bar-Yam [1997]; Erdi [2007]; Miller and Page [2007]. The ideas from complexity
science have been applied to many disparate fields, one example is the relationship
to international development for which the Overseas Development Institute’s recent
working paper Ramalingam et al. [2008] is an excellent starting point.
2.1.2 Complex Adaptive Systems
Complex adaptive systems are those with large numbers of agents which interact
and adapt or learn. To be considered a complex adaptive system (as opposed to a
‘mere’ multi-agent system) features such as emergence or self-organisation may be
observed. This kind of complex system is of particular interest for economic consid-
erations where we may be particularly interested in the macroeconomic behaviour
of a system, where we have a model of microeconomic components (agents, firms
and so on).
A key early researcher in applying ideas from complex systems to economics
is Peter Albin. In Albin [1998] several major pieces of this research are brought
together along with an extended introduction Foley [1998]. This introduction does
a good job of synthesising much of this research summarising ideas including linear
dynamical systems, oscillators, nonlinear dynamical systems and chaos. Cellular
automata are identified as a good laboratory for thinking about nonlinear dynamical
systems questions as they can show single state stability, oscillatory stability, chaos
and complex evolutions1.
Of particular interest for this thesis is chapter 5, originally published as Al-
bin and Foley [1992], which looks at a model of dispersed exchange (100 agents on
a lattice with two goods), symmetric Cobb-Douglas utility functions (each agent
values each good equally) for final holdings. The sum of endowments to agents is
equal to 100 and the total endowment over both goods is 10000. This formulation
has a straightforward equilibrium solution, where prices are set equally and each
agent would consume an equal amount of both goods. Into this basic framework an
advertising cost (broadcast of willingness to trade) is introduced such that agents
must both advertise to be able to trade at all. The key feature considered is agents
forming an estimation of the Walrasian equilibrium price from their local data (the
neighbourhood size is a parameter). After a few rounds this can result in highly
1This last category, or class 4 cellular automata, are those where nearly all initial patterns
eventually evolve into interesting (local) structures which interact in complex ways and may be
remain in some form for many periods.
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efficient outcomes, without central coordination. Below some related models are
considered, particularly in section 2.7.4 and in chapter 3 we investigate a consider-
ably less homogeneous decentralised system.
In Baumol [2004] the idea of a “Red-Queen game” is described: a competitive
scenario where each player must match or exceed the efforts of all other rivals, so
each must bid higher and higher. In this kind of scenario moving ahead of rivals
simply induces them to put in more effort, meaning everyone is perpetually short
of resources. Several historical examples are cited, where the necessity to fund
armies led to kings turning to “despised economic activities such as commerce”. The
final example cited is of innovation arms races in high technology: companies must
continually innovate to stay ahead of rivals, which means that the market mechanism
has provided incentives which have increased growth in resources directed towards
research.
A relatively recent account of markets considered as complex adaptive sys-
tems (CAS) can be found in Markose [2005]2 which identifies three main aspects of
markets as CAS:
1. formal complexity issues of equilibria,
2. the dynamic behind growth of adaption and
3. the empirical or testable elements of CAS in economic systems.
A detailed historical account is given of the development of ideas relating to CAS
which identifies three stages in the development of the theoretical ideas. These
ideas are associated with methods which have been applied to economic modelling
with varying consequences. The first stage is formalist/deductive methods, method
include classical optimisation and probability and classical economic models. The
consequences for economic modelling include perfect competition, homogeneous ra-
tional expectations and complete markets. The second stage results from mathe-
matical ideas related to incompleteness and NP-hard problems and the associated
computability methods. The economic consequences include ideas such as Hayek’s
limits on constructivist reasoning and various un-solvability and incompleteness re-
sults. The third stage is that including inductive methods and self organising dy-
namics with associated methods of adaptive computing, such as genetic algorithms,
cellular automata and agent-based models. The consequential economic models in-
clude ideas such as power laws, scaling, market crashes, evolution of norms and so
2This is part of a special issue, we look at two other papers from it, Axtell [2005] and Durlauf
[2005], in more detail below.
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on. We return to many of these and related issues, in particular see Axtell [2005]
and Durlauf [2005] in section 2.2.3 and an examination of the theme of evolution in
section 2.9.
2.2 Economics and Complexity (Science)
2.2.1 Complex Economics
Alan Kirman is a prominent critic of much of mainstream theoretical economics, see
for example Kirman [2009a]; Colander et al. [2009]; Kirman [2009b]. In his recent
book on Complex Economics Kirman [2010] looks at his alternative to the main
paradigms of contemporary economic theory. He questions the key mainstream eco-
nomic ideas of rationality and equilibrium by pointing out their lack of realism. He
highlights the stability problems with existing equilibrium theories. His alternative
is a simpler, but more heterogeneous world, with emergent coordination. The struc-
ture of markets should be a key concern and macroeconomics demands new theory.
His work is particularly interesting with respect to this thesis as it engages both
with economics (while a critic of much of economics he is very much an economist)
and complexity.
He argues for the centrality of networks for economics (we look in more de-
tail at networks in the next section of this chapter) and observes that the relative
lack of economic interest until recently in networks is odd when compared to other
disciplines, such as sociology where networks have long been recognised as impor-
tant and the typical economic assumptions of “ultra rational” behaviour have been
rejected. Network interactions can lie between the two extremes of independent
agents in markets and game theoretic interactions.
Kirman looks at Fish markets as they provide an example where aggregation
of behaviour may lead to rationality at a collective level. First looks at a simple
theoretical model, then uses simulations to extend it. Detailed data is available for
Marseille3, a market where sellers name a price, buyers can reject or not (more or
less). Kirman argues that what agents do depends on who they are in contact with;
gradually a trading network will have built up from experience of who will sell or
buy certain kinds of fish at certain prices. There is significant dispersion of prices
suggesting this market is not a good approximation of a competitive one; also typical
equilibrium concepts with price dispersion don’t work well (as the price dispersion
31. The name of the buyer 2. The name of the seller 3. The type of fish 4. The weight of the
lot 5. The price per kilo at which it was sold 6. The order of the transaction in the daily sales of
the seller. The total number of transactions for which Kirman has data is 237,162.
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isn’t fixed over time).
The traditional notion of competitive demand, the amount an individual
would buy if were only constrained by income, is questioned in the context of the
fish market and implicitly more broadly. A traditional model is proposed, then one
with less rationality. Using mean field analysis Kirman suggests we are likely to see
behaviour splitting into two categories: buying from random sellers and repeated
buying from the same sellers, with little in behaviour in between. Simulations for
larger models give the same outcome. This conclusion is supported by the empirical
data. Another fish market (Ancona) which is based on an auction system is analysed.
Again the suggested result is that agents don’t behave rationally at an individual
level; however thanks to market structure aggregate outcome is rational.
In looking at financial markets Kirman covers the various forms of the ef-
ficient markets hypothesis (EMH) along with their testable implications. Models
which assume EMH must then assume that any volatile behaviour such as a crash is
the result of exogenous factors; it cannot be explained within the model. The prob-
lem is that often there is no clear evidence for significant exogenous events driving
volatile behaviour. And there is much historical evidence for endogenously generate
bubbles. Of course most fundamentally a crash may be the very thing we wish to
model.
The concept of herding is introduced with a simple example showing when
players act sequentially the outcome may be worse when more information is avail-
able to them. Another type of herding may be via a recruiting process where popular
resource use is reinforced via use by others.
If expectations are heterogeneous, as Kirman argues for, then should move
away from rational expectation framework. May be able to think in terms of an
equilibrium distribution of a market4. While these the kinds of approaches used in
this chapter (simple rules which produce time series with plausible characteristics)
are suggestive, it would be interesting to see if the results still hold in a more realistic
(perhaps sophisticated agent-based?) framework.
Finally Kirman presents a physical model related to Shelling’s segregation
model. By looking at a continuous variant of the model can characterise the macro
results of a wide variety of micro behaviours. Simulations show interesting results
for the case where equal numbers of neighbours of each type are most desired: macro
segregation, but with constant micro movement due to dissatisfaction.
In Colander et al. [2004] Colander, Holt and Rosser give their view of the
4Subject to formulating the market in a particular way it can be proven that the distribution of
prices will be ergodic and hence has a unique limit distribution.
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“changing face of mainstream economics” arguing that it has moved away from the
holy trinity (rationality, selfishness and equilibrium) to purposeful behaviour, en-
lightened self-interest and sustainability. They view economics as a ‘complex system’
for which categories like orthodox are backward looking and of limited usefulness.
They highlight the role played by what they call the edge of economics: “the edge
of economics is that part of mainstream economics that is critical of orthodoxy,
and that part of heterodox economics that is taken seriously by the elite of the
profession. Our argument is that modern mainstream economics is open to new
approaches, as long as they are done with a careful understanding of the strengths
of the recent orthodox approach and with a modelling methodology acceptable to
the mainstream.”
They discuss the time lag in the latest research becoming part of (under)graduate
syllabus and how this can be useful (they give the example of the reluctance to in-
corporate macroeconomic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models). They
highlight several areas as examples of the edge of economics, to quote from Colan-
der et al. [2004]:
1. “Evolutionary game theory is redefining how institutions are integrated into
the analysis.”
2. “Ecological economics is redefining how nature and the economy are viewed
as interrelating.”
3. “Psychological economics is redefining how rationality is treated.”
4. “Econometric work dealing with the limitations of classical statistics is redefin-
ing how economists think of empirical proof.”
5. “Complexity theory is offering a way of redefining how we conceive of general
equilibrium.”
6. “Computer simulations are offering a way of redefining models and how they
are used.”
7. “Experimental economics is changing the way economists think about empir-
ical work.”
2.2.2 Economics and Physics
Econophysics is the application of methods from physics to the study of financial
markets and economies. It has mostly focused on areas like stock markets for which
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large amounts of data are available, though some recent work has been of a more
theoretical nature. Rosser Jr. [a, 2007, b] offer a physicist’s take on dynamic con-
ceptions of complexity and how they could be applied to economics. A contrasting
perspective can be found in Gallegati et al. [2006], an assessment of recent work in
econophysics is given by several economists. They feel that there are problems with:
a lack of awareness of existing work in economics, resistance to more rigorous and
robust statistical methodologies: visual methods may be misleading e.g. power law
fits; limited range for scaling effects5, the belief that that universal regularities can
be found in many areas (in economics relationships may change over time) and the
particular theoretical models used to explain empirical phenomena which may for
example restrict study to exchange only models due to conserved quantities. Also
thinks that many models not realistic and suggests that econophysics needs to go
beyond exchange only models.
A response by McCauley McCauley [2006] agrees with much of the criticism
in Gallegati et al. [2006] including the criticism of conservation laws, but points
out that the neo-classical economic model has a global conservation law assumption
and that many econophysics researchers do not make these kinds of assumptions.
McCauley is critical of making use of the economics literature and combatively
suggests it “should be either abandoned or tested empirically ... never accepted as a
basis for modelling”. He concludes with a strong critique of the content of economic
courses, suggesting alternatives for the future.
In Yegorov [2007] Yegerov looks at econophysics (or “socio-physics”) in a
general sense, attempting to approach the subject from an “economist friendly”
perspective. He keeps many economic assumptions while introducing a physics-
based methodology, optimistically speculating about a unified science. In terms of
future research the following are identified: analytical descriptions of transaction
processes, understanding historical paths, understanding stability of regimes and
role of state in economy. Economics, it is argued, should broaden to consider other
forces alongside the “invisible hand”, such as spatial forces, scale economies and
deviations from self-regarding preferences (see section 2.5 for a more substantial
account of similar ideas).
2.2.3 Further Economics and Complexity
In section 2.4 we look at a model where the rational expectations equilibrium is a
key concept. But first we note earlier research which asks when such equilibria are
5Many consider this a major problem in much ‘complexity’ work.
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computable6. In Spear [1989] two results are reached:
• In a two stage learning model with full information on the state of the world
it is possible for agents to learn this equilibrium (that is, it is computable).
• When agents have incomplete information this is no longer the case.
Even if a solution is computable, the difficulty (or computational complexity) in
computing it may be prohibitive. Axtell [2005] offers an attractive formulation of a
decentralised economy from the perspective of computational complexity, dropping
much of the typical Walrasian framework, to produce a model which can account for
the endogenous emergence of prices. It links economic exchange with computational
complexity, and is draw on agent-based modelling. In complexity terms the job of the
Walrasian auctioneer (or whatever alternative mechanism is in place) is extremely
hard. One can argue that it is so difficult to compute Walrasian picture is not
reasonable and that it is not (empirically) reasonable anyway. Axtell proposes a
model of decentralised k−lateral exchange and shows that it converges geometrically
in total utility. Under conditions (see Goldman and Starr [1982]) it will converge
to Pareto optimal allocations. Some numerical examples are given of heterogeneous
Cobb-Douglas agents.
Foley [1999] introduces the idea of statistical equilibrium, instead of a tradi-
tional equilibrium balancing supply and demand, here we have flows in a market with
an equilibrium distribution of prices subject to classes of traders who are replaced
having made their target trades.
In Crockett et al. [2008] a model of a pure exchange economy is developed
where agents use the common normalised global utility gradient as a vector of prices
to obtain an implied wealth distribution.
A ‘complexity’ approach to macroeconomics is adopted in the book Gatti and
et al. [2006]. First it analyses many of the stylised facts of macroeconomies. Then, in
contrast with more traditional work, presents an agent based model (chapter four).
The overarching conceptualisation is that as in statistical physics we may obtain
universal laws which do not depend on regularity at the mirco-level. The authors
argue that economists must adopt an approach based on interacting heterogeneous
agents. One particular model is that of a sequential economy, with many firms and
banks which is able to capture many “empirical” properties of genuine economies.
A model of local interaction with choices of ranked actions, with infrequent
upward shifts and rapid imitation (or diffusion) is investigated in Arenas et al. [2002].
6Whether there exists an algorithm which will run in finite time and produce the result.
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If the costs of not coordinating are high then the system can behave criti-
cally7. The system is optimal at the frontier of the critical region8. The model has
n agents on a ring, at every time step each agent i adopts an action ai(t) ∈ R+ or
technology level. Agents interact with neighbours and obtain payoffs
ψ(a, a′) = f(a)− g(a, a′)
where g(a, a′) = 0 when a = a′ (so highest payoff when equal). The payoff will be
lower if one is less technologically developed rather more for the same difference in
development. The economy updates via diffusion, a best response to the actions of
neighbours, and an occasional exogenous perturbation or ‘innovation’ which shift
technology level up by some random amount.
This model is simulated numerically. Depending on a parameter level we may
see avalanche sizes following a power law or where they are all of the system size.
Similar results are obtained for the advances (technological increases). Instead of the
synchronised situations expected by evolutionary game theory we have heterogenous
waves. One can also look at the long range behaviour and in particular at the
performance which seems to be optimal at the ‘lower edge’ of the critical region.
One key question the paper leaves us with is what networks might be conducive to
critical behaviour and when might such networks be formed endogenously.
Much research connecting complexity and economic is theoretical. In con-
trast Durlauf [2005] explicitly connects complexity to empirical economics. Durlauf
identifies four properties of complexity of particular relevance to social science con-
texts:
1. Nonergodicity
2. Phase transition
3. Emergent properties
4. Universality
An example which has been proposed of the first property and third property is
the adoption of the QWERTY keyboard. A more efficient alternative was available
(DVORAK), that is the emergence, out of decentralised decisions, of QWERTY was
only one of many possible long term outcomes. Durlauf is somewhat skeptical (he
doesn’t think these kind of historical examples are persuasive evidence in support of
7
8This is explicitly linked to the notion of “edge of chaos”.
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a complex systems perspective). Various power laws have been identified in econo-
metric data. These stylised facts are helpful for theoretically modelling. Durlauf
questions whether these observations can allow the inference that a given economic
situation is complex as there are interpretative problems. Durlauf concludes with
suggestion that economic complexity will not become a major part of economic
reasoning until theoretical and empirical work is better connected.
2.3 Disequilibrium Foundations of General Equilibrium
In Fisher [1983] we find an early exploration of out-of-equilibrium dynamics. Fisher
questions assumption of stability, or quick enough convergence to equilibrium to
make disequilibrium study irrelevant. He critiques Lucas’ sense of stability as al-
ways clearing markets, “essentially a taˆtonnement process”, as begging the question.
Having omniscient agents who can calculate general equilibrium prices is absurd9.
He argues that stability is also an important issue for macroeconomics.
Perhaps most relevantly he asks the key question: what should a satisfactory
dynamic theory have? His answer: dynamics and adjustment to equilibrium over
time. While a closed form solution would be ideal it is too much to hope for. We
must ground assumptions of functional forms of agents in theories of behaviour.
Convergence speeds should be determined endogenously and not simply assumed to
be high. Adjustment processes must arise from optimising behaviour of agents; not
via a direct computational algorithm for equilibria.
Fisher highlights four major developments of the stability literature: the re-
alisation that subject worth looking at, the realisation that global results could be
obtained, the introduction of non-taˆtonnement process and the realisation that spec-
ifying disequilibrium processes leads to more satisfactory results. He covers early
results such as Samuelson’s formulation of a non-equilibrium system and a formal-
isation of Walras’ Taˆtonnement process which is now considered anachronistic and
which required very strong assumptions. He observes that there is a “present action
postulate” implicit in all stability literature that does not allow for development
over time.
This and related early work was superseded by global results such as Arrow
and Hurwicz [1958]. These results use Lyapounov’s second method; roughly we show
the existence of a fixed point, we show it is globally stable and show adjustment
process is quasi-stable (there is a limit point for all initial conditions). The method
9See also section 2.2 where we cover Axtell’s work which looks at the computational complexity
of economic coordination.
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used to do this is to find a Lyapounov function L(P ) which is continuous, bounded
below and strictly decreasing except at fixed points. In this work the aggregate
excess demand functions must satisfy weak axiom of revealed preference10. They
conjectured general global stability, but a counterexample was soon found, see Scarf
[1959].
Fisher continues his study in Fisher [1983], looking at Disequilibrium with
Arbitrage, some refinements to his model and further issues concerning equilibrium
and stability; though doesn’t really succeed in his original, ambitious objectives.
Later in section 2.6.4 we look at a more recent attempt to build a general
equilibrium model on strategic foundations, but for now we jump forwards by about
ten years as we turn to a key piece of work on rational expectations.
2.4 Rational Expectations
An alternative to a dynamic model of coordination is to use a rational expectations
model. Here we think about forecasting activity and the concept of eductive learning
stability based on the game-theoretic conception of rationalizability. We look at
Guesnerie [1992] as a clear example of this work. It shows that in a particular
model the conditions for coordination of beliefs are robust to noise and that stability
increases with differentiation of products and when decisions are sequential and
observable.
Guesnerie introduces an adaptation of a model from Muth with the follow-
ing basic features: a continuum of producers (farmers), indexed by f ∈ [0, 1]. A
cost function Cf (q)0 for quantity q, so when sold at price p price taking leads
to maximising pq − Cf (q), where C convex and differentiable, supply function
S(p, f) = (∂qCf )
−1. The aggregate supply is
∫
S(p, f)df , but a priori will depend
on expected p, so
S¯(dµ(p, f)) = S(E(p), f)).
We have a aggregate, downward slopping demand D(p). In basic version of the
model we have C(q, f) = q2/2C(f), from which we can derive aggregate supply and
demand. Producers must decide at time t what they will produce to sell at time
t+ 1.
10The weak axiom of revealed preference is a characteristic of the behaviour of economic agents.
If an individual chooses choice A and never choice B when faced with a choice of both alternatives,
they should never choose B when faced with a choice of A,B and additional options.
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Let strategy set of farmer be Sf , then payoff to f is
{D−1(
∫
sf ′)}sf − C(sf , f).
Roughly speaking rationaizability is dervived from the rationality of the farmer
– the farmer uses best responses to some strategy profile of other farmers, which
may actually be played, who are rational so some possible best responses not best
responses and are eliminated. More formally we iteratively removed strategies via
rule (where τ is iterations of rule not time in any meaningful sense in the game):
S(τ, f) = S(τ − 1, f)/{s¯ ∈ S(τ − 1, f)|s¯ is not best response to any∏
f ′ 6=f
sf ′ where sf ′ ∈ S(τ − 1, f ′)}
leaving us with definition: a rationalizable strategy is one in < =∏f (⋂∞τ=0 S(τ, f)).
A rationalizable-expectations equilibrium is a function Q(f) of producers supplies
where each such strategy is rationalizable as defined above. We can then find
rationalizable-expectations equilibrium price p = D−1(
∫
Q(f)df) or the market
clearing price. A competitive equilibrium consists of price p such that S(p) = D(p),
whereas a rational expectations equilibrium is a distribution on {p} and is generated
by market clearing condition as t + 1 when believed by all agents at time t. As
there is no noise the rational-expectations equilibrium is a perfect foresight equilib-
rium (and thus coincides with competitive equilibrium which is unique given some
assumptions). It follows that every Nash Equilibrium is rationalizable (as never elim-
inated in iterative process), so the rational-expectations equilibrium is necessarily
a rationalizable-expectations equilibrium. Will say equilibrium is associated with
strongly rational expectations if converse true, calling it a strongly rationalizable-
expectations equilibrium which is a rationalizable-expectations equilibrium which is
unique.
For a linear model Guesnerie characterises the equilibrium (or set equilibria)
using these formulations (proposition 1 in Guesnerie [1992]). We basically have a
notional time taˆtonnement process that (in this case) will converge. But what about
evolving approaches? These require repetition rather than notional time11, but if
we disallow inventories, we could use this approach to obtain a similar result to the
static rationalizable-expectations equilibria case. Guesnerie obtains the result that
“success” of eductive learning implies “success” of adaptive learning. The converse
11Guesnerie is happier with notional time than a repeating, evolving process.
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does not hold.
This eductive process can be viewed as ultimate phases of demanding evolu-
tionary models. It is idealised but Guesnerie claims that something like it is likely
to take place in actual decisions and forces at work likely to at least go in same
direction as above analysis (that is a few steps of this notional taˆtonnement). He is
able to identify several consequences of this process:
1. Coordination improved when decisions are sequential and multi-commodity.
The effect of noise is ambiguous.
2. There might be a general connection between conditions of success for educ-
tive/notional learning and evolutionary learning.
3. Market structures can reflect the conditions of eductive coordination.
2.5 Microeconomics: contemporary perspectives
The textbook Microeconomic Theory, Mas-Colell et al. [1995], (hereafter MT to
distinguish it from the general term) is the standard microeconomics theory textbook
for postgraduate students at top universities around the world. In this section I
summarise the key elements of the this kind of approach relevant to my work, though
my focus is on a more recent approach perhaps best exemplified by Bowles [2006]
which attempts to move on from that of Mas-Colell et al. [1995]. A considerably
more extensive and detailed look at selected microeconomic topics can be found in
the next chapter.
MT covers many standard microeconomic theory topics but at least in terms
of relating it to this thesis the most relevant material is probably the substantial
coverage of general equilibrium theory. We see example equilibrium models, pure
exchange economies and examination of properties such as the welfare properties
of equilibrium and the existence and uniqueness of (general) equilibrium for certain
economic models.
Many criticisms have been made of general equilibrium economics, or rather
the central emphasis which has historically been placed on the framework. One sig-
nificant early critique (or perhaps more accurately limitation to the ambitions of it)
was as remarked above Scarf [1959]. He proposed very simple examples where prices
were globally unstable (they do not tend towards an equilibrium for non-equilibrium
initial conditions)12. The simplest example has a cycle of indifference/desire which
12In Gintis [2007a] one such example is used as a test case for a different price coordination
mechanism. See section 2.7.4.
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results in cyclical price movement. One more recent, and at least from a certain
perspective quite damning, criticism has been made by Herbert Gintis, who con-
trasting the text with an equivalent one from Physics, notes the absence of a single
‘economic fact’ in the entire book13.
In the remainder of this section I focus on Bowles [2006] as a non-quite-
traditional but still mainstream, recently published, graduate text in microeco-
nomics that explores many ideas of relevance to my PhD. It covers many standard
topics, but generally from a somewhat unconventional angle. I will refer to later
sections of the thesis where wider and more extensive accounts can be found. The
work has many connections with that of Herbert Gintis who features prominently
in section 2.7.4. In addition Bowles co-authored, with Gintis, an interdisciplinary
text covering many related themes Bowles and Gintis [2010].
Bowles highlights the importance to both classical and contemporary economists
of the subject of the wealth of nations and people; reversals of fortune and what
he considers the often overlooked importance of institutions. He then asks “What
can modern economics say about the wealth and poverty of nations and people? No
less important, what can it do?” claiming that “contrary to its conservative repu-
tation economics has always been about changing the way the world works”. Bowles
thinks that the neoclassical paradigm is ill-suited to the tasks that interested its
co-founder Marshall as it typically omits many key aspects of economic importance:
power, experience, out-of-equilibrium dynamics and institutional persistence and
change.
He will retain the purposeful actions of agents, constraints on actions by
competition and unintended aggregate outcomes; but other aspects of what he calls
the Walrasian paradigm will be replaced. He argues that his caricature of the
Walrasian paradigm 14 is recognisable of the form of economics taught in the 1980s
and although it has been somewhat displaced by the use of new tools like Game
13The observation is made in a review of Rationality in Economics (and elsewhere) and though
MT is not explicitly identified it is clear this is the book he is referring to.
14To quote: “The Walrasian approach represents economic behaviour as the solution to a con-
strained optimization problem faced by a fully informed individual in a virtually institution-free
environment. Robbins celebrated definition of the subject (in the epigraph) reflects this equation
of economics with constrained optimization. The passage of time is represented simply by a dis-
count rate; people do not learn or acquire new preferences over time; institutions do not evolve.
The actions of others are represented by nothing more complicated than a given vector of market-
clearing prices, while proximity is captured by a cost of transportation. Property rights and other
economic institutions are represented simply by a budget constraint. An economic actor in this
model is roughly Robinson Crusoe, with prices standing in for nature. The economists Crusoes in-
habit a world in which goods are scarce, but whatever institutions are necessary to coordinate their
activities in an optimal manner are freely available. The supply of optimal institutions can thus
be ignored for the same reason that Adam Smith used to explain why economists need not theorize
about the value of water: they are free goods.” Bowles [2006]
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Theory the core assumptions of “equilibrium, greed and rationality” still remain. In
their place he wants to include: non-contractural social interactions, adaptive and
other-regarding behaviours and “generalised increasing returns”15 and as results
may have multiple equilibria we should must consider equilibria selection.
Bowles outlines some general principles for Microeconomics, namely that it
must draw on insights of all behavioural sciences and must use empirical restrictions
(otherwise relaxation of Walrasian assumptions leads to vacuousness). This is es-
pecially important for individual behaviour. Theory, he argues, still provides useful
restrictions on sets of plausible assumptions and outcomes. He further suggests that
specific models should be used in place of attempts, which are typical in economic
theory, to model general markets (Alan Kirman, among others, have stressed this
point, see section 2.2.1.)
Bowles first looks at coordination problems and the classical constitutional
conundrum: how can social interactions be structured to allow people free choice
but avoiding aggregate outcomes none would have chosen. Bowles argures Pareto
standard is too strong (unrealisable) and too weak (it abstracts from other goals,
particularly fairness). In any case, alternatives may not be Pareto rankable in
practice.
He highlights several fields such as Implementation theory, mechanism de-
sign and optimal contract theory which attempt to answer problem of inducing
appropriate behaviour where well being of other is affected. Both traditional and
evolutionary game theory is introduced and split into two key groups: pure com-
mon interest games (only one Pareto optimal) and pure conflict games (all outcomes
Pareto optimal), for example all zero sum games. He points out that games may
have path dependent outcomes with convention outcomes, I focus on this topic in
section 2.6.5.
A, perhaps the, key issue of economic study (in particular for anything claim-
ing both the title economics and complexity science) is the relation of aggregate
outcomes to individual intentions; this is a key issue for this thesis (I devote section
2.2 to surveying this issue and much of the thesis is at least implicitly about it).
Bowles contrasts two main classes of population-level models that address this ques-
tion: the general equilibrium models and evolutionary dynamic models of biological
systems under chance, inheritance and natural selection.
Bowles considers concept of replicator dynamic and replicator equations ob-
serving that Robert May, in an evolutionary biology setting, discovered that evo-
15This is a misleading name, positive feedback would have been a more helpful term to use; as
he is not just increasing returns to scale.
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lutionarily irrelevant equilibria and/or nonequilibrium states can be of substantial
importance. Though for economic purposes he argues we should go further to deal
with hierarchical populations where differential replication may take place at various
levels. In a basic model we can look at stationary states and their stability but this
kind of basic model doesn’t allow us to consider innovation.
He places an emphasis on social preferences or taking account of consequences
for others. He distinguishes between reciprocity and strong reciprocity (expecting
future reward to self). While self-interest is not implied by rationality it is generally
assumed. Bowles argues that we should conceive of individuals as rule-following,
adaptive agents with preferences which are situationally specific and endogenous.
Bowles argues that no satisfactory conception of behaviour has yet been devised.
He identifies the heterogeneity of individuals as something which frameworks should
be able to take into account, something we explicitly include in chapters 3, 4 and 6.
The issue of bargaining is covered, including that using the Nash model16;
both simple and corresponds to intuitions, but not really account of how bargaining
takes place. Alternating offers bargaining is then examined, which does explicitly
model a process whereby an agreement will be reached and several issues identified:
1. relative costs of bargaining even if trivial will determine result,
2. bargaining never breaks down and outcomes always Pareto optimal,
3. empirical evidence suggests people don’t behave in these ways. Furthermore
people will try to conceal desires in bargaining; the above approaches require
knowledge of utility functions.
I look at this in more detail in section 2.6.1 (from a more sympathetic perspective).
Bowles identifies four main problems with many economic models of markets:
1. “Describes nobody’s actual behaviour in most markets”; in a sense it is not
really about a market system.
2. Needs quasi-global stability (to give convergence from initial allocation) so
much stricter requirements on utility than previously demanded.
3. Incomplete; lack of out-of-equilibrium account.
4. Market completeness assumptions are generally false.
16We require: 1) Invariant to linear transformations of utility functions, 2) Pareto optimal, 3)
Independence of irrelevant alternatives, 4) Symmetry.
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Alternative approaches, which at least attempt to address some of these issues, are
surveyed later in this chapter. See also chapters 3 and 4 for the out-of-equilibrium
approach to bargaining taken in this thesis.
2.6 Microeconomics
2.6.1 Bargaining
The standard text in this area is Rubenstein and Osbourne [1990] which looks
principally at strategic, sequential, decentralised bargaining. The basic axiomatic
approach (Nash’s Solution) is formulated along the following lines
1. Have N bargainers/players.
2. Reach agreement in set A or disagree D.
3. Each player has preference relation over set A ∪ {D}.
4. A bargaining problem is a set S, d, S ∈ R2, d ∈ S where S is set of feasible
utility pairs and d is disagreement with (in Nash’s formulation) four axioms:
(a) Invariance to Equivalent Utility Representations
(b) Symmetry
(c) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(d) Pareto Efficiency
and a solution is a function f on bargaining problems to R2 that assigns a
unique element of S.
Given this kind of formulation it can be shown that there is a unique bargaining
solution satisfying Nash’s axioms given by
fN (S, d) = arg max
(d1,d2)≤(s1,s2)∈S
(s1 − d1)(s2 − d2).
We can formulate this within a strategic framework and Rubenstein develops a
number of results for models with decentralised bargaining with one-time entry to
the market. He goes on to look at trading procedures and anonymity assumptions.
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2.6.2 Fictitious Play
In a fictitious play model, Fudenberg and Levine [1998], each player assumes that
all other players have an underlying, constant distribution of strategies. The players
then adopt a best response to what they perceive as the fixed strategy of the other
players. Over time the strategies evolve, perhaps reaching an equilibrium. One can
model this using discrete or continuous time. There are many variations on fictitious
play and it is considered a standard technique within the area.
To formally define fictitous play, for each player i let κi0 be the prior “count”,
that is function from strategies of the other players to a count in Z+. Every time
another player plays a strategy that count in incremented and we have the corre-
sponding κit at time step t. From this we obtain a na¨ıve probability distribution on
strategies defined by
γit =
κit∑
j
κjt
.
We then map this probability distribution on strategies to a best response via a
rule ρt which maps the probability distribution obtained via γ
i
t to a best response.
For a basic form of fictitious play this best response will take the form of a pure
strategy. For non-degenerate games the process will approach an equilibrium, see
early chapters of Fudenberg and Levine [1998] for a full account.
While this approach described above has benefits: it is deterministic and
easy to work with, we may be able to obtain more satisfactory results if we adopt
a stochastic scheme. One such possibility is that of a smoothed best responses. We
will no longer choose the single pure strategy but a mixed strategy which weights the
strategy possibilities according to their expected payoffs. It is argued in Fudenberg
and Levine [1998] that this closely models human behaviour when a decision is
uncertain. One scheme is by using the function
P (Choosing strategy sj) =
exp(Ej/γ)∑
i
exp(Ei/γ)
where sj are the pure strategy choices, Ej is the expected payoff for strategy sj and
γ is a smoothing term that captures the “probability of making a mistake”17.
17We can formulate this entire approach in an explicitly Bayesian way modelling the prior belief
via a Dirichlet distribution which is a conjugate prior for the multinomial distribution which we
can use to model underlying strategy choices. This approach is useful for looking at learning in
games with more than two players.
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2.6.3 Adaptive Heuristics
We look at Hart [2005], but some of Hart’s earlier work with Mas-Colell in Hart
and Mas-Colell [2000] is also explored. When thinking about learning we could
classify dynamic models into three main categories. Learning Dynamics are an
essentially a Bayesian framework with prior beliefs about the game, updated as game
is played; Hart thinks of this as ‘high rationality’. Evolutionary Dynamics have a
population of players in each role who plays same one-shot action; selection and
mutation take place, with resultant mixed strategies perhaps derived from relative
surviving proportions of population; Hart thinks of this as ’no rationality’. Finally,
he considers adaptive heuristics which deals with simple, myopic, unsophisticated
rules, which are “adaptive”, that is they induce behaviour that reacts to play of
game in ways that seem better; Hart considers this ‘in-between rationality’.
For adaptive heuristics we assume we have a game Γ, N players, each with
action set Si and utility function ui : S → R. Γ is played repeatedly in periods
t = 1, 2, . . . with action played denoted Sit . Regret Matching is defined by: switch
in next period to an action with probability proportion to regret (the increase in
payoff had that change always been made in past). More precisely let U be average
payoff so far, j the action in previous period, then for each alternative action k let
V (k) be average payoff he would have obtained by playing this instead of j in each
case where he played j. Now regret R(k) := V (k)−U if positive, 0 otherwise. Now
play k at T + 1 with probability
σT+1(k) =
cR(k) if k 6= j,1−∑l 6=j cR(l) if k = j.
The main result of Hart and Mas-Colell [2000] is that if each player uses regret
matching then joint distribution of play converges to set of correlated equilibria18
of the game.
Regret matching has nice behavioural features, as it captures a sort of “iner-
tia” and commonly used rules of behaviour. We can generalise the regret matching
to a Lipschitz continuous sign-preserving real function of the regret and show that it
doesn’t matter which particular form each player adopts. Can also show that there
18The idea is that each player chooses their action based on the value of a public signal. A
strategy assigns an action to every possible observation of the public signal a player can make. If
there does not exist a player who would want to deviate from the strategy determined by the public
signal (assuming the other players do not deviate), this distribution of strategies is a correlated
equilibrium.
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exist no uncoupled dynamics19 that guarantee Nash convergence.
2.6.4 Strategic Foundations of (General) Equilibrium
The goal of Gale [2000] is to find strategic foundations of perfect competition. This
kind of program requires:
1. A description of market or economy.
2. An extensive form game describing behaviour of agents in above.
3. An analysis showing under what conditions a perfectly competitive equilibrium
is reached.
Gale will focus on Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games (DMBG). In many
classic models prices set exogeneously by market clearing condition and where agents
believe they can buy or sell arbitrary amount at current prices. A fully strategic
approach on other hand will allow us to ask when perfect competition is appropriate
and could have a normative role in telling us how to achieve it. There are many
results mapping from cooperative games to competitive equilibria.
In the Cournot model as suppliers tend to infinity, we tend to a competitive
equilibrium. The Cournot-Shubik market game is a centralised attempt at what
Gale will attempt with his decentralised DMBG formulation. Some related examples
are given like Rubenstein’s20 alternating offers bargaining model Rubinstein [1982]
which has unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the formulation of this bargaining
in Marshallian markets with a continuum of traders and the associated notion of
quasi-stationary subgame perfect equilibrium which although an equilibrium with
instant agreement is not a competitive equilibrium.
Gale’s DMBG model has one period matches, complete information and a
limiting outcome which is more like competitive equilibrium than the above Ruben-
stein model. Production is ignored to achieve tractability in Gale’s model. In pure
exchange economy competitive equilibrium is characterised by efficiency and budget
balance; loosely speaking a competitive equilibrium is an efficient allocation which
satisfies budget balance. In order to prove a competitive limit theorem we need to
make some assumptions which are not endogenous to either agents or the equilibrium
state. The key assumption is that any agent has negligible effect on equilibrium. A
pure exchange economy consists of
19Strategies may depend on actions taken by other players, but not why they do it that is on
their utility functions. This condition is common to a wide range of approaches such as fictitious
play, best-reply and so on
20See also a brief introduction to this kind of approach above in section 2.6.1.
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1. Commodities: indexed h = 1, . . . , l homogeneous, perfectly divisible; commod-
ity bundle x = (x1, . . . , xl).
2. Agents: indexed 1 . . .m
3. Consumption sets: set of feasible consumption bundles for i, Xi ⊂ R, each
assumed to be non-empty, convex, bounded below and closed.
4. Endowment: each agent has endowment ei ∈ Xi.
5. Preferences: have utility function ui : Xi → R which is concave (i.e. agents
risk adverse), continuous and increasing.
So the whole exchange economy defined by a Ξ = (Xi, ei, ui)
m
i=1. What way can we
define efficiency? An attainable allocation is a bundle x such that
m∑
i=1
xi =
m∑
i=1
ei
and furthermore is (strongly) Pareto Efficient if there does not exist another al-
location which makes some agents better off without making any worse off; it is
pairwise-efficient if no two agents can improve situation by trading. The non-
standard assumptions made are: smooth preferences and the indifference surface
through initial endowment doesn’t intersect boundary of consumption set21. We
only consider individually rational allocations, that is ui(xi) ≥ ui(ei). Using the
Kuhn-Tucker Theorem22 We can prove that an attainable and individually rational
allocation x is Pareto efficient if and only if it is pairwise-efficient.
To formulate this strategically we want to restrict agent’s behaviour via a
non-cooperative game. Gale represents trade by a Rubenstein style (alternating
offers) bargaining:
1. Time: countable number of dates, indexed t = 1, 2 . . ..
21On page 48 an example is given that shows how we run into problems without this assumption.
22The Kuhn-Tucker theorem roughly states that: given we want to optimise f(x1, . . . xn)
subject to constraints g(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ 0 and xi ≥ 0; form Langrangian function F (x1, . . . , xn) +
λg(x1, . . . , xn) and solve:
1. ∂F
∂xi
≤ 0
2. xi ≥ 0
3. xi
∂F
∂xi
= 0
4. ∂F
∂λ
≥ 0
5. λ ≥ 0
6. λ ∂F
∂λ
= 0
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2. Matching: at each date a pair (it, jt) is matched (and assumed infinite number
of dates at which any pair matched).
3. Bargaining: i is proposer, j is responder. Proposer chooses vector z of feasible
trades (for himself and receiver), responder chooses “yes” or “no” and trade
happens or go to next date, with no change in allocations.
The play is described by path {at}∞t=1 where at = (xt, zt, rt), roughly “(allocation,
proposal, response)”. We call history ht and let Hi be information sets at which
player i controls play. A strategy is a decision rule that specifies action for player at
every information set where he moves; formally it is a function fi : Hi → Rl. Define
path af = aft and outcome Ξ(a
f ). We define payoff for agent as
lim infn→∞ui(xit) = supT≥1{inf{ui(xit|t ≥ T}}.
Though often the sequence of utilities will itself have a limit. Let payoff for agent i
be
vi(f) = lim inft→∞ui(ξit(af ))
So have a normal form game Γ with m players, strategy profiles F = ×mi=1Fi and
payoff function v.
The Nash equilbrium of the game will be the strategy profile f∗ such that
each f∗i maximises payoff to i given f
∗
−i. But this is too weak a concept for our
purposes. Could perhaps use subgame perfect equilibrium23 (SPE) but Gale will
actually go further and restrict memory; we restrict use to Markov Strategies24
and use Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) as equilibrium concept, where choice is
restricted to SPEs, but MPEs are optimal.
An Edgeworth Process is evolution of state/utility process which is non-
decreasing over time: non-deceasing vector of scalars rather than single objective
function. Gale proposes “Edgeworth Property”, though in his DMBG version agents
are far-sighted. As an agent can never become worse off (offer z = 0 and reject
trade), vi(f
∗) = limt→∞ui(xit). We can show that if f∗ be MPE of Γ and {x(t)}∞t=1
be equilibrium outcome. Then vi(f
∗) = limt→∞ui(xit),∀i. And if we further assume
each ui is strictly concave (ensures allocations converge if utilities do). Then the
MPE outcome {xt} converges to limt→∞xt ∈ P .
Now define sequence of economies (Em) (i.e. each of size m) and matching
probabilities pim, can define DMBG on these. Want to look at (fm) where fm ∈
23Every player must use optimal action in every situation not just along equilibrium paths
24For any information set same z chosen and same response made.
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MPE(Γm). If ym = limt→∞xmt , then by Second Welfare Theorem (and concavity)
there exists a supporting price vector pmsuch that:
ui(yi) ≥ ui(pmi ) and yi 6= ymi =⇒ pm · yi > pm · ymi .
We can normalise these price vectors and get bounded sequence; which thus has a
subsequence converging to p0, a limiting price vector.
Even for a very large number of agents, players could condition responses on
the actions of a single agent; something we wish to avoid. Introduce a continuity
assumption: for fixed {fm} (sequence of MPE), ∀, there exists M and T such that
∀j and strategy fj ∈ Fmj we have
1
m
m∑
i=1
||ξit(a(fm−j , fj))− ymi || < ,∀m > M,∀t > T
where ξt(a(f−j , fˆj)) is the allocation given a deviation by agent j to fˆj . That is
for large enough m, t one player cannot change allocations by large amount. This
isn’t a desirable assumption but makes things tractable. We also make a curvature
assumption.
We want to prove that any net trade lying in competitive budget set { ∈
R|p0 · z ≤ 0} is achievable in asymptotically pure MPE for m large enough, that
is will have shown each agent can obtain same utility as in competitive equilibrium
with p0. First note that as limiting allocation is efficient and has supporting price
vector for any net trade z, can find n such that −z/n is preferred trade for any
agent j holding limiting bundle ymj (from curvature assumption). Then can achieve
net trade z by offering z/n when possible and rejecting anything else.
Define Em as exchange economy with first m agents; define game Γm by
specifying order of play. pim. {Γm} is a competitive sequence of games if for every i:
1. Xi non-empty and closed.
2. ei ∈ Xi
3. ui is strictly concave, increasing and C
1 on open superset of Xi
4. We have curvature assumption
5. {Xi} uniformly bounded below and mean endowments are uniformly bounded
above.
If {fm} is a sequence of equilibrium strategy profiles such that {fm} ∈ MPE(Γm)∀m,
then a subsequence of M is a competitive sequence of equilibria if:
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1. for every m, fm is MPE and xmt → ym for almost every ω.
2. for every m ∈M , there exists pm such that if ||pm|| = 1 and ui(xi) > ui(ymi ),
then pm · xi > pm · ymi ∀i = 1, . . . ,m.
3. limm∈M ymi = y
0
i and limm∈M p
m = p0.
4. subsequence satisfies continuity assumption.
Call (y0, p0) a (strong) competitive limit equilibrium if
∀i, y0i ∈ arg max{ui(xi)|xi ∈ Xi, p0 · xi ≤ p0 · ei}
(and if Y 0 is attainable). Let {Γm} be a competitive sequence of games with
{fm}m∈M a corresponding competitive sequence of equilibria. Let y0 and p0 be
limiting allocation and price system. These are a (strong) competitive limit equi-
librium if convergence of {ymi } is uniform.
It is possible to derive several more substantial results within in this frame-
work including results for introducing stochasticity into matching process. There is
also a imitation model which will converge to the equilibrium outcome with a profit
maximising price maker. For these and further results see Gale [2000].
Gale draws his basic formulation of a DMBG from Goldman and Starr [1982]
which we now turn to. In this paper be look at t-wise optimal allocations. A t−wise
optimal allocation is one which cannot be improved via trading taking place in
groups of size t. The key question is when such an allocation is Pareto optimal.
Have pure exchange economy of M consumers, N commodities, with an allocation
an M ×N non-negative matrix A = (aij) where aij is i’s holding of good j. Utility
functions are a vector of C2, quasi-concave functions ui : RN+ → R. Also have vector
of linearised utility functions about A. Due to nature of utility functions we can
characterise state of economy by these linearised utility functions.
A t-wise reallocation Z such that zi = 0 for all but t ∈ 1, . . . ,M . It is a
t-wise improvement, if pizi = 0, with strict inequality for at least one i. Make
obvious definition of t-wise optimal. Say has t-wise equivalence property if set of
t-wise optimal is set of Pareto optimal. A state is a pair (A,P ), let Πt(A),Π∗(A)
be the set of t-wise, Pareto Optimal states respectively.
In a result due to Rader it can be shown that ff A has strictly positive row,
then Π2(A) = Π∗(A). This means there is a trader with all goods. The correspond-
ing price system will be his marginal utilities. If we have pairwise optimality then
marginal rates of substitution coincide with the strictly positive row. And in a theo-
rem due to Feldman can show if A has strictly positive column, then Π2(A) = Π∗(A).
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So every trader has some of one good. We can use this good as numeraire and get
price for other goods. Pairwise optimality guarantees marginal rates of substitution
of goods held by two traders are equal. We can then generalise results to if A has
some row (or column) with t − 2 or fewer zero entries then Πt(A) = Π∗(A). And
with some additional conditions: Πt(A) = Π∗(A)⇔ Πt(A) = Πt+1(A).
2.6.5 Conventions
A convention, see Young [1993], is an expected, possibly non-symmetric equilibrium.
Young [1993] looks at an evolutionary framework to examine how these arise and
how stable they are. The basic model consists of an n person game, with players
drawn from large but finite population, players basing actions on sample of events
from recent past and occasionally mistakes/experiments.
This is similar to fictitious play (see section 2.6.2) but with limited memory.
For the basic form of adaptive play there need not be convergence to a Nash equi-
librium (pure or mixed); but when we have stochasticity and finite memory we have
a stationary distribution in the long run; if all of the weight of this distribution is
on one equilibrium we call it stochastically stable.
Formally let Γ be n person game in strategic form, with Si the finite set of
strategies available to player i. N is population of individuals partitioned into n
non-empty Cj . Each member of Cj could play role i in game. All individuals in a
class have same utility function ui(s) for s ∈ S, set of strategy tuples. t = 1, 2, . . .
are successive time periods. Player i chooses pure strategy si(t). Let combined
tuple be s(t) and history up to t, h(t). Each player takes k samples from m most
recent periods to determine strategy. So now think of general history h as a state in
Markov chain, with successor obtained by deleting leftmost element and adjoining
new rightmost element. We have transition rule which is a best reply distribution,
that is give positive probability to strategy if and only if ∃ sample to which it is
best reply (and also is independent of t). Define:
P 0hh′ =
∏
i
pi(si|h).
where P 0hh′ = 0 if h
′ not a successor state of h. Clearly a strict, pure Nash equilib-
rium. m times in succession is an absorbing state, call this a convention. Conver-
gence to absorbing state implies a strict, pure Nash equilibrium.
We can define a best reply graph of Γ such that each vertex s is n-tuple of
strategies and there is directed edge s→ s′ if and only if s 6= s′ and exists an agent
i such that s′i is best reply to s−i and s−i = s−i. A game is acyclic if best reply
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graph has no directed cycles. Weakly acyclic if for all initial vertices s, there is a
directed path to s∗ from which there is no exiting edge. L(s) is length of shortest
path from s to a strict Nash equilibrium Let LΓ = maxs L(s).
Young obtains the result that if Γ a weakly acyclic n-person game. If k ≤
m/(LΓ + 2) then adaptive play converges almost surely to a convention
25.
Now we introduce noise term - probability a player in role i experiments λi.
Now let qi(s|h) be conditional probability that i chooses s given that he experiments
and history h. It turns out that subject to suitable conditions selected equilibria
are independent of precise q, λ. The conditional transition probability for a subset
of players J is
QJhh′ =
∏
j∈J
qj(sj |h)
∏
j
/∈ Jpj(sj |h)
or
QJhh′ = 0− if h′ not successor
and new perturbed Markov process has transition function:
P hh′ = (
n∏
i=1
(1− λi))P 0hh′ +
∑
J⊆N,J 6=∅
|J |(
∏
j∈J
λj)((
∏
j /∈J
(1− λj))QJhh′ .
We call this process adaptive play with memory m, sample size k, experimentation
probabilities λi and experimentation distributions qi. P
0 is the unperturbed process.
Now consider P  where  is small. This is irreducible and aperiodic, so has
unique stationary distribution µ (that is µP  = µ). Let µh be probability that h
is observed at any sufficiently large t. A state is stochastically stable relative to P 
if lim→0µh > 0. Define a mistake for h
′ successor of h as component of si of s not
an optimal response by i to any sample of size k from h. The resistance r(h, h′) is
total number of mistakes in transition h→ h′ (if h′ successor) or ∞ (otherwise).
Now view H as vertices of directed graph. For every h, h′ insert directed
edge if r(h, h′) is finite and let this be it’s weight. Let H1, H2 . . . , HJ be recurrent
communication classes of P . Now look at graph G with vertices Hk and directed
edges with weight ri,j , the path of least total resistance between classes.
Finally for every vertex let T be set off all i-trees26 on G . The resistance of i-
tree is sum of resistances of edges. The stochastic potential of Hi is least resistance
among all i-trees. Can obtain the result that the stochastically stable states of
adaptive play P  are states in recurrent communication classes of P 0 with minimum
stochastic potential.
25This bound might not be tight.
26An i-tree is spanning tree such that for every vertex j there is a unique directed path j → i.
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This kind of model can be developed and applied in many directions. In
Young [1998] the above ideas are developed further via the introduction of a spatial
model (in Chapter 6), looking at more general n-person games (in Chapter 7) and
bargaining (in Chapter 8). which includes the introduction of a limited sort of
heterogeneity. In Axtell et al. [2001] Axtel, Epstein and Young explore a model of
the evolution of conventions where certain members of the population have “tags”
(e.g. black, white) but are otherwise identical. While an equitable norm is the only
stochastically stable norm, a discriminatory norm may persist for many periods.
The concept they use to describe this is that of broken ergodicity : the process is
technically ergodic but may spend a lot of time in a far from asymptotic state.
In Young [2009] a simple framework for diffusion (where agents have a propensity
to adopt) is explored via three mechanisms: contagion, social influence and social
learning. This method will be used in chapter 6 in order to analyse the long run
behaviour of a set of economic models.
2.7 Agent-Based Modelling
Agent-Based Modelling is the creation of a computational model which simulate the
interactions of, potentially many, independent agents and their interactions in an
attempt to characterise the resulting behaviour of the systems as a whole. It is a
technique used within many disciplines including economics, computer science and
sociology. Agent-Based Computational approaches have been widely recognised as a
promising technique for general economic and organisational modelling, having been
featured recently in high profile publications such as The Economist (Economist
[2010]), the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Bonabeau [2002] and
Nature (Farmer and Foley [2009]). Agent-based models have been applied to a
wide range of practical problems from logistics to traffic modelling. The resource 50
Facts About Agent-Based Computing27, a commercial promotional document, gives
an attractive overview of many of the success stories and statistics related to real
applications of agent-based modelling.
The classic example of Agent-Based Modelling is the Schelling Segregation
model Schelling [1971]. In it there are two colours of agents. Each agent weakly
prefers to live in a neighbourhood consisting mostly of his own colour. If these agents
are initially randomly scattered across a landscape. When agents are unhappy they
move to a new location where they will be happy. Even though they would be happy
27From Agentlink, available from http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/
AgentLink.50CommercialApplic.MLuck.pdf, covers many commercial applications of agent-
based modelling.
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to live in a mixed neighbourhood, they quickly segregate into blocks of their own
colour.
In this section we look at some agent-based modelling work particularly in
relation to economics, though we also consider a few examples from further afield.
2.7.1 Early Agent-Based Models
The challenge of designing economic agents which behave the way actual humans
do is set out in Arthur [1991]; the idea being that we could represent agents via
parameterised decision algorithms chosen and calibrated such that their behaviour
matches human behaviour. It is accepted that a universal model is unlikely, but
it may be possible to achieve the goal for contexts. For the parameterised learn-
ing an automaton which uses a form of reinforcement learning is suggested with a
tuneable rate of learning. This automaton can be calibrated via experiments with
human subjects. Arthur considers the traditional economic expectation of conver-
gence to equilibrium and suggests that his automaton (and humans) may not always
converge.
While not, in its original conception, a model for financial markets Arthur
[1994] introduces a model which in a simplified form has become a major research
field for agent-based modelling of financial markets. The model introduced is the
‘El Farol Bar Problem’, where there are a set of agents who will enjoy going to the
El Farol bar, but only if less than sixty percent of all agents go; otherwise they
would prefer to stay at home. In this model traditional economic approaches do
not work well, as there is no ’rational’ solution28. The approach taken is to assume
that agents individually form k predictions of next week’s attendance from the last
d weeks. Examples of predictions given are:
• Same as last week
• Mirror image around 50 of last week’s attendance
• Bounded trend of last 8 weeks
• Same as m weeks ago (periodic)
Agents act on their most accurate predictor and update each week given the re-
sulting situations. This is then enacted as a computational experiment and it is
observed that mean attendance always converges to 60. The predictors self-organise
28There are mixed equilibrium solutions; however Arthur argues against this approach, as it
misses the point.
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into a kind of equilibrium where of those active around 40 percent predict above
60 attendance and around 60 percent predict below 60 attendance. This model
has subsequently been simplified in the form of the Minority Game: now an odd
number of agents choose between two options independently and want to be in the
minority. There have been literally hundreds of research papers on this topic and
it is widely seen to be ; Challet et al. [2005] includes both an introduction to and a
comprehensive collection of many major papers on the Minority Game.
In Arthur et al. [1997] an influential agent-based model of a stock market
is presented. We look at this work via the retrospective LeBaron [2002]. This
examines the development of the Santa Fe artificial stock market, one of the first
major attempts to build a (somewhat) detailed agent-based model of a financial
market. The initial artificial stock market model was one with a risk free asset and
a risky stock paying a dividend
dt = d+ ρ(dt−1 − d) + µt
where d, ρ are fixed parameters and µ ∼ N (0, σ2µ). Agents have individual expecta-
tions for the price change of the stock and for its variance. Using a classifier system
where agents’ decisions are formed from a series of bits, each corresponding to a
property of the market, such as a rule relating price, risk free interest and dividend.
Each agent has a set of 100 of such rules and there is no sharing of rules between
agents. A genetic algorithm is used by each agent such that periodically the twenty
worst performing rules are removed and replaced with new rules via both crossover
and mutation from their existing rules. This kind of individual based selection be-
tween rules is similar in style to Arthur [1994]. The model generates many features of
real financial data, specifically excess kurtosis in returns, low linear autocorrelation
and persistent volatility.
2.7.2 Agent-Based Modelling in Economics
In Tesfatsion [2006] a framework (“constructive approach”) is formulated for Agent-
Based Computational Economics (ACE). This is derived from the Walrasian equi-
librium framework, but with the “auctioneer” removed. Four major strands of ACE
work are identified:
1. Empirical understanding: why do global regularities persist despite lack of
central control and planning.
2. Normative understanding: can we discover good economic designs.
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3. Qualitative insight and theory generation: economic systems can be more
fully understood through systematic examination of potential dynamical be-
haviours.
4. Methodological advancement: programming, visualisation and validation tools
will have to be carefully considered.
Tesfatsion argues that agent-based tools allow for more realistic models of cognitive
agents than in ‘homo economus’ models. Events are wholly endogenous and driven
purely by agent interactions. But we need to construct dynamically complete eco-
nomic model, that is start with full initial conditions and then continue without
further exogenous events; to do this we must look at wide range of plausible ini-
tial specifications. Models are difficult to verify against empirical data due to the
contingency of empirical events.
Tesfatsion describes the general process by which we may replace Walrasian
“auctioneer” (or equivalents) by agent-based process. Something like the following
circular flow required:
1. Terms of Trade
2. Buyer-Seller matching
3. Rationing
4. Trade
5. Settlement
6. Shake-Out
We then must consider what concept of equilibrium or solution concept should be
used. A stationary-state is likely to be too strong for interesting models. Possible
alternatives include: unchanging carrying capacity, continual market clearing, un-
changing structure, fixed trade network, unchanging belief pattern and steady-state
growth pattern (constant rates of growth). However we may want a weakened form
of the one or more of the above.
This kind of constructive approach will have several key steps (an example
of procurement processes is given in section 4 of Tesfatsion [2006]):
1. Select as benchmark case an equilibrium economic model from literature that
is clearly presented and addresses some important issue
2. Remove every assumption which externally entails equilibrium condition
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3. Dynamically complete model by introducing trading/interactions between agents
in model
4. Define “equilibrium” for this complete model
We don’t have to impose rational expectations, but can incorporate realistic models
of learning. May introduce conventions and organisations to provide “scaffolding”.
In Axelrod [2006] examples are given where Agent-Based Modelling has been
used to facilitate interdisciplinary work, to look at problems which are mathemat-
ically intractable and where it has revealed unity across disciplines. Of particu-
lar interest are remarks on the difficulties of “selling” Agent-Based Modelling and
tentative standards for using this kind of technique, such as parameter values to
investigate.
In Judd [2006] some computational issues related to ACE are explored. The
main appeal of computational approaches is outlined: the elements previously sac-
rificed for simplicity can be investigated. He looks at two objections to numerical
approaches. Lack of generality: to which he argues that theories (really) look at a
“continuum of examples” (but perhaps a measure zero set of plausible/interesting
examples). Viewed this way, Judd argues that the relevance and robustness of ex-
amples is more important than the number. A second common objection, errors, is
dismissed, as when handled carefully these are negligible. But how can we system-
atically do computational (economic) research? We can’t (currently at least) prove
theorems using computers, but we can:
1. Search for counter examples to a proposition.
2. Use Monte Carlo sampling methods (which can be clearly expressed in terms
of classical or Bayesian statistics)
3. Use regression methods to obtain “shape” of some distribution.
4. Replication and generalisation – can perhaps straightforwardly adapt a com-
puter model to a new case, something which is often not at all straightforward
for a theorem.
How agents learn is a key aspect of Agent-Based Modelling. In Brenner [2006]
various learning processes are surveyed. The assumption is that we wish to model,
in an agent-based way, human behaviour as closely as possible; with a categorisation
adapted from the psychological literature. Economists are typically divided into two
camps vis a` vis learning: a desire that learning should converge towards optimal
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behaviour and those not so interested in optimality. Human learning, it is claimed,
can be split roughly into reinforcement learning and cognitive learning.
Three frequently used reinforcement learning models are: Bush-Moteller
model, the principle of melioration and the Roth-Erev model. In all models the
frequency of behaviours that lead to better results increases. Melioration works by
average past behaviour. The others assume change is determined by current out-
come together with previously determined frequency distribution; they only store
frequencies, not the entire past.
We can model routine based learning using techniques such as experimenta-
tion (trial and error), melioration/experience collection, imitation, satisficing (meet
an aspirational level), replicator dynamics and selection mutation equation, evolu-
tionary algorithms and combined models (for example experience weighted attrac-
tion, variation-imitation-decision).
And we can model beliefs via Fictitious Play (see section 2.6.2), Bayesian
Learning (the oldest and most prominent ‘optimal’ model), Least Squares Learn-
ing, Genetic Programming, Classifier Systems, Neural Networks, Rule Learning (i.e.
cognitive learning following same kind of process as reinforcement learning) and
Stochastic Belief Learning (information from own experience or communication,
when contradictory information obtained stochastically stick to old belief or not).
Brenner argues that in relation to routine versus belief learning the choice is
difficult and related to choice of realistic versus simple model which may be more
tractable. In choosing a model we should be capturing real learning process, obtain-
ing an outcome matching stylised facts and, perhaps, converging to equilibrium. In
assessing validity he argues experimental studies should provide main criteria, but
evidence not always available and laboratory results may not apply to real world.
We want effective description of resultant behaviour, even if details contradict psy-
chology. Simple models are generally good (not over-fitted) but bad (as learning
processes can be complicated) and unnecessary as current computer power means
that we may be able to look at large number of parameters.
His practical recommendations include the suggestion that evolutionary ap-
proaches are good for population level results though perhaps not individual dynam-
ics. Fictitious Play (see above) is both simple and supported by evidence and thus
recommended. In terms of belief learning he suggests that more research needed.
It seems like Fictitious Play and rule learning recommended as simpler solutions;
stochastic belief learning is good if more information about beliefs is available.
In LeBaron and Tesfatsion [2008] the idea of modelling macroeconomic pro-
cesses via systems of interacting agents is surveyed. Emphasis is placed on work
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which carries out some kind of empirical validation, through for example matching
agent-level behaviour with people’s behaviour.
In LeBaron [2001] specific guidance is given for the construction of models
of financial markets; these are well organised, centralised and dynamic. To design a
model one must think about the key areas of trade (do we assume simple response to
excess demand, build market such that local equilibrium price can be found easily
or explicitly model dynamics of trading in attempt to approximate real world?),
securities, evolution, calibration and time (there are problems with how to deal
with the past, the relative rates of change and the issue of concurrency).
2.7.3 Agent-Based Modelling in other disciplines
I have looked at some approaches to agent-based modelling in other disciplines such
as computer science and sociology. Often the goals and basic questions are quite
different to those we may wish to ask in an economic context, however, some of the
methods used may be similar.
Some of the most relevant work in computer science looks at issues of trust
and information exchange, such as Nowak and Sigmund [2005], which offers an
indirect explanation for reciprocal behaviour without individual benefit, and Grif-
fiths [2006], which looks at the idea of multidimensional trust in a peer to peer
agent-based system where production takes place in a cooperate way. The issues of
decentralisation and information are typically given a more explicit treatment than
in economics models.
Looking at sociology and picking two illustrative examples we can clearly see
the contrast with computer science. Edmonds et al. [2009] use the idea of “tags”
(a socially distinctive mark not hardwired to any particular trait) and shows how
reasonably robust cooperation can emerge in various systems. Yang and Gilbert
[2008] is an example of an attempt at quantitative Agent-Based Modelling which
connects an ethnographic investigation to agent-based modelling highlighting danger
of adding concretisation to model and suggesting that networks of agents may prove
to be useful class of models.
Another key distinction to draw from the above examples, and which holds
more generally, is that agent-based work in computer science typically has a much
stronger focus on the design of efficient, autonomous systems of various kinds;
whereas in economics and sociology the interest is typically in building models of
societies or markets. This kind of distinction in approach is important when con-
sidering the kind building agent-based modelling methodologies as in chapter ??:
the kind of tools suitable for economics or social agent-based modelling are quite
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different to those which might be suitable for most computer science agent-based
modelling (or multi-agent systems) work.
2.7.4 Economic theory and Agent-Based Modelling
Herbert Gintis has developed and brought together two areas of work relevant to my
research. The first is his agent-based modelling work, which is quite basic, though
does ask interesting economic questions. The second is his theoretical work which
attempts among other objectives to unify the behaviour sciences(!)
In Gintis [2006, 2007a] the dynamical properties of variants of classical mod-
els of economies are examined using an agent-based modelling approach. The key
innovation of this work is the proposal of a decentralised mechanism which leads
to convergence of pricing from a far from equilibrium situation. How convincing
and substantial Gintis’ framework really is will be examined, but his approach is
very relevant to this thesis and some of the work is in some sense parallel to that of
chapter 3.
The first of his papers Gintis [2006] focuses on a barter29 economy. This
provides a simple setting in which to examine and compare approaches. Gintis’
basic barter economy consists of n goods and N >> n agents each of whom produces
one of the goods and consumes all of the goods. The utility function of an agent
i who consumes goods xi = (xi1, . . . , x
i
n) is u
i = minj
xij
oj
where o = (o1, . . . , on) is
constant for all agents. That is, with respect to utility agents are homogeneous.
Each agent has a “private” price vector, giving his relative evaluation of each good,
pi = (pi1, . . . , p
i
n) which he uses to make and accept or decline offers of trade made
by other agents. In each period each agent produces n units of his production good.
Given this specification, bartering takes place in a series of periods in a
process quite different to the major bartering formulations such as Rubenstein bar-
gaining which introduces the notion of time and a penalty for delaying agreement.
However, an alternative approach is demanded by the modelling approach Gintis
adopts. His bargaining process is basically to randomly order each good, then each
agent; in this order agents visit producers of a good attempting to carry out trades
until some limit on offers has been reached. The agent consumes or holds onto
the good he has obtained, and a score is calculated using the utility function given
above. This is repeated for every agent.
29A barter economy is an economy where exchanges of goods or services take place simultaneously,
without using money. The key consideration here is the relative evaluation agents, or some central
coordinating body places on goods. Bartering is generally divided into axiomatic and strategic
theory: the former is a more general set of results, the later focusing on more specific kinds of
scenarios.
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The key question here is how trades are made. If offers are made in terms
of the agent’s “private” price vector (its strategy) then the change in goods held
must meet the constraint M0 = p
i · xi(0) = pi · xi (where xi(0) is the amount of
each good an agent holds before trading). So the agents should attempt to trade for
the quantities that would optimise their utility given this constraint. The optimal
amount to attempt to trade for will be
xij = λ
∗oj
where
λ∗ =
M0∑
j p
i
joj
.
Given the above, the agent producing good a and trading for b will make an offer of
quantities xa, xb of his good and good to trade for via the ratio obtained by setting
piaxa = p
i
bxb. This offer will either be rejected, partially fulfilled or entirely fulfilled
- which occur respectively when it fails to meet the evaluation of the receiver, when
the receiver does not have the requested quantity and when he does. Offers are
repeatedly made as outlined previously and the success of the trading is evaluated
via the utility function. The economy which has been describe above does not remain
static. The ‘private’ prices evolve via a mutation-imitation evolutionary dynamic.
After a fixed number of periods a fraction of low scoring agents copy the strategies
of high scoring agents with a small mutation. For fuller details of the model see
Gintis [2006].
There seems to be fundamental problems with Gintis’ proposed framework.
The key idea is that of private prices, but on close inspection this notion is quite
weak: the suggestion that they represent ‘private information’ is misleading. In
formulating bids the prices must be revealed, but even more problematically they
are copied by other weakly performing agents. Furthermore to be able to formulate
bids the agents must ‘know’ enough to derive the equilibrium prices in any case
(at least in the most basic form of the model). A better description would be
‘individual’s price’. The evolutionary framework is in some ways standard but it is
not convincingly justified in the context of this work; in particular imitation conflicts
with the notion of privacy of prices. It is difficult to see how one could approach
Gintis’ framework in an analytic way. While one can derive the optimal pricing;
this is only the case for the basic framework. It would be ideal if an alternative
framework could be formulated that was more analytically tractable, though this is
perhaps too ambitious a goal.
In Bilancini and Petri [2008] two key findings of Gintis [2007a] are criticised:
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1. the claim that the results justify “the importance of the Walrasian model in
contemporary economic theory”
2. “models which allow [agents] to imitate successful others lead to an economy
with a reasonable level of stability and efficiency.”
One objection – the possibility of multiplicity of equilibria – is noted, but a more
fundamental objection, namely that Gintis does not really include capital goods (but
rather some “indestructible, non-produced factor”), forms the focus of Bilancini and
Petri [2008]. That Gintis’ results are not generalisable to models including capital
goods – something which for all their problems, Walrasian models are, moreover
it is in these generalisations we are typically interested in – means that claim (1)
doesn’t really hold. It is argued claim (2) will hold, but only in economies without
capital. Furthermore the difficulty of introducing investment decisions to a Gintis-
style model is pointed out.
Using the notion of stochastic stability Young [2008] Mandel and Botta Man-
del and Botta [2009] explore equilibrium selection in a simplified form of Gintis’
model. As in Gintis’ formulation each agent is homogeneous (at least in terms of
utility function). Noting that in this economy any price is an equilibrium price (no
excess demand), they propose a minimal trading equilibrium. They consider instead
of price pricing a selection of market institutions within which to perform exchange.
Gintis [2010] is a refined version of his two previous work in Gintis [2006, 2007a],
though many of the same weaknesses are still present.
In his text Gintis [2009a] (see also the abridged form in paper Gintis [2007b])
Gintis develops a five fold framework to unify the behavioural sciences: gene-culture
coevolution, sociopsychological theory of norms, game theory, rational actor model
(or Beliefs, Preferences, Constraints model) and complexity theory. The book is very
much an economist’s take on offering a unified framework for the social sciences, it
would most likely not be accepted by other disciplines, much fully less understood.
Together with Samuel Bowles he has produced another text Bowles and Gintis [2010]
which approaches things from a more biological/sociological angle.
2.8 Networks
The use of a network as a modelling tool for societies and complex organisations is
becoming increasingly common. In a network model there are a set of vertices, which
could represent for example people, and a set of edges representing connections, for
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example social relations. Networks provide a simple, computationally workable30
way of modelling a wide range of phenomena, but one which allows modellers to keep
the important details in the model. By explicitly capturing interactions between
parts of a system, they are a natural tool to use for the modelling of complex
systems.
A wide variety of sources exist for the well established mathematical the-
ory of networks, see for example Newman [2008] for a starting point. Most of the
relevant definitions are standard to network theory. So we draw on typical defini-
tions of graphs, edges, nodes; represent them via adjacency matrices, have weighted
networks, directed networks; nodes have degrees (number of edges), clustering (pro-
portion of “friends who are also friends”). One key one which comes from Economics
is the notion of pairwise stability : no player would be better off if she severed one
of her links and no pair would benefit from adding a link. The relationship between
stability defined in this way and efficiency varies.
Jackson [2010c] offers a recent overview of work in social and economic net-
works. Networks, he argues, provide a more realistic framework for markets that
might otherwise be conceived of as centralised. Labour markets are one area where
networks have been extensively applied. Networks have also been used for the mod-
elling of learning and diffusion. He reviews the main mathematical concepts and
introduces small world networks; clustering is a key way of looking at structure
and homophily a key way of looking at how links depend on other characteristics
of nodes. The study of network formation is a key part of the economic study of
networks.
Jackson [2008] provides a concise overview of the main ideas from the per-
spective of Economics. Random networks studied typically of form of Poisson ran-
dom networks: a link between i and j is formed with probability independent of all
other such links. The resultant degree of any given node is thus binomial and well
approximated by the Poisson distribution. Small world networks also a key area of
study, here a regular network is rewired randomly and there is large range of pa-
rameters where network is both highly clustered but also has low average distance.
Other models often considered include preferential attachment models and richer
sequential link formation models.
Jackson highlights several areas where networks have an impact: diffusion,
learning and bargaining/trade – where we introduce a cost to establishing trading
relationships and so we no longer get Pareto optimal outcomes. There may be a
30http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social network analysis software provides a comprehen-
sive, though far from exhaustive, list of software packages for network modelling and analysis of
social networks.
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significant Price of Anarchy31.
Diffusion from a strategic perspective is focused on in Jackson and Yariv
[2010], where models for marketing, collective action and fads are surveyed. They
move on to look at a variety of models embedded in a social setting utilising a unified
framework where we have a finite set of agents connected by a network with binary
actions (e.g. infected or not); they look at infection modelling, graphical games
(games where payoff depends on their own actions and those of direct neighbours)
and perhaps most relevantly for the work here dynamics, albeit via the study of
equilibria.
The survey paper Jackson [2010b] looks at both epidemiological-style diffu-
sion and recent strategic diffusion models. It first examines empirical work, sum-
marising many of the interesting results in terms of correlation with ones social
network and identifying the challenges of disentangling the effects of homophily and
in unobserved commonalities in nodes (typically individuals). Various asymptotic
results are summarised for networks and diffusion. Then strategic results are in-
troduced. Section 4.5 looks at dynamic results on networks, though this is a little
developed area within Economics.
In Kirman et al. [2007] network formation is examined using a boundedly
(spatially myopic) self interested evaluation of the marginal contribution an agent
will make; but the key feature is that this calculation is limited to some level of
neighbours i.e. just immediate potential neighbours (level 1), also to neighbour’s
neighbours (level 2) and so on. It turns out agents only need to look at level 2 as
no further levels will improve upon outcomes. (Here we use a directed network and
consider networks g ⊂ gN , where gN is set of networks ignoring links which are only
unidirectional.)
Section 10.3 of Jackson [2010a] the work on markets on networks is surveyed.
Bilateral trading networks have been constructed Corominas-Bosch [2004] using the
idea of alternating offers bargaining in two-sided markets (buyers and sellers on a
bipartite network) and finding an equilibrium where agents are very patient (that is
as temporal discounting tends to zero (δ → 1)). In simple cases gains from trade are
competed away to zero by the side with more agents. An inductive decomposition
algorithm can be used to find limiting payoffs for more complex network structures
which seemingly gives a good prediction of results from experiments Charness et al.
[2007]. Jackson [2010a] also gives further examples of networked trading.
31The game theoretic notion of the price of anarchy, that is of the ratio of global utility between
the worst Nash equilibrium outcome and social optimal, is a major concept with the computer
science study of game theory, in particular on networks. It is surprisingly rare in the economics
literature.
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A graph-theoretic version of the classical Arrow-Debreu General Equilibrium
model is formulated in Kakade et al. [2004]. There are a set of commodities, con-
sumers (with endowments and utility functions) and a vector of prices. We have
goods good(i, h) which is traditional good h sold by consumer i. We have trade
restrictions modelled via an undirected graph over consumers. Each consumer has
a local price vector pi, the prices at which each consumer is selling. Trade is bud-
get constrained if the endowment is completely sold and value is less than sum
of purchases. They look for two properties at equilibrium: consumer rationality
and market clearance. Assuming utilities are continuous, strictly monotonic in ev-
ery good and quasi-concave32 and we have non-zero endowments then a “graphical
equilibrium” exists.
We consider use explicit network models in chapter 4. An explicit network
model may be one way of considering the kind of communities/economies we consider
in chapter 6, though we do not adopt this approach, though in the penultimate
section of chapter 6 we do consider agents on a lattice, which is a particular form of
regularly connected network.
2.9 Evolution and Economics
An empirical approach to trying to identify what evolutionary economic research ac-
tivity has taken place is carried out by Silva and Teixeira in Silva and Teixeira [2009]
who use bibliometic methods to tackle the problem. The identify two extreme posi-
tions: “history of economic thought and methodology” and “games”. They highlight
the lack of empirically-related work (1.4% from 1982-1991, 3.1% from 2002-2005).
They claim that the use of evolutionary concepts has been increasingly associated
with formal theorising; behind this “stands [...] a considerable amount of work on
complex dynamical systems through computed simulation”. Evolutionary publica-
tions in top rated journals restricted to ‘games’ work.
A survey of some of the varying techniques used by ‘evolutionary’ economics
is given in Safarzynska and van den Bergh [2009]. Various modelling techniques
have been used. Evolutionary game theory originates from the work of Maynard
Smith and Price; with the interactions of boundedly rational players, random se-
lection of individuals, little or no informations about game. Here evolutionarily
stable strategies is typically the central concept. Various selection dynamics, but
replicator dynamics dominates (population frequency varies with payoffs). Other
options include best response, imitation and mutator dynamics. Mutation can offer
32If ui(y) > ui(x) then ui(αy + (1− α)x) > ui(x).
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stochastic perturbation. Evolutionary Computation for example genetic algorithms,
genetic programming, evolutionary programming, learning classifier systems. There
is some kind of search process for better solutions. Multiagent Models See else-
where in this document for a thorough introduction. The paper also outlines some
“building blocks”. Diversity is central to evolutionary modelling: we must have a
heterogeneous population. We may also have innovation. Selection in some form is
also fundamental. Bounded rationality and explicit modelling of decision processes
often included. We may also have (related to selection) diffusion of behaviours/tech-
nologies/... already present in the economy. Evolutionary processes may be path
dependent and lock in to trajectories. Coevolution e.g. of demand and supply may
be modelled along with multi-level selection. The paper concludes that there is un-
likely to be convergence in building blocks and modelling techniques for evolutionary
economics in the near future.
In Laslier a simple “Walrasian” market is examined. The key changes to
the traditional model are decentralisation, “adaptive rationality” and sequentiality.
Agents assess performance on comparison with previous results, reasoning on the
basis of information available to them from environment (“situated rationality”).
Simulation results are given for a labour market. And this framework generalised
to a wider class of models. The main difficulty reported is in generalising to groups
of markets.
In Mirowski [2007] a way of thinking about markets is explicated. Mirowski
defines a market as software which carries out functions like: data assimilation and
communication, order routing, queuing and execution, price discovery and assign-
ment, record keeping and so on. He lists five areas which have looked at markets as
comptutational entities: mechanism design, zero-Intelligence Agent canon33, “mar-
ket microstructure” within finance, “engineering economics” and the artificial intel-
ligence literature where it deals with markets. He argues that all these approaches
fail to properly apprehend the evolutionary nature of markets and then proposes
his idea of the markomata, rejecting the call for a model arguing that it would be
equivalent to giving a general model for evolution or a computer, though he does
provide a rough framework with reference to hierarchies of languages/automata. If
we take his theory seriously Mirowski identifies a number of empirical consequences.
In summary Mirowski [2007] is an interesting if highly speculative paper. A fuller
history is offered in the (rather long, initially highly readable) Machine Dreams
Mirowski [2002].
An account of evolutionary microeconomics is given in Jacques Lesourne
33“Canon” is exaggeration or irony.
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and Walliser [2006]. Of particular interest is chapter five on mimetic interactions.
Imitation is classified into
1. Informational: A imitates B who he assumes knows more.
2. Normative: conformance because of threat of punishment or existence of es-
tablished norm.
3. Preferential: utility function of both individual and collective (of group) utility.
A model of binary choices is developed and numerical results presented. Some
grand claims about mimetic scenarios conclude the chapter: multiple equilibria the
rule rather than exception, frontiers between disciplines questioned, socioeconomics
rejuvenated and more need for empirical work.
In the final two chapters of Gintis [2009b] Gintis examines dynamical frame-
works for evolutionary game theory. The first introduces the idea of a replicator
dynamic; essentially the relative frequency of a strategy increases if it has an above
average payoff. One can generalise this idea to multiple dimensions.
2.10 Polarisation and Segregation
In chapter 6 I create a set of models for polarisation and/or segregation, applying
many of the insights and methods from earlier chapters. In this section we look
at some of the existing related work in this area. We focus on work related to
microeconomic modelling of development, particularly complexity issues such as the
influence of neighbours (local interactions).
2.10.1 Concepts and Context
Durlauf and Young [2001] brings together a wide variety of perspectives and ap-
proaches to the general area of social dynamics including attempts to describe gen-
eral approaches, work from H. Peyton Young (we have already described the general
approach featured in this volume) and Samuel Bowles (another researcher we have
already featured previously in this chapter). Though it also includes ideas ranging
from econometrics to a sort of game-theoretic approach to political philosophy.
Fernandez [2008] offers a survey of some of the various ways to think about
culture and economics, defining culture as the systematic variation across groups
of individuals separated by space. Neoclassical economics has largely ignored cul-
ture but some recent efforts have been made by economists to answer the question
of “whether culture matters?” There is some empirical evidence (e.g. difference
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in economic experimental results across countries) and varying approaches survey,
epidemiological approach (based on immigrants) and historical case studies.
So how does one incorporate culture into standard models? Fernandez [2008]
suggests that it is “definitely” not necessary to modify the standard economic model;
we can instead think of societal preferences as a choice of equilibrium strategy34.
Though this claim seems inconsistent with later comments about the blurring of
preferences and beliefs. The survey concludes with a list of difficulties with empirical
work on culture. The volume Rao and Walton [2004] offers and interdisciplinary
perspectives on the role culture plays in development.
In Appadurai [2004] the question of why culture matters for development and
the reduction of poverty is examined. The key idea of this essay is that ideas of the
future are embedded and nourished in culture, whereas the typical approaches focus
on the “pastness” of culture. The key question is then how to build the capacity to
aspire, considered as a cultural capacity.
We can think of capacity to aspire as a dense combination of nodes and
pathways in a map of aspirations nurtured by real world conjectures and refutations.
An extensive case study is given of a group which has managed to mobilise its
capacity to aspire and in doing so has changed the terms of recognition (an alliance
of housing activists in Mumbai). The essay also offers concrete steps in how to build
the capacity to aspire.
The influential Wilkinson and Pickett [2009] is a recent accessible argument
that inequality is responsible for a multitude of social problems; of particular interest
is the third chapter which summarises work looking at how inequality may have
dramatic psychological effects on individuals. This is focused on the idea that we
have a certain relative status or class position and the dramatic psychological effects
which this can have. Many studies have shown that we are more anxious than
we used to be, for example Twenge [2000] which summarises work on changes in
overall threat levels, economic conditions and social connectedness over time. Meta-
analyses of existing studies showed a substantial linear increase in anxiety, with the
cohort effect explaining a large proportion of the variance. While many statistics
for social conditions correlated well with anxiety, economic conditions did not once
other major factors were controlled for. The key conclusion is that people must feel
safe and connected to others if they are have low levels of anxiety.
A key aspect of feeling secure is the lack of “social evaluative threat”; appar-
ently the three most powerful sources of stress which effect health are “low social
34Gintis adopts a somewhat similar position vis a vis what culture might be i.e. different selected
equilibria, but offers a convincing case that the “standard model” needs to be modified.
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status, lack of friends and stress in early life”. The sociologist Thomas Scheff goes
as far as call shame the social emotion, where shame is “the self ’s perception of the
evaluation of the self by other(s). In Scheff [1988] he presents a theory of how this
leads to compulsion to obey exterior norms.
The work in the above subsection is a few highlights of features which tend
not to be included in economic models. While chapter 7 by no means addresses
these issues in full if provides a framework which is more amenable to modelling
this kind of phenomena.
2.10.2 Growth, innovation and technological change
Neoclassical macroeconomic approaches to growth assume growth levels are deter-
mined by an exogenous scientific process which runs independently of economic ac-
tivity. The basic form is AK theory which in its simplest form (where the marginal
product of capital is constant) has aggregate output
Y = AK
where A is constant, K capital level. In this formulation what matters is the saving
rate s; growth rate will be
g =
1
Y
dY
dt
= sA− δ
where δ is a depreciation constant.
Many more sophisticated models have followed under the titles like innovation-
based theory in the early nineties from economists such as Romer, Aghion and
Howitt. For a fuller account Howitt [2008] is a good starting point. But typically
this kind of work has been in a sense quite simplistic, particularly with respect to
micro-macro relationships.
The recent Arthur [2009] explores the (surprisingly) little studied explored
notion of a general theory of technology and technological change. Technologies are
combinations of elements which are themselves technologies; they use phenomena
for purposes, they ’program’ nature (phenomena) for a goal. From technologies
arise other technologies via combinatorial evolution. Arthur connects his concepts
of evolving technology to an evolving economy and develops a conceptual framework
for thinking about technology.
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2.10.3 Aspiration and decisions
Nowhere, one might argue, is a traditional economic approach, with its emphasis
on equilibrium solutions, less suited that in the modelling of fundamental socio-
economic changes. Below we explore some of the existing work in economics which
build (at least somewhat) dynamic models for this purpose or which include features
such as segregation, polarisation and aspiration.
Genicot and Ray examine how individuals react to aspirations and how as-
pirations are formed in Genicot and Ray [2009]. An infinite number of families
with one individual per generations which has utilities round a reference point
(an “aspiration”). Income yt = ct + kt (consumption plus investment in child),
such that yt+1 = f(kt). This is standard; the key idea is that utility is given by
u(ct) + Ω(yt+1, at) where at is the aspiration at time t and
Ω(z, a) = v(z) + w(z/a)
where v is intrinsic utility of target income and w depends increasingly on ration of
income to aspirations.
They assume that without aspirations welfare of children not fully inter-
nalised and obtain results:
1. Target ration is increasing in aspirations ration
2. If aspirations unattained growth rates locally increasing in aspirations ratio
The really interesting question is how aspirations are formed. They consider
aspirations formed as a result of ambient income distribution perhaps a prediction
of the next generation’s incomes or perhaps from neighbourhoods.
In Esteban and Ray [2008] a model is proposed with m groups, ni the share
of the population in each group and a distance δij between groups i and j. In
equilibrium the level of conflict can be very well represented by a linear function
of inequality, fractionalisation and polarisation. The more recent Esteban and Ray
[2010] explores similar ideas in this case where we have contests: agents can challenge
system with probability of winning given by normalisation of contributions from
each group, or accept the probabilistic payoff given by the system. Conflict occurs
when one group receives less than it could by precipitating non-cooperation; however
once we consider both occurrence and intensity of conflict, the relationship between
polarisation, fractionalisation and conflict is non-linear as costly conflict may not be
undertaken even under undesirable systems.
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The more recent Mookherjee et al. [2010] brings together some of the authors’
previous work and work from Bowles et al. [2009]. Both present equilibrium models
of segregation and the resultant outcomes for society; both have some kind of skill
accumulation which is a rational decision in equilibrium about whether to acquire
high skills, where the cost of attaining these depends on an individual (intrinsic)
skill factor and a local (geographic) factor. In Bowles et al. [2009] their are a set of
groups (or equivalently regions; two is the case most extensively considered) whereas
in Mookherjee et al. [2010] there is a geographic continuum; both consider models
with a continuum of agents. We look in more detail at Bowles et al. [2009] below.
In Dalton and Ghosal [2010a] a model for decisions is proposed which at-
tempts to deal with situations where individual’s choices do not reflect what is best
for them. Decisions are made relative to a reference point; an individual may inter-
nalise the effect of her choices on her psychological state, or may not. In the former
case she choose an action and psychological state which maximises true best inter-
est, a standard decision problem, or she may take as given her psychological state, a
behaviour decision problem. Examples where these diverge including a student and
motivation to study, default options and a smoker are given.
In this work we have a decision scenario D = (A,P, pi) with A actions, P
psychological states and map pi from A→ P of feedback from A to P ; where agents
can rank over A × P . Various analytical results can be derived characterising the
testability and other properties of solutions, the policy implications are discussed
and the model is related to literature within social psychology and philosophy.
In Dalton and Ghosal [2010b] this kind of model is used to frame poverty
and aspirations. Instead of exogenous poverty traps, endogenous factors play an
important role, perhaps along with exogenous factors such as initial circumstances.
Aspirations are a function of chosen actions; this may be internalised or not. They
may use interpersonal comparisons (perhaps only with similar individuals) in setting
aspirations.
Intergenerational transfer of wealth is investigated for “small-scale” societies
in Mulder et al. [2009]. The transmission varies greatly with agricultural/pastoral
communities being comparable to those developed countries with strongest inheri-
tance of inequalities such as the USA and Italy, whereas hunter-gatherer/horticultural
communities are comparable to Nordic social democratic countries.
If we are thinking about how agents might determine an action via a learning
process a natural technique which goes beyond the typical mean field approaches
is to consider learning weighted by similarity. An objective formulation based on
the notion of empirical similarity is outlined in Gilboa et al. [2010]. Probabilities
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are estimated empirically based on the similarity of an event to past events. The
model uses a weighted euclidean distance; using the negative exponential of this as
the corresponding similarity. This method is ill suited for identifying trends in data
or where deduction could be used. Another key issue is if and when the similarity
function should be updated.
In chapter 6 we consider in detail some work specifically relevant to the
approaches adopted there but the above provides a general introduction and context
for the work in chapter 6.
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Chapter 3
Decentralised Exchange
3.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the limiting properties of out-of-equilibrium dynamics with de-
centralized exchange, that is bilateral bargaining between randomly matched pairs
of agents1. When agents have perfect foresight, the equilibrium outcomes of de-
centralized exchange have been used to provide strategic foundations for compet-
itive equilibria, see for example Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1985]; Gale [1986a,b];
McLennan and Sonnenschein [1991]; Gale and Sabourian [2005]. In this chapter,
starting from an out-of-equilibrium trading scenario, the conditions under which
out-of-equilibrium trading convergences to efficient allocations are characterised,
and, numerically, the rate of convergence to efficient allocations is examined.
Agents are assumed to be myopic, have limited information about other
agents and trading histories and engage in experimentation entailing utility losses
relative to current holdings. Under assumptions on preferences that ensure pair wise
optimal allocations are also Pareto optimal, it is shown that limit allocations must
be efficient as long as traders trade cautiously (are aware they propose and accept
trades that improve their utility evaluated at their current holdings subject to a
small utility loss which is almost surely bounded over time), the proposals made
are drawn from a distribution that satisfies a minimum probability weight condi-
tion and the underlying trading process is connected (any pair of agents meet with
positive probability after any history of matches). Two examples are constructed
to show that trade may not converge to an efficient allocation if either the mini-
mum probability weight condition fails to be satisfied or traders do not experiment2.
1Our set-up could be interpreted as modelling exchange in barter economies where the underlying
fundamentals are stationary.
2An example of such a setting is the exchange economy studied by Scarf [1959] with a unique
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Straightforwardly, the results extend to the case of production once Rader’s principle
of equivalence Rader [1976] is invoked.
Numerically, in economies where agents’ preferences can be represented by
Cobb-Douglass utility functions, we show that the rate of convergence to efficient
allocations is exponential even as both the number of agents and the number of
commodities are varied. We are also able to show, numerically, that the distribution
of initial wealth and final wealth (initial and final endowments evaluated at limit
prices) have a linear relationship with each other.
In our model of decentralised exchange, the map from action profiles to prices
and allocations is well-defined out-of-equilibrium; in fact there is no ‘equilibrium
path’ or equivalent concept as for this kind of model to be considered strategically
we would have to make onerous and implausible demands on information and coor-
dination. So properties of the dynamics studied by us can be explicitly related to
the behaviour of agents. In contrast, classical approaches, for example Arrow and
Hahn [1971], whether taˆtonnement (without explicit out-of-equilibrium trading) or
non-taˆtonnement (with explicit out-of-equilibrium trading)- suffer from the prob-
lem that the price adjustment and allocation dynamics isn’t explicitly based on the
behaviour of agents. Such conceptual problems have important consequences. For
example, taˆtonnement dynamics may not always converge. Moreover, to construct
a convergent non-taˆtonnement dynamics typically requires that the preferences of
agents be known.
Various attempts have been made to model trade in decentralised economies.
Early results Feldman [1973]; Rader [1976] characterise the conditions required for
for a decentralised bilateral exchange economy to converge to a Pareto Optimal al-
location. Goldman and Starr [1982] derives generalised versions of these results for
k-lateral exchange where exchange happens between groups of k agents. An alter-
native approach is the assumption of “zero intelligence” Gode and Sunder [1993].
Here there are a variety of computer agents, one form of which simply makes random
offers subject to a budget constraint. They speculate that the “efficient” outcomes
are due to the double auction market structure under investigation. Another an-
gle is taken by Foley’s work on statistical equilibrium, for example Foley [1999],
which models an economy via discrete flows of classes, that is homogeneous classes
of traders entering a market who have discrete sets of trades they wish to carry
out. The result is probability distributions over trades, so as in our process agents
competitive equilibrium that is globally unstable under taˆtonnement dynamics. It is shown that
in an example adapted from Scarf [1959], if traders do not experiment, trading fails to converge to
efficient allocations. However, once trading is augmented to allow agents to experiment and such
experimentation is almost surely bounded, convergence to an efficient allocation occurs.
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with identical initial endowments may end up with different final allocations, but
as in the many Walrasian frameworks, but unlike our approach, the trading process
remains an unspecified black box. More recently Gale [2000] has approached an out
of equilibrium economy with a model with decentralized exchange in the special case
with two commodities and quasi-linear utility functions.
Axtell [2005] has explored decentralised exchange from a computational com-
plexity perspective. He argues that the Walrasian auctioneer picture of exchange is
not computationally feasible, while decentralised exchange is. While this adopts a
somewhat decentralised (possibly bilateral perspective) it assumes a high level of in-
formation in the groups which are bargaining (essentially a Pareto optimal outcome
for that group is directly calculated) and seems to sidestep the issue of coordinating
the matching of these groups.
In a related contribution Fisher [1981] studied a model of general equilibrium
stability in which agents are aware they are not at equilibrium. In this chapter, in
contrast to Fisher [1981] we do not require agents to hold their expectations with
certainty and we allow for price setting by individual agents. Herbert Gintis has
looked at an agent-based model of both an exchange economy Gintis [2006] and gen-
eral equilibrium economy Gintis [2007a] although the dynamics in his models, driven
by evolutionary selection, are limited to quite homogeneous agents (for example, in
his exchange economy agents all have the same linear utility functions).
3.2 The model
We consider individuals who are aware they are in an out-of-equilibrium state and
thus realise they may make mistakes if they were to attempt to condition their
current trade based on their future expectations. In response to this agents may
only accept trades which improve upon their current holdings or which disimprove
in a limited way. We assume that the process is connected, that is at every time any
given pair of agents will attempt exchange at some point in the future. We call this
process, in a connected exchange economy, cautious trading and specify fully below.
After the specification of the model, analytical results are presented. Examples
clarifying the key conditions follow. The end of this section presents proofs of the
previously presented results and shows how the model can incorporate production.
3.2.1 Specification of model
There are individuals I = {1, . . . , i, . . . , I}, commodities J = {1, . . . , j, . . . , J} and
endowments eji ∈ R, eji > 0 of commodity j for individual i. Trade takes place in
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periods t ∈ T = {1, 2, . . .} and we write the bundle of commodities belonging to
individual i at time t as xit and restrict these to positive bundles (you can only
trade what you currently have). Agents have strictly increasing real valued utility
functions ui(xit) which are defined for all non-negative consumption bundles
3.
In each period t two agents are matched at random with equal probability
that any particular pair will be selected. We will assume that once a pair is matched
the two agents put up all their current holdings for exchange. One agent, the
proposer, which without loss of generality is m, proposes a non-positive4 trade zt to
a responder n such that:
xjmt > −zjt > −xjnt ∀j (3.1)
and
um(xmt + zt) > um(xmt)− hm. (3.2)
The first condition is just that the trade would leave m and n with positive
quantities of each good. The second condition is that the trade is utility increasing
for m or disimproves by at most hm. The responder, n, will accept the trade if it
improves his utility or disimproves by at most hn, that is
un(xnt − zt) > un(xnt)− hn. (3.3)
but reject it otherwise (in which case no trade takes place)5. The maximum
disimprovement terms hm, hn will be fully specified shortly.
Note that the requirement that agents put up all their current holdings ap-
plies to a wide variety of cases. Firstly no agent is likely to have an incentive to
conceal his holdings; an agent is free to reject any offer that is put on the table
and by concealing some of his holdings the agent reduces the probability of generat-
ing a mutually improving trade6. Secondly a wide variety of conceptions of markets
3Formally, the trading dynamics we study in this chapter has the feature that agents do not
consume till trade stops. However, following Ghosal and Morelli [2004], note that a reinterpretation
of our model so that agents trade durable goods that generate consumption flows within each period
will allow for both consumption and trade.
4That is not simply proposing a gift: it must be an actual exchange.
5The critical requirements are that two agents are randomly matched and a non-negative trading
proposal is generated. We adopt a proposer-responder formalisation as for the later numerical work
a concrete process must be specified, but a wide variety of processes are essentially equivalent to
the process above. For example, the proposal could be generated by a third party.
6Analytically for the below convergence results we could work with a weaker condition, an upper
bound on trade proposals, but the form presented here will turn out to be numerically convenient,
something we will return to in section 3.3.
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would make an agent’s holding’s public knowledge and this is a stronger requirement
than the framework presented here which only requires that the proposer knows his
current holdings, his utility function and the responder’s holdings.
For the analytical results presented in this section attention is focused on the
solution concept of k−wise optimality. An allocation X = (x1, . . . ,xI) is pairwise
optimal if there exists no way of redistributing bundles between any pair m,n that
would make at least one strictly better off, while making the other at least as well
off. This notion can be generalised to k−wise optimality in the obvious way. If k = I
(that is if it equals the total number of agents in the economy) then one would be
considering Pareto optimality. The formulation of these concepts used here is drawn
from Goldman and Starr [1982].
Let us assume that the proposals are drawn at random from the set of all
proposals Z that meet the conditions specified in equations 3.1 and 3.2, such that
there is a strictly positive probability of choosing a proposal within any open set
X ⊂ Z. Furthermore we will assume that the random choice of a new proposal
will satisfy the following minimal probability weight condition: there exists some
c ∈ (0, 1] such that for all periods t the probability of choosing a proposal from
any open subset X of Z is greater than cp where p is the probability of choosing a
proposal in X if we choose from a multivariate uniform random distribution over Z.
We could actually use the weaker condition that for some strictly positive proportion
of periods the original condition holds, however (at least with respect to analytical
results) this would in effect mean ignoring the other periods. In section 3.2.3 we
show how that without this condition it is possible to take any well behaved process
and map it to one which has a strictly positive probability of never converging,
despite possibly having positive probability of making a successful trade in every
period.
A benchmark process that satisfies the above conditions and which will satisfy
our solution concepts is a set of n agents, with Cobb-Douglas utility functions,
interior endowments and uniformly random proposals over the set of improving
trades (here we set hi = 0∀i ∈ I). In Lemma 1 this is proven for a more general set
of scenarios and in section 3.3 further results are obtained numerically for this and
more sophisticated cases.
So far a basic model of bilateral trade has been introduced; however there is
one more major element to fully specify for the model. In section 3.2.3 it is shown
how the process that has been defined along the lines proposed above may under
certain circumstances fail to carry out any trades, even where it would benefit all
individuals in such an economy to do so which suggests that some kind of experimen-
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tation may be necessary for trade to occur. It also makes sense that the model can
include some notion of noise, as this suggests greater robustness. It turns out one
can include both ideas in a straightforward way by including an “experimentation”
process in the model.
We specify a very general form of experimentation in a relatively straightfor-
ward way which can include both making mistakes and a (heterogeneous), limited
amount of experimentation on the part of agents. For each agent an experimenta-
tion function fit from current period in t ∈ N to a probability in [0, 1] is required.
Furthermore the limit as t→∞ should be 0; this is the probability in a given period
that experimentation will take place. Also required is a further function hit which
determines the loss in utility that is acceptable in a given period (that is loss in
utility for each agent engaged in trade), subject to a similar condition that the limit
a t → ∞ is 0, that is no loss is deemed acceptable at the limit. So now the hm, hn
terms in equations 3.2 and 3.3 could be replaced with this more general process:
With probability fmt
um(xmt + zt) > um(xmt)− hmt. (3.4)
and with probability fnt
un(xnt − zt) > un(xnt)− hnt. (3.5)
otherwise as before.
However for most of the analytical results in this section the heterogeneity is
unimportant as we are looking at asymptotic properties. The realised loss by agent
i in period t is E (x)it where is there is a gain in utility by i we set E (x)it = 0.
Total experimentation is almost surely bounded if the composite process de-
scribed above leads to a total loss across periods t to all agents that is bounded with
probability one. Formally, with probability one, the sum over losses
I∑
i=1
∞∑
t=1
it ≤ H
for some finite H. Any form of experimentation which ceases in finite time will
trivially satisfy this condition. This is our final restriction on Cautious Trading.
To clarify these concepts consider the following examples:
1. Let f(t) = p˜t where p˜ < 1 and fix experimentation level h(t) = ˜ for all agents
for all t. This is almost surely bounded.
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2. Fix the experimentation probability at f(t) = p˜ > 0 for all agents, for all t
and set experimentation level h(t) = 1/t2. This is also almost surely bounded.
3. Fix experimentation level at some positive  and fix probability of experimen-
tation at probability p˜ > 0. This is not almost surely bounded.
All of the key concepts have now been introduced. So to state in full, a set
of n agents with strictly positive endowments carry out Cautious Trading if:
1. In each period t two agentsm,n are matched at random (with equal probability
of any particular pair being selected).
2. Agent m proposes a non-positive trade such that xjmt > −zjt > −xjnt ∀j.
3. The trade either improvesm’s utility level or with probability fmt might reduce
it by at most hmt.
4. The trade is accepted if it either improves n’s utility level or with probability
fn(t) might reduce it by at most hnt.
5. The experimentation process defined by the collection of experimentation lev-
els {fit}i∈I,t∈T and experimentation probabilities {hit}i∈I,t∈T which is an ex-
perimentation process which is almost surely bounded.
6. The proposals satisfy the minimal probability weight condition.
3.2.2 Results
Below the key analytical results are presented for Cautious Trading. Proofs are
given in section 3.2.4.
Lemma 1. The Cautious Trading, with hit = 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T , converges in utility
and the allocations converge to a set of pairwise optimal utility-identical allocations.
It should be noted that even in this special case the limit allocation is path
dependent, there is no unique pairwise optimal allocation; though it would be pos-
sible to define a process which had such a feature, it would necessitate greatly
constraining possible exchanges. While the limit allocation is path dependent, it
does have qualitative features which are not.
Corollary 1. If after some finite time an exchange process begins cautious trading
as in Lemma 1, then it will converge to a pairwise optimal allocation.
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So we could have any kind of initial experimentation process or trading con-
ditioned on future expectations based on empirical distribution of trades and still
obtain the same result if eventually cautious trading with no experimentation per-
mitted commences. However it is possible to prove more general results.
Proposition 1. Cautious trading converges with probability one to a set of Pairwise
optimal allocations.
The following proposition shows that under two additional assumptions cau-
tious trading will get arbitrarily close to the Pareto frontier in finite time.
Proposition 2. (i) If the utility functions are continuously differentiable on the
interior of the consumption set a Pairwise optimal allocation is Pareto optimal. (ii)
If indifference surfaces through the interior of the allocation set do not intersect the
boundary of the allocation set then if one agent has some of all goods and others have
some of at least one good then cautious trading without experimentation converges
to a Pareto optimal set of allocations.
Even if we augment the trading process with the possibility that agents may
trade to boundary allocations, subject to the conditions of continuity and strict
monotonicity this will never occur under the conditions specified below.
Corollary 2 (First Welfare Theorem for Cautious Trading). If utility functions
are continuously differentiable on the interior of the allocation set and indifference
curves in the interior of the allocation set do not intersect the boundary, the process
of Cautious Trading will with probability one both
1. not go to an allocation on the boundary
2. and will converge to a set of Pareto Optimal allocations.
3.2.3 Examples
This section presents two examples which make clear the crucial role of the minimal
probability weight condition in obtaining convergence to pairwise optimal allocations
and show how even in an example with particularly bad prospects for convergence
a very low level of experimentation (or noise) may allow it to happen7.
Example Suppose there are two agents i and j. We will set up our example such
that there is a non-zero probability that trade will never occur. Consider i’s pro-
posals to j; assuming that no trade occurs the set, Z, that these are drawn from
7In figure 3.8 in section 3.3 this is numerically illustrated for low levels of experimentation.
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will not vary with time. Furthermore we can partition the set of improving trades Z
into Zi the set of individually improving but not improving to j trades and Z(i,j) the
set of mutually improving trades. Assume we are not at a pairwise (in this example
trivially Pareto) optimal allocation and that Zi is also non-empty. Now assume that
i draws its proposals from a fixed probability distribution for each proposal in this
particular state. That is it picks a z ∈ Zi ∪ Z(i,j). Now let pi be the probability it
picks a proposal in Zi and p
(i,j) be the probability it picks a proposal in Z(i,j). It
has been assumed that there is a strictly positive probability of choosing a proposal
within any open set X ⊂ Z, so this applies in particular to Zi and Z(i,j).
Now consider a new process where we transform the probability distributions
over the disjoint sets Zi and Z(i,j) by a constant scaling such that p
i
t = (1 − τt)pi
and p
(i,j)
t = τtp
(i,j) where τt is given by the sequence τt =
1
2t+1
for time periods
t = 1, 2, . . .. We make no restrictions on the behaviour if we were to leave the initial
state and claim that there is now a positive probability that trade will never occur
so a fortiori we will not converge to a pairwise/Pareto optimal.
To see this consider the probability of at some point proposing a trade in
Z(i,j), that is one which will be accepted. This is strictly less than p
(i,j)
∑
t τt =
p(i,j)
2 ,
which implies there is a non-zero probability that trade will never occur. Actually
to complete this argument we need j to propose in the same way. If both agents are
proposing in this fashion then there is a non-zero probability that trade, and hence
any kind of convergence, will never occur. Note that is is possible to generalise
this to a larger number of agents by using the same weights on each distribution of
proposals of i to any agent k.
While this example is somewhat pathological it illustrates an important
point. For cautious trade to work we can’t have agents conditioning their actions
on the period in a way which essentially rules out trade at all, or via a limiting
process8.
Example One famous class of examples that show non-convergence and instability
in a global competitive equilibrium is presented in Scarf [1959]. This example can be
adapted for our model in a similar way to Gintis [2007a]: the basic idea is that there
are three classes of agents each of whom has a utility function which is the minimum
of the good it has and one other; but no agent, at least initially, can find an agent
8Note that in this example we have assumed that agent i needs to know the utility function of
agent j. One could weaken this to an assumption of the knowledge of the forms of utility functions
over an economy as a whole.
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with whom a mutually improving trade can take place. To specify precisely:
u1 = min(x
1, x2) with endowment e1 = (1, 0, 0)
u2 = min(x
2, x3) with endowment e2 = (0, 1, 0)
u3 = min(x
1, x3) with endowment e3 = (0, 0, 1)
This means that in the model proposed above, and similar models, no trade
will ever take place.
However once one introduces a small probability  of experimenting, that is
proposing or accepting a disimproving trade (either deliberately or through making
a mistake) then trade will take place and outcomes which are Pareto improvements
over the initial state can be attained.
3.2.4 Proofs of results
Below the proofs of the results presented in section 3.2.2 are given.
Proof of Lemma 1. We know that ut+1i ≥ uti for any agent i as only mutually utility
increasing trades will be made as Fit = 0 ∀i, t. Furthermore the sequence of utility
values is bounded as the set of feasible allocations is compact and as uit ≤ u˜i, where
u˜i = ui(
∑I
k=1 ek). So for each agent i the sequence of utility values ui(xit) converges
to its supremum; call the vector of these u¯.
Now consider the sequence of allocations Xt generated by cautious trading.
We claim that any limit points of such a sequence must be pairwise optimal alloca-
tions with utilities u¯. Suppose such a point wasn’t then by definition there would
exist a pair of agents i, j and trade vector z such that
ui(x
t
i + z) > ui(x
t
i)
and
uj(x
t
i − z) > uj(xti)
But by assumption there is a strictly positive lower bound on the probability of
picking a trade within every neighbourhood of z in every period. By continuity
there exists some such neighbourhood of z, for example an -ball around z, B(z)
for sufficiently small  , which pairwise improves (there may in fact be additional
regions of our allocation space where this holds) so we know that a trade will almost
surely happen at some point in the future between these two agents and so this
cannot be an allocation at u¯.
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Proof of Proposition 1. For a particular realisation let xti be the current allocation
of agent i at time t, uti the utility of agent i at time t. Let E (x)it be the loss in
utility to agent i in period t. (If no experimentation occurs in period t for agent i
then E (x)it = 0 as before.) By assumption the total amount of experimentation of
all agents is almost surely bounded, so for any particular agent
∑
t=o E (x)it is also
bounded.
Let the sequence vi, indexed by t, be given by v
t
i = u
t
i +
∑t
k=1 E (x)it. Then
this new sequence vi is increasing. It is also bounded as it is the sum of two bounded
sequences. Therefore it converges to a limit, say v˜i. But this implies that ui also
converges to some limit u˜i.
Now consider once more allocations at this limit u˜i. They must be pairwise
optimal as if they weren’t then a pairwise improving trade would be made at some
point in the future, even without experimentation to perturb the state.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let X be a pairwise optimal allocation in the interior of the
allocation set. If we are in the interior of the allocation set then by assumption
marginal rates of substitution exist for each agent i and for each pair of goods
m,n. Let i, j be any two agents and m,n and two goods. Now consider the
marginal rates of substitution for agents i, j of goods m,n, that is MRSi(m,n)
and MRSj(m,n). If MRSi(m,n) 6= MRSj(m,n) then a pairwise improvement
is possible via an exchange of the two goods m,n between i, j. So we much have
MRSi(m,n) = MRSj(m,n) for all agents i, j and goods m,n. But if this holds then
the current allocations X is Pareto optimal. From proposition 1 we know that the
sequence converges to a set of Pairwise optimal states, so under the extra conditions
imposed above it converges to a set of Pareto optimal states.
Now consider the case where one agent has some of all goods, without loss
of generality let this be agent 1 and others have some of at least one good, without
loss of generality let this be good 1. We need to establish that the process reaches
the interior of the the allocation set then the result follows by the above argument.
Consider an agent i 6= 1 and the non-empty set M = {m ∈ J |xmi = 0}. As
the indifference curves through the interior of the allocation set for all agents do
not intersect the boundary of the set it is always in the agent’s interest to accept a
trade away from the boundary, that is a trade z such that for each i ∈ M , zi 6= 0.
When paired with agent 1 there exists an open set of trades Z which leaves him
with some of all goods and improves the utility of agent 1. So eventually such a
trade will happen. This argument trivially extends to all agents on the boundary,
so with probability one in finite time we will reach an allocation in the interior of
the allocation set.
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Proof of Corollary 2. To go to an allocation on the boundary with the above con-
ditions an agent must in effect accept an infinite loss in utility; but with probability
one this will not occur as it is assumed that the total amount of experimentation is
almost surely bounded, so the loss in any particular period must also be bounded.
If the utility functions are continuously differentiable then any pairwise op-
timal allocation is a Pareto optimal allocation as the marginal rates of substitution
of goods for each agent must be equal. By proposition 1 the process converges to
a set of pairwise optimal allocation allocations, so with the additional assumption
this is Pareto optimal.
3.2.5 Extension to Production
Our convergence results for exchange can be extended to economies with production
using the process described in Rader [1964, 1976]. Formally an exchange economy is
an array {(ui, ei,RJ+): i ∈ I}. An economy with production is an array {(ui, ei,RJ+) :
i ∈ I; (Y f ) : f ∈ F, θif : f ∈ F, i ∈ I} where f ∈ F = {1 . . . F} is the set of firms and
θif is individual i’s share in firm f with
∑
i θif = 1,∀f . Assume that the production
set Y f of firm f is convex, non-empty, closed, satisfies the no free lunch condition
(Y f ∩ RJ+ ⊂ {0}), allows for inaction (that is 0 ∈ Y f ), satisfies free disposal and
irreversibility (that is if y ∈ Y f and y 6= 0 then −y /∈ Y f ). We can convert an
economy with production to an economy with household production by endowing
each individual i with a production set Y˜i =
∑
f θifY
f . Next, by using Rader’s
principle of equivalence Rader [1976], an economy with household production can be
associated with an equivalent economy with pure exchange with indirect preferences
defined on trades. The conditions under which pairwise optimality implies Pareto
optimality with such indirect preferences follow directly from Theorem 2 and its
applications, also in Rader [1976].
3.3 Numerical Results
While we have shown that the sequence of allocations will converge to a Pareto
optimal set, this does not answer the question of how long such a process will take
to get close to Pareto optimal. This section examines this question via a numerical
approach, showing that for a common class of utility functions, the average speed of
convergence is, in a sense to be specified shortly, good9. This section also examines
9This section has been written so as to be as accessible as possible to the non-programmer.
Those with experience of programming may wish to skim this section, while consulting the source
code directly, the key sections of which are included in the appendix.
64
the question of how the cautious trading process affects the wealth of agents.
3.3.1 Numerical Model
Attention is focused on sets of heterogeneous agents with Cobb-Douglas preferences
and random initial endowments as a benchmark case. We can represent the prefer-
ences by utility functions:
ui(xi) =
∑
j
αji ln(x
j
i ).
One can of course represent Cobb Douglas utilities by ui(xi) =
∏
j(x
j
i )
λji . How-
ever, the logarithmic representation is preferred for numerical work because it has
a considerably lower computational cost. We have initial endowments, eji , of each
commodity drawn from a uniform distribution over (0, 1] and parameters αji of the
functions are again drawn from (0, 1] uniformly, then normalised such that the sum,∑
j α
j
i = 1. They are normalised to a fixed value so as to make talking about global
utility as the sum of agent’s utilities more meaningful; this does not change the
preferences which they represent.
As before trades are restricted to the set of all trades which leave both
proposer i and responder j with positive quantities of each good, that is:
−xjmt < zit < −xint
as to actually implement the trading process it is necessary to fix some boundary
values10
The key objects we need in our computational model is an agent and a collec-
tion of agents. The former implements agents with Cobb-Douglas utility functions
as specified above, random initial endowments and importantly specifies the actual
mechanics of trade proposals, acceptance or rejection and trades. The later creates
a collection of these agents and carries out realisations of the economy. A schematic
representation of these classes can be found in figure 3.1. Utilising these we can
obtain various numerical results via processes such as that illustrated in figure 3.2.
We make one further major assumption: each agent makes one proposal per
10An alternative, and in some ways more satisfying alternative (as it limits required information),
might be to restrict trades to within the total endowment of the economy. While analytically we
would obtain the same asymptotic results, numerically it would simply lead to many rejected
proposal and vastly longer running times if these were simulated directly. One could try and
simulate the proposal process indirectly if one could formulate joint probability distributions over
improving offers, over improving proposals and over agent pairing. However for anything other
than trivial economies this is extremely difficult due to the number of dimensions and changing
state when proposals accepted.
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Figure 3.1: An outline of the main attributes and methods of the Agent and Econ-
omy objects.
Figure 3.2: An example algorithm of a numerical simulation of Cautious Trading.
The precise details vary depending the experiment being carried out but this exam-
ple gives an overview of the kind of algorithm used to generate the data for most of
the figures in this chapter.
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round, irrespective of the size of the economy. An alternative way to approach
implementing this model might be to fix some n, perhaps n = 1 as the total number
of proposals per round, with agents drawn at random in each round. However, if
one takes seriously the decentralisation of the economy, then one should assume that
the agents actions are unconstrained by the size of the global economy.
3.3.2 Results
Attention was focused on estimated convergence in average global utility to assess
the performance of cautious trading. To estimate this we calculate global utility by
summing across utility for all agents in the economy, then take an average over many
runs as the process is stochastic. One can then use the final value as an estimate of
limiting utility and calculate how far away earlier values are. The last few hundred
values are discarded as for them this estimate of limiting utility is not, relatively
speaking, as good. The analysis depends on the increasing nature of sequences of
utility values for agents this analysis to make sense.
In figure 3.3 one can see how varying the total number of agents effects the
average speed of convergence. As one can see there is in fact very little qualitative
effect. There is some increase in time taken, however when one plots the log of
average convergence as in figure 3.4 one can see that we get a close approximation
to a straight line after an initial faster period; suggesting an exponential speed of
convergence, at least over the these time periods.
Figure 3.3: Average over many runs of global utility convergence when varying the
total number of agents in the economy. Parameters: 5 goods, 25-100 agents.
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Figure 3.4: Log of average global utility convergence when varying the total number
of agents in the economy. Parameters: 5 goods, 25-100 agents.
We also examined the effect of the number of goods via similar analysis. In
figure 3.5 one can see how the speed of convergence varies with the total number
of goods in the economy. There is a similar result of little qualitative change. This
is more surprising as we have the same number of proposals taking place as before
over larger increasing numbers of goods. When one examines the the log plot in
figure 3.6 one gets the same kind of result as for varying agents.
One can fit an exponential function, via regression on the log of the values,
to these average utility paths in order to obtain a numerical estimate for the average
speed of convergence. In tables 3.1 and 3.2 we present such results for a range of
model sizes. The important point to note is the approximately exponential conver-
gence in global utility for a range of sizes of economy, both in terms of number of
goods and number of agents, rather than the actual fitted parameters. Note that
the p-values for the regressions are less than 0.0005 indicating an extremely high
level of confidence in the fit of the model.
Goods 4 5 6 7
linear coefficient: -0.0026 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0021
constant term: 6.3642 5.6688 5.9079 6.3833
Table 3.1: Fitting exponential function to average convergence for varying numbers
of goods. The values given are for linear fit of log of convergence. For every fit the
p-values for the regressions are less than 0.0005 indicating an extremely high level
of confidence in the fit of the model.
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Figure 3.5: Average global utility convergence when varying the total number of
goods in the economy. Parameters: 4-7 goods, 50 agents.
Figure 3.6: Log of average global utility convergence when varying the total number
of goods in the economy. Parameters: 4-7 goods, 50 agents.
Agents 25 50 75 100
linear coefficient: -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0023
constant term: 4.4728 4.3750 5.3190 5.2299
Table 3.2: Fitting exponential function to average convergence for varying numbers
of agents. The values given are for linear fit of log of convergence. For every fit the
p-values for the regressions are less than 0.0005 indicating an extremely high level
of confidence in the fit of the model.
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Another aspect of the exchange process we can analyse numerically is that of
wealth dynamics or change. If we had a single set of prices or relative valuations p
in the economy, then we could obtain the wealth of an agent i, simply be calculating
pxi. In our out-of-equilibrium scenario there is no single set of prices, however
given that the marginal rates of substitution converge, this implies a convergence
to a uniform set of relative evaluations (in terms of changes in utility); in effect
a common set of prices. From this set of prices we can calculate a value for each
agent’s bundle. But if we know their original endowment we can calculate their
initial wealth using these prices, so we can obtain a set of relative ex post wealth
values.
In figure 3.7 the density of wealth change is plotted. We see a linear rela-
tionship of final to original wealth, but with a very high level of noise, as one might
expect. It should be emphasised that in all cases utility for every agent increases
over time, however ’wealth’ may change in either direction.
Figure 3.7: This uses the average of the final marginal rates of substitution to obtain
an estimate for initial and final wealth. The darker the square the more likely such
a transition from initial to final wealth in that square is; this heatmap was included
as the scatter plot is difficult to read due to the high number of samples with similar
changes in wealth 12500 samples (or 250 realisations of 2000 periods, with 50 agents;
normalised per realisation.
In figure 3.8 we take the example outlined above in section 3.2.1 and examine
what happens numerically, introducing a small probability  of making a mistake,
that is proposing or accepting a disimproving trade. If no experimentation takes
place no trade ever happens and global utility remains at 0. As we increase the
level of experimentation short term global utility improves (rises more steeply) at
the cost of a lower level of long term convergence. In cautious trading form nothing
happens, but with experimentation trade happens.
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For high values of experimentation faster initial improvement than low values,
but longer term global utility is slightly lower and the economy more volatile. This
suggests that in selecting the level of experimentation there is a trade off between
convergent level of utility and speed of convergence.
Figure 3.8: Without experimentation no trade takes place in this model adapted
from a model of Scarf. Notice how long term utility appears lower for a higher level
of experimentation.
Above an example adapted from Scarf was presented which showed how ex-
perimentation could lead to a better outcome than before, however, this example is
a very special case. An interesting question we can ask numerically is how experi-
mentation effects the speed of convergence in a larger, more heterogeneous example
such as the Cobb Douglas utility function economy we looked at previously. In fact
there is qualitatively similar long term behaviour when experimentation is included
as can be seen in figure 6 where experimentation is introduced into the original
model from section 3.3. For certain values of experimentation we even see slightly
better overall performance with experimentation.
So we have seen that cautious trading allows trade to occur when it would
not have otherwise happened. Furthermore, in economies where experimentation
is not required, such as the Cobb-Douglas economy in figure 3.9, experimentation
does not appear to have a qualitatively detrimental effect.
3.4 Conclusions
Even with “zero information” an exchange economy with typical assumptions will
converge to a Pareto optimal outcome purely through bilateral exchange among
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Figure 3.9: Low levels of experimentation have little effect in the Cobb Douglas
economy we looked at before.
uninformed partners. It is possible to numerically examine the speed of convergence
which turns out to be exponential for a typical class of utility function. Augmenting
this process with experimentation leads to both convergence in some examples where
it did not previously occur and potentially faster convergence in cases which did
converge previously.
One can conceive of this ‘zero information’ as a worst case assumption. In
‘real’ markets one presumably has more to work with but almost never the kind of
complete information that is typically assumed in comparable models of exchange.
The dual discipline of having to deal with decentralisation and its resultant lack of
information (not simply uncertainty over a small number of possible states of the
world) and having to explicitly implement the models for numerical investigation
has proved useful. In the next chapter we look at the structure of trade by explicitly
modelling trading networks, contrasting the results with those of this chapter where
in effect we assume a fully connected network.
72
Chapter 4
Exchange on Networks
4.1 Networks
In 2.8 we examined general background and related literature on networks. A net-
work approach is the natural model for a situation with connected agents and in this
chapter we extend the model from 3 to an explicit exchange network model. While
this is by no means a realistic model of exchange, it does allow us to consider how
network structure can affect even idealised trading. Figure 4.1 shows some simple
example of network ‘types’; in this chapter we will look at how these differing struc-
tures can effect exchange, but first we extend our model to networks and examine
the new model analytically.
4.2 Trading on Networks
In the previous chapter we have assumed a anonymous, fully connected economy,
with trading partners picked at random from all agents in the economy. But an
attempt to investigate decentralised economies would be incomplete without a con-
sideration of if and how the structure of that economy affects outcomes. The natural
way to think about this is in terms of a network of agents with edges representing
potential trading partners1. So we have a undirected graph G = (V,E), where V is
the set of vertices (agents) and E the set of edges (potential trading links). For a
more general survey of network concepts see section 2.8.
Agent i has endowment ei as before, however we now restrict offers and
1We consider only static networks, however if one is conceiving of an exchange economy where
the cautious trading process is one step repeated with changes to the fundamentals of the economy
at each step, then there is no reason why the network topology couldn’t be considered a fundamental
to be altered at each step.
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"ring" network "star" network
random network "hierarchical" network
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4.1: This figure illustrates some network structures. Note that simulations
were run on networks of much larger size.
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trade to pairs of agents connected by an edge d ∈ E. We call this Networked
Cautious Trading. We can use the same very general formulations for proposals and
acceptance as before, however our “local” optimality will have to be redefined as
follows: an allocation X = (x1, . . . ,xI) is connected-pairwise optimal if there exists
no way of redistributing bundles between any connected pair m,n that would make
at least one strictly better off, while making the other at least as well off. If we
have a fully connected2 graph then we would be considering pairwise optimality, as
in the previous chapter. We will once more consider Pareto optimality as a solution
concept, where we allow redistribution over all agents irrespective of location on the
network.
4.3 Analytical Results
We can reformulate the analytical results for Cautious Trading in the context of
networks, as below. We need to replace the notion of pairwise optimality with
connected-pairwise optimality and take account of various networks specific issues.
Lemma 2. Networked Cautious Trading, with hit = 0∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T , converges
in utility and the allocations converge to a set of connected-pairwise optimal utility-
identical allocations.
Proof. We know that ut+1i ≥ uti for any agent i as only mutually utility increasing
trades will be made as hit = 0 ∀i, t. Furthermore the sequence of utility values
is bounded as the set of feasible allocations is compact and as uit ≤ u˜i, where
u˜i = ui(
∑I
k=1 ek). So for each agent i the sequence of utility values ui(xit) converges
to its supremum; call the vector of these u¯.
Now consider the sequence of allocations Xt generated by networked cautious
trading. We claim that any limit points of such a sequence must be connected-
pairwise optimal allocations with utilities u¯. Suppose such a point wasn’t then by
definition there would exist a connected pair of agents i, j and trade vector z such
that
ui(x
t
i + z) > ui(x
t
i)
and
uj(x
t
i − z) > uj(xti)
But by assumption there is a strictly positive lower bound on the probability of
picking a trade within every neighbourhood of z in every period. By continuity
2There is an edge linking every agent to all all other agents.
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there exists some such neighbourhood of z, for example an -ball around z, B(z)
for sufficiently small  , which pairwise improves (there may in fact be additional
regions of our allocation space where this holds) so we know that a trade will almost
surely happen at some point in the future between this pair of connected agents and
so this cannot be an allocation at u¯.
Proposition 3. Networked Cautious Trading converges with probability one to a
set of connected-pairwise optimal allocations.
The proof here is omitted as the experimentation is assumed to be indepen-
dent of network structure, so the argument in the proof of proposition 1 still holds,
reinterpreting in the light of Lemma 2.
Proposition 4. Let us assume our network is connected. (i) If the utility functions
are continuously differentiable on the interior of the consumption set a connected-
pairwise optimal allocation is Pareto optimal. (ii) If indifference surfaces through
the interior of the allocation set do not intersect the boundary of the allocation set
then if one agent has some of all goods and others have some of at least one good
then Networked Cautious Trading without experimentation converges to a Pareto
optimal set of allocations.
Proof. Let X be a connected-pairwise optimal allocation in the interior of the allo-
cation set. If we are in the interior of the allocation set then by assumption marginal
rates of substitution exist for each agent i and for each pair of goods m,n. Let i, j
be any two agents and m,n and two goods. Now consider the marginal rates of
substitution for any set of connected agents i, j of goods m,n, that is MRSi(m,n)
and MRSj(m,n).
If MRSi(m,n) 6= MRSj(m,n) then a pairwise improvement is possible via
an exchange of the two goods m,n between i, j. So we much have MRSi(m,n) =
MRSj(m,n) for all pairs of connected agents i, j and goods m,n. But if this holds
then the current allocations X is Pareto optimal if the network is fully connected.
From proposition 1 we know that the sequence converges to a set of Pairwise optimal
states, so under the extra conditions imposed above it converges to a set of Pareto
optimal states.
Now consider the case where one agent has some of all goods, without loss
of generality let this be agent 1 and others have some of at least one good, without
loss of generality let this be good 1. We need to establish that the process reaches
the interior of the the allocation set then the result follows by the above argument.
Consider an agent i 6= 1 and the non-empty set M = {m ∈ J |xmi = 0}. As
the indifference curves through the interior of the allocation set for all agents do
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not intersect the boundary of the set it is always in the agent’s interest to accept a
trade away from the boundary, that is a trade z such that for each i ∈M , zi 6= 0.
Agent 1 must be paired with at least one other agent, without loss of gen-
erality agent 2. For agents 1, 2 there exists an open set of trades Z which leaves 2
him with some of all goods and improves the utility of agent 1. So eventually such
a trade will happen between these agents. So with probability one in finite time we
will reach an allocation for agents 1 and 2 in the interior of the allocation set. This
argument extends inductively to any finite size of connected network, so we have
our result.
Corollary 3. If utility functions are continuously differentiable on the interior of
the allocation set and indifference curves in the interior of the allocation set do not
intersect the boundary, then Networked Cautious Trading will, with probability one,
both not go to an allocation on the boundary and will converge to a set of Pareto
Optimal allocations.
The same argument for this holds as for corollary 2 as the potential move
to boundary is independent of the network (consider the sub-network of an agent
and its immediate neighbours, the original argument holds; and as trade only takes
place with neighbours, this gives us the result).
The result of Pareto optimality is in general a weak optimality condition, it
explicitly takes no account of issues relating to equity of distribution; in a world
with initial uniformly random endowments and symmetric trading potential, this is
trivially equitable (at least in terms of expectations of final utility). However, if we
have an asymmetric network structure of trading this is more obviously a fundamen-
tal concern, in contrast to the Cautious Trading case where we assume symmetry.
There is little to say in general about such a network as if the structure matters
for outcomes then we presumably will not obtain general results on outcomes. By
adopting a numerical approach we can attempt to characterise the effect of network
structure on expected outcome.
4.4 Numerical Results
Asymptotically Cautious Trading on a network has similar properties to anonymous,
pairwise matching; though the question we want to examine here is how network
structure effects outcomes. There may also be significant differences in properties
like initial convergence which we are able to examine numerically. In figure 4.1 some
different structures of networks were illustrated: a ring network, where each vertex
77
has an edge joining it to each of its nearest neighbours; a star network where one
vertex is joined to all others; a random network and a hierarchical network which
has a hierarchy of star-like components. All these networks are connected, but far
from fully connected as was assumed to be the case for the original formulation of
cautious trading in chapter 3. In any case if an economy were not connected then
we would really be dealing with two or more economies.
Figure 4.2: Here we have three quite different structures for our economy; however
the average path of the economy if very similar. We have the original Cautious
Trading, a uniformly randomly connected graph (with an average of four edges per
vertex) and a ring graph (each agent is connected to it four nearest neighbours).
These all have quite different properties but seemingly due to the reasonably high
level of connectivity result in the same average behaviour. Averaging over 2000
realisations, 100000 proposals per realisation, 50 agents.
The key issue for our model is the level of connectivity as illustrated in figures
4.2 and 4.3. In the first figure extremely similar results are obtained for the original
cautious trading process, cautious trading on a “ring” network and cautious trading
on a random network. In figure 4.3 the results are quite different for networks with
lower levels of connectivity. In summary, if connectivity is low, as is the case for a
“star” network the speed of convergence is reduced; if it is sufficiently high (for the
sizes of networks examined in this chapter this means around four edges per vertex)
then the results are similar to the fully connected scenario, with the actual structure
of connection having little effect.
We looked at varying levels of clustering using the Watts and Strogatz model
for small world graph generation Watts and Strogatz [1998]; basically we start off
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Figure 4.3: In contrast to figure 4.2 we see quite different average behaviours for
these networks versus the original cautious trading. These networks are a star
network in which one agent is connected to all others (an idealisation of a central
market in which all agents exchange goods) and a hierarchical network (where there
is a ’central market’ which is connected to a small number of other ’markets’, in
turn connected to all the other agents in the economy). These networks have low
levels of connectivity (roughly one edge per agent) and this seemingly restricts the
speed of converge and lowers global utility. Averaging over 2000 realisations, 100000
proposals per realisation, 50 agents.
Figure 4.4: These plots show the change in wealth, using the average of the final
marginal rates of substitution to obtain an estimate of changes in wealth for a net-
worked (star network) economy 12500 samples (or 250 realisations of 2000 periods,
with 50 agents; normalised on a per realisation basis such that the total wealth sums
to one.
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with a ring network (agents are connected to their nearest neighbours) and rewire
each edge with a fixed probability β. We obtained similar results to figure 4.2, that
is there was little effect at a global level if we kept connectivity constant (as the
Watts-Strogatz model does by construction).
Examining wealth change in a centralised economy (a star network) there
is a substantial contrast with the original cautious trading model, now final wealth
appears to be more random, with less correlation with initial wealth as can be seen
in figure 4.4. Again there would appear to be a high level of noise in the system,
with many outliers.
It might typically be expected that a more centralised system would be more
efficient as for example the shortest path length between any two agents with the
potential for mutually beneficial trade is shortened. For example Markose et al.
[2004] with a simpler form of trading but with endogenous learning finds a much
more structured outcome. However, in the case of a model with direct, bilateral
trading it seems that this may not be the case as intermediary agents extract the
gains from trade that might otherwise be more equitably shared3. We address this
issue in the next section where we look at a version of cautious trading where the
network structure is itself endogenous.
4.5 Endogenous Network Formation
There are many analytical results for network formation, see for example Jackson
[2008] or for a general overview Jackson [2010a], these kind of approaches typically
require stronger assumptions than it is reasonable to make for our kind of highly
decentralised, limited information, dynamic model. Instead we examine numerically
an extension of the cautious trading model whereby agents can break-off their low
performing edges and connect to new agents.
Each agent i has a set of edges D ⊆ E connecting it to a set of neighbours
(potential trading partners) Ni. In this section we consider a version of cautious
trading on a directed network with multiple rounds of trading. Each agent com-
mences each round with an individual, but constant across rounds4, endowment.
Intuitively we can think of farms producing a certain type of produce each year or
factories producing certain goods each day; this amount is assumed to be constant
for a set of heterogeneous individuals. They start with a fixed number of randomly
assigned edges which are directed in the proposal direction. They track the utility
3Of course a trading structure explicitly structured with social objectives should do better.
4Otherwise any learning or adaption in behaviour wouldn’t make much sense.
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gained from trades as a result of their proposals over each edge and at the end of
a round they disconnect their lowest performing edge, averaged over all rounds in
which they have been connected to that agent5, and reconnect to another agent at
random. While the out-degree of each agent remains constant, the in-degrees can
vary and it is this which allows us to think about how agents adapting their local
network structure in a self-interested way might determine global network proper-
ties.
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Figure 4.5: The in-degree counts for the first sixty rounds. Each round consists of
200 periods, where 50 agents propose a trade to each of their 5 current neighbours,
at the end of each round the lowest performing neighbour (lowest utility gain from
trades averaged over all rounds) is replaced by a new neighbour. The network
structure shifts from the initial configuration (as randomly assigned) to one with
a greater variance in in-degree (out-degree is kept constant and link formation is
unilateral).
We find, as shown in figure 4.5 how the in-degree counts (aggregated over
windows) quickly shift to a broader structure (than the initial random distribution
of links). High in-degree counts are avoided as they seem to be too competitive
(opportunities for the proposer to gain from the responder are reduced by the larger
number of competing offers). If we look at the variance of in-degree, as in 4.6 we
5I also looked at a version where only the last round is taken into consideration; this results in
a considerably noisier outcome.
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Figure 4.6: This plot shows how the variance of in-degree count by agent starts out
low, then within around 50 periods converges on a value that will stay more of less
constant (with substantial noise).
can see that it rapidly increases initially, reflecting the endogenous shift in network
structure as seen in figure 4.5, and then remains at a roughly constant level (though
with substantial noise). Similarly the aggregate in-degree counts remain roughly
constant after this initial phase.
Of course alternative network formation mechanisms could be considered,
in particular making link formation some kind of bilateral process. The above
mechanism seems to be one of the most straightforward mechanisms which makes
sense with our process of cautious trading; it is hard to see how one could advance
on it without substantial ad hoc configuration or assumptions which don’t really fit
in with our model.
This endogenous network formation model suggests a solution to the counter-
intuitive result from the previous section where centralisation didn’t seem to improve
outcomes and slowed conversion: while being central is good for the individual agent
it appears to disadvantage its trading partners resulting in fewer opportunities for
substantively beneficial trade to occur.
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4.6 Learning and the Emergence of Money Within the
Network
Cautious trading works well if agents are (reasonably) well connected and have a
wide variety of goods. It was shown in the previous chapter how a small amount of
experimentation might resolve convergence issues where the initial state or form of
utility was unfavourable to trade. In this section we look specifically at a version
of cautious trading where agents learn how much experimentation to engage in; in
particular they can modify their decision process to accept some amount of loss in
utility in order to gain a better final outcome.
Consider an economy with n+1 goods and agents with a linear utility function
ui =
∑n
j=0 α
j
ix
j
i where for all agents i, we set α
0
i = 0, that is we have a good which
is worthless to all agents; however, all agents have some of this good.
We introduce a diversification level δ ∈ [0, 1] which determines the balance
agents place between a diversification or experimental valuation of potential trades
and a purely utility determined one. Specifically we set the valuation of a bundle of
goods to be:
vi(x) =
n∑
j=0
(δ
1
n+ 1
+ (1− δ)αji )xji
so where δ = 0 we have pure cautious trading and where δ = 1 utility is entirely
ignored and agents value goods equally.
Using this form of evaluating bundles of goods and successive rounds of
trading (again each agent starting from the same initial state in each round) a
simple reinforcement learning algorithm is introduced for the level of diversification.
An agent picks the best level of diversification from a finite subset of [0, 1] (based
on the average level form previous rounds) but with a small probability chooses a
level at random (ensuring that the full state space is explored).
In figure 4.7 we can see the diversification level counts at intervals of twenty
rounds. We can see how agents move from not diversifying (except with their small
probability of experimenting) towards engaging in moderate levels of diversification.
Figure 4.8 shows the round by round mean of the diversification level clearly showing
how this increases (with some noise due to the experimentation and the stochastic
nature of the trading process).
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Figure 4.7: This plot shows the diversification level every 20 rounds. We can see
that from an initial position of little diversification agents split into (roughly) two
groups: those which do not engage in diversification and those which engage in a
moderate level of diversification and so use the ‘worthless’ good (or ‘money’) in order
to improve their performance. In figure 4.8 the increasing mean diversification level
is made clear, though of course this misses the bimodal nature of the diversification.
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Figure 4.8: This plot shows how the mean diversification level endogenously in-
creases as a subset of the agents learn to engage in diversification. Figure 4.7 shows
the counts of agents at each level at intervals.
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4.7 Conclusions
We see in figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 how network structure may be important. The
first shows how global utility (the sum of individual agent utilities) converges more
quickly and to a persistently higher level than for the network models, though in the
first few periods they are very similar; this is not surprising as a uniform random
matching process allows an agent to be matched with many more potential trading
partners so should allow gains from trade to be more quickly found and the initial
behaviour should be roughly the same as the proportion of repeated matches will be
small so it should be roughly the same. In figure 4.3 we see a much more dramatic
result of a trading network, here the networks are structured in a hierarchical way
which seems to be much less efficient. In figure 4.4 we see a flatter distribution
of wealth, but more interestingly the ability of agents, depending on their network
position, to exploit most of the gains from trade. While this is a simple model, the
idea of agents being able to gain disproportionately from trade, depending on their
position may be a highly significant one for economic activity in general. When
we introduce endogenous network formation we see, dynamically, a preference for
avoiding connecting to these highly connected nodes.
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Chapter 5
Towards a new approach for
Agent-Based Modelling
5.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at tools and methods for agent-based modelling of socio-economic
systems. We begin with a survey of the more popular agent-based modelling frame-
works such as SWARM, Repast and Netlogo. We categorise the approaches into
three broad groups: visual programming systems, agent-based modelling libraries
for general purpose programming languages and purpose built agent-based mod-
elling languages (or domain specific languages). Arguing that the last two are of
most interest we identify a key set of ideas for building a framework that sits in be-
tween these areas, an “internal domain specific language”, and which draws on other
ideas from contemporary software engineering which are of general applicability to
agent-based modelling, in particular version control and testing. For each idea we
identify the key elements and identify the features required to properly support it.
Having identified a set of key ideas we introduce a new framework built on
these ideas, along with some additional ideas inspired by frameworks from other do-
mains and a hierarchical way of thinking about agent-based modelling. We further
remark on each of key ideas and on our choice of implementation method. We look
at a very simple example using this framework to illustrate the key components of
our framework which splits agent-based modelling into a five level approach with
explicit consideration of project, experiment, simulation, world and agent levels.
We then turn to the more substantial problem of modelling an software ‘App Store’,
showing how we can quickly build a model and create an experiment which investi-
gates different strategies a seller might adopt (while allowing for substantial future
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development of this model).
We then go on to evaluate our framework from a variety of angles, looking
at issues such as performance and ease of use. We conclude by discussing the steps
required to make this into a full framework1, in particular we look at some of the
major features that aren’t currently included, the ways in which current features
could be expanded and improved and issues relating to making it more user friendly.
5.2 Current approaches and possibilities
This section surveys some of the major current approaches to agent-based modelling
before considering future possibilities. It does not even attempt to be a complete
survey as even the existing surveys are somewhat incomplete given the wide range
of approaches and frameworks adopted. The Wikipedia page2 for agent-based mod-
elling software in late 2011 lists over 70 different pieces of agent-based modelling
software; and is itself an incomplete list..
A recent, broad survey of Agent-Based modelling platforms can be found
in Nikolai and Madey [2009] and, aside from the Wikipedia list3 mentioned above,
there probably does not exist another more comprehensive collection. Fifty-three
platforms are included and commonalities identified. In terms of programming lan-
guage the popularity of Java, C++ and C is noted, at 43%, 17% and 11% respec-
tively; alongside those frameworks which have their own special purpose language –
around 28% (in contemporary software engineering this would typically be referred
to as a domain specific language, see below). There are additional frameworks which
use some kind of visual programming, something that we will not really focus on
in this chapter (again, see below for further context). In Nikolai and Madey [2009]
there is further analysis of operating system support and the kind of licences they
are available under (open-source, closed-source but free to use, commercial and so
on).
There are some surveys which take a narrower approach to focus on a smaller
subset of the more popular frameworks. One such work is Railsback et al. [2006]
which looks at the SWARM, Java SWARM, Repast, MASON and Netlogo frame-
works. Within the socio-economics agent-based modelling community these are
probably the mostly commonly used (to this list one might want to tentatively add
Repast Simphony4 which confusingly is not a new version of Repast, but a different,
1Though it is already possible to do ‘real’ work with it.
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison of agent-based modeling software
3It was in fact this article which formed the original basis of the Wikipedia page.
4The spelling here is correct.
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newer, easier to use, more graphical system). SWARM and Java SWARM are sup-
ported by the Santa Fe Institute and take a somewhat unconventional approach. In
at SWARM model, the model and a separate laboratory for observing and conduct-
ing experiments. There is the additional hierarchical idea of a swarm: a group of
objects and schedule of actions, which may contain sub-swarms. It uses Objective-
C, which is quite unusual outside the Mac OS operating system (though SWARM
does work on Windows and Linux). Java SWARM isn’t really a Java framework per
se, but is a cross platform Java framework for passing messages to the Objective-C
SWARM. Respast is a more traditional Java approach, but attempts to replicate
most of SWARM’s features. MASON focuses on performance and is, in the authors’
view, somewhat simpler that Repast.
Figure 5.1: A screenshot of Netlogo. Notice the three tab interface, with graphical
view/configuration, documentation and code kept separate.
Netlogo is quite distinct from the others; it uses its own language (a version of
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Logo), and has an easy to use environment that can be seen in figure 5.1. A project in
Netlogo contains three tabs, a set of visual configuration and observation interfaces,
a documentation tab (where you can write an explanation of the project) and a tab
where you write the procedures in Netlogo’s Logo language which run your model.
It includes an extensive collection of example projects that range from social science
models to games and from particle models to ‘music’ generating models. If you are
new to programming and agent-based modelling, or just want to play around with
some pre-built models it is an excellent place to start. However, for many purposes,
in particular, larger, more complex models it is less suitable.
I first implemented a version of the model in chapter 3 using Netlogo; but
ended up switching to a Java model. I found there were two main problems with
Netlogo for that project. Firstly, while Netlogo has a large number of built in ob-
jects 5, it isn’t so easy to create substantial custom models. The Logo language is
old fashioned, with an unusual syntax, limited abilities to do the kind of object ori-
entated programming which naturally fits the idea of agent-based modelling. There
are also specific issues when models become larger (everything is in one file so it
is difficult to decompose code into independent parts or using libraries). While in
principle this is possible I found it easier just to switch out of using Netlogo entirely.
The second major issue I found arose when trying to run the kind of repetitions of
experiments and collecting results in a form that could be processed which I wanted
for that project. Netlogo does have a tool called Behaviour Space which can auto-
mate this, but for one of things I wanted to look at there were performance issues
in calculating certain values6.
The work in this chapter is influenced by Isaac [2011] which takes the ‘ref-
erence implementations’ of Railsback et al. [2006] then refines specifications of the
examples and implements them in Python7 to add to the existing framework im-
plementations. The sixteen examples are implemented in ‘pure’ Python, though
with the use of several libraries including a custom ‘grid world’, MatPlotLib8 and
NumPy9. The work convincing demonstrates that Python is a suitable language for
agent-based modelling with many advantages over more popular approaches. It has
also clarified the reference implementations from Railsback et al. [2006] and associ-
ated work. Another pertinent observation relates to the over emphasis on real-time
5If for example you want to create a model on a lattice, network or 2D space a lot of this has
been created for you saving much time.
6Recent releases of Netlogo have included various performance improvements and bug fixes for
this tool so it possible that the performance issues may no longer arise.
7http://python.org/
8A collection of Python libraries that offers analogous features to Matlab.
9A numerical library for Python.
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visualisation in many agent-based frameworks; while this may be of pedagogical
value, it isn’t really particularly important for more serious work (or, of course, for
preparing work for publication or presentation).
5.2.1 The two approaches
In summary, broadly speaking we can split agent-based modelling frameworks into
three groups: visual programming systems, agent-based modelling libraries and
agent-based modelling languages. We do not remark visual programming systems
further; while they are extremely useful for learning and for allowing those unfa-
miliar with computer programming to engage with agent-based modelling I do not
think they represent a productive way for those with the requisite computer skills
to engage with general agent-based modelling. As an argument I offer two observa-
tions: firstly, aside from for some very specific purposes, visual programming tools
remain relatively unused for any kind of general problem solving and the kind of
approached covered above seem to be currently dominant in published agent-based
modelling work. On the other hand, visual tools may be ideal for modelling in a
specific domains.
So that leaves two general approaches, though the distinction is not always
particularly neat as agent-based modelling libraries may range from useful com-
ponents you might wish to use when doing agent-based modelling to a particular
scheme for doing modelling, such as SWARM’s split into model and laboratory. The
final approach is of a special purpose language, taken most prominently by Netl-
ogo. This should have many advantages as argued in Gilbert and Bankes [2002]
but despite that fact that this paper is nearly a decade old, many of the challenges
they note such as calibration of model and automatic case generation, still have not
really been satisfactorily addressed.
5.2.2 A third way and other ideas
In this chapter we argue for a ‘third way’ which will draw on many ideas from
contemporary software engineering practice to formulate a multi-part proposal for
how agent-based modelling might be done. There is relatively little work in the
field which examines these kinds of issues. An exception is Ropella et al. [2002]
which identifies several key issues with particular attention paid to working with
SWARM models, it is now a little dated; in particular there is now a more established
understanding of testing in software engineering practice.
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Internal Domain Specific Language
There are many benefits to purpose made programming language as can be seen
in Netlogo and other such projects; however, there are major drawbacks. Any
improvements or changes to the language will have to be made by the developers of
the framework, rather, than is typically the case with a standard language, a much
larger pool of developers with much greater expertise and funding. It also means
that it is likely to be difficult to integrate external libraries; rather than using a
standard language’s standard approach there will most likely be additional hoops
to jump through, if it is even possible to use external libraries.
The idea we pursue instead is an internal domain specific language, see Fowler
[2005]. Whereas a domain specific language just means a specialised (programming)
language, an internal (or embedded) domain specific language is using particular
forms of a general purpose language to include domain specific elements, so when
considering agent-based models we may have a specific language for defining and
manipulating agents. But alongside theses domain specific features we have access
to the full power of the base language. This is great for when it is difficult to tell
ahead of time what precise functionality you will need (very much the case with
agent-based modelling) but has the drawback of being less accessible to those who
don’t already know the base language.
Project not program
One of the nice features of Netlogo that we highlighted above was the integrated
documentation tab; it means that in a limited way a visual control of program,
documentation and program script are packaged together. The idea that what we
are really interested in is an agent-based modelling project (or even collection of
related projects) rather than a mere agent-based model will be a key idea in our
approach. A project will bring together consideration of some or all of the following:
a model containing (many) agents in a environment, simulations of this model,
experiments which compare or otherwise run simulations, visualisations of results,
presentation of the model, additional written work, additional mathematical analysis
and bringing various elements together in one document. There are of course many
ways in which this could be done, including considering most of it outside the scope
of the framework and leaving it up to the researcher (the standard approach).
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Version control
An accepted part of modern software engineering is version control10. This in essence
means keeping track (and storing) changes to a computer program11 and is partic-
ularly useful when multiple programmers or authors are involved as each can work
independently and combine changes at a later date (distributed version control).
There are three main issues vis a vis agent-based modelling frameworks: the main
content should ideally be stored in text files of some sort (such as a program lan-
guage’s source files) as this allows for easy comparison between versions, there should
be a distinction between source files (which are tracked) and generated files (which
may be temporary or depend on the particular computer on which the file exists
and so should not be tracked) and finally the actual configuration of the version
control system.
Testing
The other major element that one might argue is missing from most approaches
to agent-based modelling is automated testing. It has become an accepted part of
contemporary software engineering; using frameworks such as JUnit12 programmers
can write programs which test parts of their code in an automated fashion. While
any agent-based modelling framework which is a library for a standard computer
programming language makes automated testing possible, there seems to be little
explicit support for it. It is possible to identify three main issues. Firstly, does a
framework provide examples of tests of models on which a user can base their own.
Secondly, is the model itself explicitly tested and are these tests (along with the
source code) open to users so they can understand and modify them. Finally, how
the tests are run; most testing frameworks have specific ways of being run, that can
often be integrated into development tools. The issue of testing is vitally important
for addressing concerns about program correctness for agent-based modelling. While
there are more formal approaches to proving software correctness these are often
impractical for real projects. Simply making code open source for peer review is
insufficient as it may be extremely difficult to verify it is functioning properly, ideally
a comprehensive set of tests should accompany scientific work.
10Alternatively revision control or source control
11Or indeed any files; I use a version control program to keep track of changes to this thesis.
12http://www.junit.org/
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5.3 A prototype framework: Ambl
In this section we describe a prototype framework13 called Ambl which is built on
the key ideas identified in the previous section. It serves as an illustration and test
bed for the ideas and potentially a foundation on which a fully fledged platform
could be built. We comment on additional features which could be added to Ambl
towards the end of this chapter.
Project not program
Ambl conceives of an agent-based model broadly. Not only does it include specific
support for experiments, which contain multiple simulations of worlds containing
agents, it explicitly models the idea of a project which can include multiple experi-
ments. These projects can be exported in a variety of forms, the prototype includes
examples of export to LATEX, to HTML
14 and to a simple slide based presentation
format; and many more formats could easily be added and can contain things like
automatically generated diagrams, tables, visualisations of results, descriptions of
model components, simulations and experiments run and so on.
Internal Domain Specific Language
Ambl is part library and part internal domain specific language. For the basic
building blocks of an agent-based model Ambl has particular syntax, but it is syntax
within a standard programming language. As we mentioned above Ambl splits a
model into five basic building blocks:
1. Agent
2. World
3. Simulation
4. Experiment
5. Project
Which are arranged as figure 5.2 illustrates. So for example to take the idea of an
agent. Ambl has special syntax for adding a description to an agent, having variables
and parameters, declaring things that we are interested in observing for the agent
and documenting methods of interest (while keeping ‘internal’ methods internal).
13In fact both a prototype of a framework and a framework for prototyping models.
14Which will work in Word, Pages, OpenOffice Writer.
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Figure 5.2: A schematic overview of the main components of an agent-based model
in the Ambl framework. A project contains one or more experiments, each of which
contain one or more simulations, some of which may be repeated. Each simulation
takes place in a world, which has sets of agents (possibly of size one). The framework
supports multi-directional relationships between agents.
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In the next section we give a simple example that will make the capabilities and
particular kind of implementation clearer.
Testing
The key parts of Ambl include automated tests. These serve a dual purpose: firstly
they ensure that the various parts work as expected and secondly the user can
see clear examples of the usage of Ambl (which helps with their understanding,
gives them examples to base their projects on and gives them examples on which
to base their own tests for their projects). Ambl uses the RSpec15 framework,
which is a “behaviour driven development” framework; basically the idea is that you
(can) write examples of how a program should work and then write the program.
Ambl includes a command line driven way of running all tests in a project which is
compatible with integrated development environment tools which allow for features
like automated testing16.
Version control
While Ambl doesn’t explicitly include version control, it includes a configuration
file for the popular open source distributed version control program Git17 telling
the program which files should be tracked. All the major files are text based so
work well with such version control programs. Users may wish to customise on a
per project basis whether results and other outputs from runs of experiments are
stored in their version control system as either option could make sense.
5.4 Implementation
Up until this point I’ve managed to avoid referring specifically to the language Ambl
is implemented in. While appendix B and indeed the source code and documentation
of Ambl give full details, we’ll look at a self-contained summary here. Ambl is im-
plemented in the Ruby18 programming language, specifically the JRuby19 variant20.
15http://rspec.info/
16I used Rubymine (http://www.jetbrains.com/ruby/) for most development of Ambl and it
has an ‘auto-test’ toggle which means that tests are run on every modification of a source file, so you
get immediate feedback on whether you have broken something or can see if you have successfully
fixed something).
17http://git-scm.com/
18http://ruby-lang.org
19http://jruby.org
20Actually most of Ambl should work, possibly with minor modifications, with any recent version
of Ruby, see appendix C.
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In order to create the kind of internal domain specific language which advocated
above a language with flexible syntax is required. Popular choices for this kind of
task include languages such as Ruby and Scala21, but for agent-based modelling we
want both flexibility in running things (or describing how they should be run) and
flexibility over defining them. There are few languages that offer the kind of flexi-
bility Ruby offers for both areas. One can endlessly debate choices of programming
languages, but Ruby is a reasonable and perhaps currently the best choice for this
application, even if it has some drawbacks (see section 5.7.2). But fundamentally
we are addressing the methodological ideas and issues, the choice of language while
relevant, particularly if one is planning on developing the particular implementation
further, is not the main issue under consideration in this chapter.
Secondary advantages of JRuby include its inherently cross platform nature
(as it is based on the Java Virtual Machine it will run on a wide variety of platforms)
which allows the creation of things like graphical user interfaces which will across
different systems without modification, see figure 5.4. Ruby has a clear, concise
syntax, but unlike Python is very flexible, which makes creating a framework which
often appears fairly like normal written English possible. Finally it has access to
both Ruby and Java libraries, so for tasks ranging from scientific numeric computing
to pdf generation there are already multiple existing libraries which could be used.
The Ambl is extremely extensible and just about everything can be cus-
tomised, but if you use the defaults it is very easy and concise. Ambl and its
examples currently stand at around 6000 lines of Ruby code, not including addi-
tional templates and other supporting files22. The equivalent in languages like Java
would probably be several tens of thousands of lines of code, although much of the
functionality would be impossible to implement in anything like its current form in
most languages. In appendix C technical details, including how to obtain and run
Ambl for yourself, are provided.
5.5 A simple example
In this section we look at building a simple agent-based modelling using our proto-
type framework. This simple model contains a set of agents which have an energy
level. This energy level essentially undergoes a (possibly biased) random walk. The
agents have a utility which depends on their energy level. For the world of these
agents we have a couple of global properties (minimum utility and total utility)
21http://www.scala-lang.org/
22As estimated via find ./ -name ’*.rb’ -print0 | xargs -0 cat| wc -l
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Figure 5.3: An overview of Ambl and the outputs which it can generate.
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Figure 5.4: Graphical user interfaces for providing an overview of an Ambl project
and for running specific Ambl projects; both work across multiple platforms with no
required modifications. (Composite screenshot from Windows 7 and Mac OS 10.7.)
which we are interested in. We carry out simulations collecting these values as they
vary as determined by the individual random walks. The experiment we will carry
out will be for an unbiased random walk. Finally this experiment will be the only
one contained in a project with some additional information. The remainder of this
section will break down the above into components and explain how they each fit
into Ambl.
5.5.1 An Agent
Below we define the agent. Basically there are three main things to think about for
an agent: the things which are part of the definition (description, list of parameters
and so on), the things that an individual agent can do (the methods) and the
properties of an individual agent (the attributes, these are preceded with an @ symbol
in Ruby, and hence Ambl).
On line 2 we add a description of agent which can then be used for docu-
menting and outputting to various formats. On line 7 we declare a variable x which
we can then refer to as @x (Ambl takes care of setting it up). The next line defines
our agent’s parameters in a similar way. Lines 9 and 10 document certain methods
(to be defined below as being of special significance). On lines 12-15 we define our
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first method which returns the utility level of the agent; lines 17-19 and 21-23 de-
fine methods which increase or decrease the energy level (essentially take steps in a
random walk). By using the kind of internal domain specific language that is found
in lines 2-10 we have saved ourselves a lot of effort and ensured that our model of
an agent is much more concise and readable than it would otherwise be.
Listing 5.1: Example Agent
1 class ExampleProjectAgent < Ambl : : Agent
2 a d d d e s c r i p t i o n ”A simple example agent with two parameters .
3 I t has some energy l e v e l , which i s determined by a random walk o f
4 s tep s i z e : d e l t a . The u t i l i t y o f the agent i s the energy l e v e l
5 m u l t i p l i e d by : alpha ”
6
7 h a s v a r i a b l e s : x
8 has parameters : alpha , : d e l t a
9 ha s ob s e rvab l e s : u t i l i t y
10 has methods : dep l e t e ene rgy , : i n c r e a s e e n e r g y
11
12 def u t i l i t y
13 #can a l s o use parameters ( : alpha )
14 @x ∗∗ @alpha
15 end
16
17 def dep l e t e ene rgy
18 @x −= @delta
19 end
20
21 def i n c r e a s e e n e r g y
22 @x += @delta
23 end
24 end
5.5.2 A World
Below we define the world that our agents ‘live’ in. In Ambl the world will typically
be the most complex component of a model. In line 2 as for the agent we add a
description. Line 5 adds a collection to the world, giving it a name, declaring a class
that the objects in the collection will belong to and declaring a set-up method (where
we initialise the collection). Line 6 and 8 do similar things to the agent example,
declaring a parameter and some ‘observable’ properties we may be interested in. Line
7 declares an update. In Ambl we declare a set (possibly with only one member) of
updates which are carried out in each time period (Ambl, as is standard, assumes a
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succession of time periods).
In lines 11-17 we build our collection of agents. Line 12 illustrates a trivial
use of the Ambl options system. In Ambl class @options is a special attribute
which stores the options that have been passed to it. By using the fix method we
are adding additional options, in this case it is trivial as we are adding the same
values for every agent, in practice we will most likely want to vary options23 in
some fashion. In line 15 the Agents are created and added to the collection (Ambl
automatically generates the collection for us).
In lines 19-27 we have our update: it is relatively straightforward: for each
agent it randomly increases or depletes its energy. Lines 29-31 and 33-35 report on
global ‘observables’; they use Ruby’s concise functional programming style syntax.
If you are not already familiar with Ruby some of the above may not have
been clear. The good news is that the remainder of the components are in much
more of a domain specific style; the agent and world must, because they vary so
much from model to model, be somewhat lower level and hence depend largely
directly on the language’s syntax.
Listing 5.2: Example World
1 class ExampleProjectWorld < Ambl : : World
2 a d d d e s c r i p t i o n ”A simple example world conta in ing many ExampleAgents
.
3 A parameter : beta c o n t r o l s the b i a s o f the random walk o f the agents ”
4
5 h a s c o l l e c t i o n : example agents , : o b j e c t c l a s s => ExampleProjectAgent ,
: s e t up => : b u i l d c o l l e c t i o n
6 has parameter : beta
7 has updates : update energy
8 ha s ob s e rvab l e s : t o t a l u t i l i t y , : minimum uti l i ty
9
10
11 def b u i l d c o l l e c t i o n
12 opt ions = @options . f i x ( : x => 1 . 0 , : alpha => 2 . 0 , : d e l t a => 0 . 9 )
13
14 1 . upto (100) do | id |
15 @example agents << ExampleProjectAgent . new( opt ions , id )
16 end
17 end
18
19 def update energy
20 @example agents . each do | agent |
23Ambl includes specific support for having options which are agent dependent, rather than
having to call this repeatedly.
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21 i f rand > @beta
22 agent . i n c r e a s e e n e r g y
23 else
24 agent . d ep l e t e ene rgy
25 end
26 end
27 end
28
29 def t o t a l u t i l i t y
30 @example agents . i n j e c t ( 0 . 0 ) { | t o ta l , agent | t o t a l + agent . u t i l i t y }
31 end
32
33 def minimum uti l i ty
34 @example agents . i n j e c t ( @example agents [ 0 ] . u t i l i t y ) { |min , agent | min
= agent . u t i l i t y i f min > agent . u t i l i t y }
35 end
36 end
5.5.3 A Simulation
The below simulation almost doesn’t need explanation; everything is pretty close to
plain English. On line 3 is declares its World and line 4 specifies a parameter (as
before). Line 5 specifies a result which should be collected. Ambl has a sophisticated
results system, but most of the time you shouldn’t have to worry about it. You
specify an observable in the world to collection, optionally specify the resolution
(in what proportion of periods should it be recorded), and it will just collect it and
report it to the Experiment where it can be processed, outputted to a file for further
analysis and so on. Line 6 specifies something which should be collected at the end
of the simulation and line 7 specifies for how many periods to run it.
Listing 5.3: Example Simulation
1 class ExampleProjectSimulat ion < Ambl : : S imulat ion
2 a d d d e s c r i p t i o n ”A s imu la t i on o f the world with agents per forming a
random walk ( p o s s i b l y with b ia s : beta ) ”
3 has wor ld ExampleProjectWorld
4 has parameters : n
5 c o l l e c t r e s u l t : t o t a l u t i l i t y
6 c o l l e c t f i n a l : minimum uti l i ty
7 r u n f o r 25
8 end
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5.5.4 An Experiment
The experiment in this case is particularly simple as we only have one simulation,
to which we specify a beta value of 0.5, making it an unbiased random walk. Line
9 could be omitted as by default if only one simulation is supplied it is run. There
are more sophisticated run modes which will do things like carry out repetitions or
compare simulations.
Listing 5.4: Example Experiment
1 class ExampleProjectExperiment < Ambl : : Experiment
2 a d d d e s c r i p t i o n ”An example experiment which runs in the d e f a u l t way .
”
3
4 #Inc lude s imu la t i on s ; by d e f a u l t a l l would then be run ,
5 #but can more p r e c i s e l y s p e c i f y way they are run
6 has s imu la t i on : one , ExampleProjectSimulation , : beta => 0 .5
7
8 #The below i s the d e f a u l t so could have been omitted
9 run s imu la t i on : one
10 end
5.5.5 A Project
The below listing concludes our simple example project. As with the Experiment
and Simulation above it should be relatively straightforward to follow. We add a
title, author and description. We add some sections and some text. The interesting
lines are 6-8 where we declare several outputs and line 13 where we declare the
experiment. The position of that line is significant: it determines the order in which
sections will appear in the outputs and is somewhat in keeping with the idea of
Literate Programming, see Knuth [1984], where we mix description and code.
Listing 5.5: Example Agent
1 class Bas i cPro j e c t < Ambl : : Pro j e c t
2 a d d t i t l e ”Example Ambl Pro j e c t ”
3 add author ”James Porter ”
4 a d d d e s c r i p t i o n ”An example p r o j e c t which i l l u s t r a t e s the key id ea s
o f us ing the Ambl framework . ”
5
6 has output ” ba s i c p r o j e c t ” , HTMLProcessor
7 has output ” bas ic−pro j e c t−d r a f t ” , LatexProcessor
8 has output ” ba s i c p r o j e c t ” , Pre s en ta t i onProce s so r
9
10 add se c t i on ” In t roduc t i on ”
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11 add text ” This i s a s imple p r o j e c t with only one s e t o f agents . ”
12
13 has exper iment : s imple , ExampleProjectExperiment
14
15 add se c t i on ” Conclus ion ”
16 add text ” Hopefu l ly these examples have been h e l p f u l . Good luck with
your own p r o j e c t ( s ) . ”
17 end
5.6 A fuller example
In this section we carry out an example trans-disciplinary investigation using Agent-
Based Modelling. As the example we focus on an investigation of commercial strate-
gies that could be used by a developer when creating ‘Apps’ for an online distribu-
tions store such as the Android Market24 or Apple App Store25. This is an ideal
example for a number of reasons:
• The global, competitive market means that many simplifying economic as-
sumptions we may wish to make are in fact fairly realistic.
• The large number of Apps (in the hundreds of thousands) and downloads (in
the tens of billions) means that we have a lot of actual data on which to base
our model (and the potential to gain more with collaboration from developers).
• This kind of environment can be considered paradigmatic of many current and
future online retail methods.
• They are popular and well understood markets (many, if not most, readers
will own smart-phones and have personal experience using such markets).
• I have personally developed applications for the Android Market and thus can
play both sides of this trans-disciplinary investigation.
Using an agent-based model we can create a framework in which a developer can
simulate many different approaches and calibrate for their particular current situa-
tion, audience and chosen application area. While a more traditional mathematical
model could no doubt be constructed (and would probably be of interest) the agent-
based approach offers more flexibility and a greater ease of dealing with some of the
complex interrelated features of a App Market.
24See http://market.android.com
25See http://www.apple.com
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5.6.1 The problem
The problem we examine is the choice between a developer creating one higher qual-
ity application or more than one application, which will then presumably be lower
in quality. The difficulty in this decision comes from the way in which application
sales are driven. While typically an application is available to every buyer in the
world, they do not know ahead of time the quality of the application. In assessing
this they may depend on a number of channels, such as:
1. the reviews from previous buyers,
2. their ownership of another application from that developer
3. and promotion by the App Store.
The first and third will depend on the quality of the application. The second will
depend on their already owning another application from the developer. While one
could develop this model much further, we use the development of a basic case in
order to illustrate the use of the framework.
5.6.2 Modelling the agents and world
First we need to consider at what level to model our scenario. In this model we will
just consider one seller in isolation, who produces one or more applications each of
whom have a set of buyers. There are more efficient ways of modelling this than
the approach we adopt below, but this approach allows for the future addition more
sophisticated interrelationships, which could be driven by empirical data gained
from actual App Stores.
Below is our first type of agent, the seller. The seller will produce one or more
application and the the question we want to examine is how revenue is determined
by the choice of the number of applications to develop. The model we built is highly
simplified but many of the components that are included, or could be included, are
in practice measurable either in aggregate, or in some cases at the individual level
via the use of software analytical tools by the developers.
Lines 1-5 function as in our previous example project (detailed above). We
declare a new AppStoreSeller object and set up several parameters. We also flag
a couple of methods as being observable (for documentation purposes) along with
additional methods. The has many in line 5 is new and essential says that under
the name apps instances of this object should have a collection of AppStoreApp or
applications. This will be initialised for us and is made available as @apps.
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We then have several methods which create a new application (lines 7-11),
develop the number of applications specified by our parameter (lines 13-16) and
update buyers of each application (lines 22-26). The method in lines 18-20 return
the current revenue for the seller (the sum of the revenues for each application).
The code takes advantage of a number of Ruby features, such as the functional
programming style inject26 to keep things clear and concise.
Listing 5.6: An App Store Seller
1 class AppStoreSe l l e r < Ambl : : Agent
2 has parameters : s k i l l , : c a p i t a l , : number of apps
3 ha s ob s e rvab l e s : revenue
4 has methods : create app , : develop , : u p d a t e b u y e r s o f a p p s a t r a t e
5 has many : apps , AppStoreApp
6
7 def c rea te app ( e f f o r t )
8 a = c r e a t e w i t h i d ( AppStoreApp , { : e f f o r t => e f f o r t } , @apps . l ength )
9 a . s e l l e r = s e l f
10 @apps << a
11 end
12
13 def develop
14 e f f o r t = @capita l / @number of apps . t o f
15 @number of apps . t imes { c rea te app ( e f f o r t ) }
16 end
17
18 def revenue
19 @apps . i n j e c t (0 ) { | sum , app | sum + app . revenue }
20 end
21
22 def u p d a t e b u y e r s o f a p p s a t r a t e ( r a t e )
23 @apps . each do | app |
24 app . upda t e buye r s a t r a t e ( r a t e )
25 end
26 end
27 end
Below is the code for an App Store application (or App). It is the most
complex part of the model (currently) but is still quite concise as it takes advantage
of many of the features of Ambl. Lines 5-11 declare the various Ambl properties. It
has a certain quality that is determined by the effort put into producing it. Each
buyer gives is a score and the rate of new buyers depends on these scores. It has an
26In other languages this often goes by the name reduce or fold; both would in fact be valid
Ruby but inject is more standard.
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observable property called revenue which we have already summed above to get the
total revenue per seller. It has a function setup which is declared as to be used to
set up the object instance. It also has both one seller and many buyers.
As is mentioned in the comment on lines 16-17 the current implementation
of setting the quality and score is basic and we should probably customise it for
particular App Stores based on their scoring system. Lines 18-39 define the functions
to set up the App, to get a score (this scoring is done by buyers, but it easiest
to define this here) and to give an overall quality score for the app (which will
determine future sales). Lines 49-55 define how we add buyers. This is done at a
rate determined by a value passed by the world (the rate), by the quality score and
with a noise term rand.
Listing 5.7: An App Store App
1 class AppStoreApp < Ambl : : Agent
2 a d d d e s c r i p t i o n ”An a p p l i c a t i o n ( or \”app \”) ; i t has a q u a l i t y
determined by e f f o r t ( in the s imple case d i r e c t l y ) . I t can repor t
i t s revenue
3 ( t o t a l s a l e s ) and maintains a l i s t o f buyers . ”
4
5 h a s v a r i a b l e s : qua l i ty , : s co re s , : t o t a l s c o r e
6 has parameters : e f f o r t
7 ha s ob s e rvab l e s : revenue
8 has methods : add buyer , : update buyers
9 has se tup : setup
10 has one : s e l l e r , : AppStoreSe l l e r
11 has many : buyers , : AppStoreBuyer
12
13 #Assume q u a l i t y i s on un i t i n t e r v a l
14 #This i s a s imple func t i on which has d e s i r a b l e p r o p e r t i e s
15 #i . e . d imin i sh ing marginal r e tu rn s to e f f o r t , in un i t i n t e r v a l , doesn
’ t a t t a i n 1 ( no ’ p e r f e c t ’ apps )
16 #Probably want to con s id e r something more s o p h i s t i c a t e d
17 #Should be based on user s c o r e s / other met r i c s
18 def setup
19 @qual ity = (3 / 4 . 0 ) ∗ @ef f o r t ∗∗ 2 .0
20 @scores = [ ]
21 @ t o t a l s c o r e = 0
22 end
23
24 #Determined p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y v ia q u a l i t y
25 def g e t s c o r e
26 s co r e = rand < @qual ity ? 0 : 1
27 @scores << s c o r e
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28 @ t o t a l s c o r e += sco r e
29 s co r e
30 end
31
32 #a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d not ion o f q u a l i t y tak ing in to account the
ac tua l q u a l i t y along with user feedback
33 def q u a l i t y i m p r e s s i o n
34 i f @scores . l ength > 0
35 @qual ity ∗ @ t o t a l s c o r e / @scores . l ength . t o f
36 else
37 @qual ity
38 end
39 end
40
41 def revenue
42 @buyers . l ength
43 end
44
45 def add buyer ( buyer )
46 @buyers << buyer
47 end
48
49 def updat e buye r s a t r a t e ( r a t e )
50 ( rand ∗ r a t e ∗ q u a l i t y i m p r e s s i o n ) . round . t imes do
51 buyer = AppStoreBuyer . new( @options , @buyers . l ength )
52 buyer . buy s e l f
53 add buyer buyer
54 end
55 end
56 end
Our final agent class if for the buyers. If you were attempting to optimise
the performance of this model you would probably remove this class as it currently
stands; but we leave it here as if we wanted to make the model more realistic we
will almost certainly need to build on this. Currently the interesting part is the
possibility that if a buyer likes an App (lines 19-21), they buy all the other Apps
sold by the seller (lines 24-30). Of course we should probably replace this with a
probability based on observed data27.
Listing 5.8: An App Store Buyer
1 class AppStoreBuyer < Ambl : : Agent
2 a d d d e s c r i p t i o n ”A buyer o f the smart phone a p p l i c a t i o n . Has a l i s t
27In my experience the assumption that someone who likes an App immediately buys all other
Apps on sale from the same seller is heroically optimistic.
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o f a p p l i c a t i o n s and has a s co r e f o r each ( the s co r e i s 0 f o r
d i s l i k e , 1 f o r l i k e ; a r e a l i s t i c
3 model would f o l l o w s c o r i n g o f App Store ) , c u r r e n t l y i f the buyer l i k e s
an app she buys a l l other apps from the s e l l e r , should
4 be based on e m p i r i c a l data . ”
5
6 h a s v a r i a b l e s : apps
7 has methods : b u y o t h e r a p p s f r o m s e l l e r o f
8 has se tup : s e t u p s c o r e s h a s h
9 has many : apps , : AppStoreApp
10
11 def s e t u p s c o r e s h a s h
12 @scores = {}
13 end
14
15 def buy ( app )
16 @apps << app
17 @scores [ app ] = app . g e t s c o r e
18
19 i f @scores [ app ] > 0
20 b u y o t h e r a p p s f r o m s e l l e r o f ( app )
21 end
22 end
23
24 #Buy apps from the s e l l e r o f the app which the buyer does not a l r eady
have ( i . e . @apps )
25 def b u y o t h e r a p p s f r o m s e l l e r o f ( app )
26 ( app . s e l l e r . apps − @apps ) . each do | a |
27 buy a
28 a . add buyer s e l f
29 end
30 end
31 end
The world in this case is relatively simple as we only have one seller and
interactions between agents do not occur explicitly in the world (but are handled
by agents). We declare a collection of sellers in line 7, even though in this case it
is a simple collection of 1 and set it up in lines 12-18; getting each seller (though
we only have one) to develop applications. We can work out the total revenue as in
lines 20-22; this code will work when we have more than one seller. We only have
one update per period, which is defined in lines 24-27 and as you can see just calls
the update method of each seller; again this code will work when we have more than
one seller.
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Listing 5.9: App Store World
1 class OneSellerAppStoreWorld < Ambl : : World
2 a d d d e s c r i p t i o n ”A world with one App s e l l e r . As buyers buy the App
they
3 may i n c r e a s e the ra t e o f s a l e s o f the App i t s e l f
4 and ( i f a p p l i c a b l e ) p o s s i b l y buy other Apps from the same s e l l e r . ”
5
6 has parameter : r a t e
7 h a s c o l l e c t i o n : s e l l e r s , : o b j e c t c l a s s => AppStoreSe l l e r , : s e t up =>
: c r e a t e l i s t o f s e l l e r s
8 ha s ob s e rvab l e s : revenue
9 has updates : update world
10
11 #Current ly j u s t one s e l l e r
12 def c r e a t e l i s t o f s e l l e r s
13 opt ions = @options . f i x ( : c a p i t a l => 1 . 0 , : s k i l l => 1 . 0 )
14 @ s e l l e r s = [ AppStoreSe l l e r . new( opt ions , 0) ]
15 @ s e l l e r s . each do | s e l l e r |
16 s e l l e r . develop
17 end
18 end
19
20 def revenue
21 @ s e l l e r s . i n j e c t (0 ) { | sum , s e l l e r | sum += s e l l e r . revenue }
22 end
23
24 def update world
25 @ s e l l e r s . each do | s e l l e r |
26 s e l l e r . u p d a t e b u y e r s o f a p p s a t r a t e ( @rate )
27 end
28 end
29 end
5.6.3 Setting up an experiment
For this illustration we set up a set of simulation which vary the number of appli-
cations produced by a seller. We declare the World, a parameter to be supplied by
the experiment, we collect the revenue observable every 5 periods and run this for
100 periods. All of those feature can be easily modified.
Listing 5.10: Example Agent
1 class AppStoreSimulation < Ambl : : S imulat ion
2 a d d d e s c r i p t i o n ”A s imu la t i on o f a s e l l e r with a f i x e d s t r a t e g y ”
3 has wor ld OneSellerAppStoreWorld
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4 has parameters : number of apps
5 c o l l e c t r e s u l t : revenue , : r e s o l u t i o n => 5
6 r u n f o r 100
7 end
Below is our experiment which runs the above simulation with different
number of apps parameters (running from 1 to 5); it repeats each simulation 10
times and will automatically average the results.
Listing 5.11: Example Agent
1 class AppStoreExperiment < Ambl : : Experiment
2 a d d d e s c r i p t i o n ”A s e t o f s imu la t i on s o f a s i n g l e s e l l e r on an App
Store
3 comparing the revenues obta ined by d i f f e r e n t f i x e d s t r a t e g i e s ( number
o f a p p l i c a t i o n s developed ) . ”
4 ha s s imu la t i on : comparison , AppStoreSimulation , : r a t e => 100 , :
c a p i t a l => 1 .0
5
6 v a ry p a r a me t e r f o r s im u l a t i on : comparison , : vary parameter => :
number of apps , : o v e r v a l u e s => [ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ]
7 repeat 10
8 end
We omit the project as in its current form it is very similar to the previous
example. A full project for this would include multiple experiments with different
versions of the App Store model. When we run this model (either via the command
line, our software tools or the graphical user interface in figure 5.4) we obtain the
final revenue figures presented in figure 5.5. When you run an Ambl project the
results are saved in a standard .csv file and default visualisations are created for
each result collected. In this experiment the results do depend heavily on the way
multiple applications are evaluated, so it would be of critical importance to replace
details of the model with empirically calibrated values before drawing conclusions.
5.7 Evaluation
There are two major areas to evaluate for a methodology for agent-based modelling.
The first areas is that of the method and we might ask questions such as how easy is
it to use, does it accomplish it goals and so on. The second concerns performance.
While a framework might meet all its stated objectives if is extremely slow then it
is unlikely to be successful. Related questions concern the difficulty in optimising a
model and how it interoperates with other frameworks. Ambl is currently missing
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Figure 5.5: An example final revenue result for the App Store model over 100
periods. With these parameters producing 2 applications maximises revenue.
several features which should probably be included in such a general framework, we
leave discussion of theses until the next section.
5.7.1 Method
In section 5.3 we covered (briefly) how Ambl implements each of the key ideas we
covered and in the final section we discuss some future additional possibilities but
here we focus on evaluating some of the unique (or unusual) features of Ambl.
A key aspect of Ambl is in the automated generation of outputs with no
additional work on the part of the user. Figure ?? shows one example of a generate
output from an example Ambl project. It is pdf generated from LATEX source which
has been compiled unmodified from that generated by Ambl. Ambl takes a project
with its experiments, simulations, worlds and agents and automatically summarises
it. It runs the simulations and picks appropriate visualisations for each kind of
experiment, so for example if the experiment compares different parameter values it
plots all results on the same plot so the can be compared; if it repeats a simulation
Ambl averages over your results. It outputs these results, then converts them to a
format suitable for compilation via pdflatex. While this will not produce a final
article it quickly produces something that can be shared, amended and expanded
upon. A future version of this framework could quite reasonably be expected to
112
produce outputs something along the lines of first draft of an article, though this
would require a few more features, particularly improvement in visualisation (see
the final section).
A simple example of the largely unmodified28 output of an example included
with Ambl is provided in Appendix D. While this is far from a polished report or
paper it provides a basic LATEX outline, summaries of the key parts of the agent-
based model and the experiment undertaken; along with actual results from those
experiments; all with no additional work.
Visualisation of results is the key challenge in advancing this kind of work-
flow. Trying to create something that can produce results without much human
intervention is hard. All of the standard tools which I have tried appear to be
in some way clumsy, ugly or limited. Ambl uses Ruby-Vis29 which is a Ruby im-
plementation of Proto-Vis, a visualisation toolkit favoured by many visualisation
professionals30 as it can produce very pretty results and is extremely flexible. In
figure 5.6 example visualisations created using this framework are shown to demon-
strate something of the range of possible visualisations. It is currently relatively
straightforward for experienced programmers to to adapt these examples for their
own use to create state of the art visualisations; however, it is far from accessible to
inexperienced programmers, let alone non-programmers, and may take quite a bit
of time; which is why I remain unsatisfied with the visualisation aspects of Ambl.
However, as Ambl saves results in a standard format users can use whatever tools
they are comfortable with (I actually used Matlab for most of the figures in this
thesis). Ambl also saves visualisations in a user-editable vector format (.svg) so it
is possible to prettify visualisations using standard graphics tools, which is in fact
the approach suggested in the visualisation text Yau [2011].
5.7.2 Performance
In chapters 3 and 4 we utilised a carefully optimised model written in Java for
numerical realisations of the economies. In this section we take the model from 4
and recreate it in our framework in order to compare performance. There are two
major ways we will compare performance; firstly, in terms of raw speed of execution
and secondly in terms of how clear the code is, how long it would take to write and
so on.
The original Java application is written in the typical way. It does not
28Some changes were necessary for it to be included within this thesis document.
29http://rubyvis.rubyforge.org/
30See for example http://flowingdata.com/index.php?s=protovis.
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Figure 5.6: A collection of sample visualisations which use the Ruby-Vis library.
use any agent-based modelling libraries but outputs results to a standard .csv
file for processing and visualisation. The code for the model has been repeatedly
improved. It is clear and relatively concise (for Java, a language with a reputation
for verboseness). However the Ambl files, are in my opinion at least, much clearer.
A particular problem for the Java project was in the creating of lots of files to run
various simulations; these tended to contain a lot of boiler plate code and repetition.
While that problem could be partially solved by the use of an appropriate Java
framework, it is highly unlikely that even then we would get as concise and clear
simulation and experiment running files as those made possible by Ambl.
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 compare the performance of the Java and Ambl versions
of the networked cautious trading model from chapter 4. This is not an entirely fair
comparison as the Ambl version has a built in benchmarking mode which turns off
result collection so that you are just testing the main algorithm; the Java version is
building up arrays of results (though not outputting them). The Ambl performance
is slightly better on average; however if result collection is enabled this will no longer
be the case. The result collection mechanism in Ambl could be further optimised for
performance; though as this would make the simulation running code considerably
more complex this should probably only be done once simulation running has been
finalised. Also the Java version will significantly outperform the Ambl version once
we have more closely converged agents; at this point the numerical random gener-
ation of proposals becomes the important issue. A further caveat on performance
is that JRuby will soon be updated to a version with potentially large performance
improvements31 so I’m reluctant to draw any strong conclusions here; however, the
performance of Ambl seems to be satisfactory.
31Updated to version 1.7 which takes advantages of new features in the JVM.
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The architecture of Ambl allows the lower level components (the agents and
world) to be replaced by code written in a lower level language. It should be straight-
forward to write a JRuby adapter32 for a suitably written and compiled Java version
of a model; which would give nearly all the performance benefits of a pure Java
model, but with all of the documentation and output benefits of Ambl.
Figure 5.7: Total run time in seconds for 100 runs of 1000 periods, comparing the
Java version to the Ambl version as we vary the number of agents in the networked
economy. This is not an entirely fair test as the Ambl version has a built in bench-
marking mode which turns off result collection so that you are just testing the main
algorithm; the Java version is building up arrays of results (though not outputting
them).
32The idea of an adapter is to take a piece of code and create a wrapper round it (an adapter) so
that it can fit in with other code which expects certain functionality. The authoritative reference is
Gamma et al. [1994]. Here we would actually be replacing Ambl code at the agent and world level
with a compiled Java replacement. A simple adapter World could be set up to call the Java code
appropriately but also to use the original Ambl code for documentation and so on.
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Figure 5.8: n
Total run time in seconds for 100 runs of 1000 periods, comparing the Java version
to the Ambl version as we vary the number of goods in the networked economy.
This is not an entirely fair test as the Ambl version has a built in benchmarking
mode which turns off result collection so that you are just testing the main
algorithm; the Java version is building up arrays of results (though not outputting
them).
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5.8 Future work
Hopefully this chapter has convinced you both of the feasibility and usefulness for
agent-based modelling of version control, testing and thinking about agent-based
models in a more holistic project-based way. Each of these ideas to some extent is
included or at least could be included by most general purpose agent-based modelling
systems. Our argument is that they should be, perhaps to a greater extent. Explicit
support for many of these ideas could make them more accessible to newcomers
and generally encourage their use. Proper testing of models should be an essential
part of agent-based modelling and there are a lot of existing tools from software
development more generally which could be used for this purpose.
There are various directions one could take to build on Abml in order to
to make this into a ‘full framework’ (as I’ve argued it is already useful for many
purposes). There is a clear need for improved documentation, both in the form of
a reference and tutorials for newcomers; though one can say the same about most
agent-based modelling frameworks, or indeed most software frameworks in general.
The appendices B and C along with the source code, for those with the requisite
skill in Ruby, are starting points.
In terms of modelling currently there is only explicitly support for time in
the form of periods; one can add continuous time modelling via the Gillespie algo-
rithm, but it would be helpful to have explicit support for this kind of thing. Many
agent-based modelling platforms offer some kind of “event driven” notion of pro-
cesses; Ruby as a language can quite naturally support such ideas, but again some
kind of explicit support might be useful, particularly if it allowed for automatic
documentation generation along with explanatory diagrams.
Visualisation is, as remarked above, a key challenge. Ambl seeks to automate
this as much as possible (at least for the initial version). One would ideally have a
system where visualisations are automatically generated but where a tool exists to
tweak or replace them as desired. There is a recently started open source project
which aims to make these kinds of things, among others, much more accessible33.
In terms of outputs a natural generalisation of the current system might be
to think of a project and output in terms somewhat inspired by aspect orientated
programming: we might have different aspects of our project (report, presentation,
visualisations, models or custom combinations of these) which are woven together in
various formats; so we could produce a LATEX report or a web based model overview.
Including more sophisticated model diagramming, perhaps something like UML, see
33http://sciruby.com/
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Bersini [2012], could be useful (though it is easier to use this kind of thing when
working in statically typed languages). One might also want to think about how to
include actual write ups and how to work effectively with collaborators on projects
using Ambl.
But Ambl is, in its current form, very much ready for actual agent-based
modelling work. The agent-based models created for chapter 6 were created using
Ambl (and are included as examples with Ambl). The only addition required was
some code to calculate the average values of a property across periods for each agent;
everything else was essentially ‘pure’ Ambl. In fact this highlights one of the key
advantages of an internal domain specific language: when additional functionality
is required for some special purpose it is typically easy to add.
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Chapter 6
Strategic Segregation
6.1 Introduction
A pure equilibrium approach is unlikely to suffice for those major economic and
social issues dealing with questions of economic or social change with non-trivial
micro-macro interrelationships. Models which are either intrinsically dynamic or
which can be straightforwardly extended to dynamic models are necessary but, at
the microeconomic level in particular, relatively rare. In this chapter we consider a
model where agents make choices about their effort, but where the outcome depends
(stochastically) on the actions of others. It is thus, at one level, a strategic model.
But it can form the basis of more sophisticated dynamic models, of models with
simple local learning and (potentially) of policy discussions.
In our model agents are given the choice of whether to acquire human capital
(to ”get educated”), in which case with some probability they may escape poverty,
achieve success and so on, or to remain at the status quo, in which case they have
a guaranteed utility which is higher than that is they put in the effort but fail to
succeed. The probability of success if they do put in effort depends non-trivially on
the decisions of others in their community.
This kind of model can incorporate a wide range of social scenarios from
the university attainment rates from the classroom of a developed country to urban
migration from a village in a developing country; in each case an individual’s prob-
ability of success depends on the action of their peers. Two major factors will be in
play here: competition and cooperation, the model we present shortly can be used
to model purely competitive cases, purely complementary cases and our benchmark
case where both effects occur.
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6.2 Related Work
I previously introduced the Schelling Segregation model (Schelling [1971]) in section
2.7 as a classic example of agent-based modelling1, but it is additionally (and more
specifically) a fundamental model of dynamic segregation. The typical area to which
it is applied is residential segregation, but of course it can be applied more widely.
Some of the major, more recent, efforts in modelling polarisation and segregation
are explored in section 2.10. In the remainder of this section we look at some of the
work more specifically relevant to our approach.
Roland Benabou looks at a model of residential segregation in Benabou
[1993]. His model links residential choice, educational investment and production
with distinct communities. Homogeneous agents choose between becoming high-
skill or low skill workers or remaining outside formal labour force. It is a general
equilibrium model, with the distribution of agents’ abilities and tastes being deter-
mined endogenously. The key elements of the model are: a continuum of identical
agents, a city: agents choose to live in one district or remain outside production
(with constant returns to scale) and education as a local public good. An equilib-
rium solution for a fully integrated community (i.e. one district) is found; a simple
dynamic is formulated to consider how agents might switch between skill sets. Un-
der particular conditions 2 segregation occurs (concentration of high skill workers).
Results are generalised for any number of districts.
Bowles et al. [2009] explores group inequality resulting from segregation and
its resultant effects on the cost of human capital investment. In their model there
are two social groups, parents invest in the human capital of their children without
discounting (i.e. they fully internalise the resultant utility of their children). Oc-
cupational status is split into two categories, attaining the higher requires greater
investment. The model considers a continuum of agents.
Output in period t is given by f(ht, lt), where ht (proportion of high skill
workers) is less than st (proportion who have higher skills) and f satisfies constant
returns to scale and diminishing marginal returns. h˜ is value of h for which marginal
products are equal, so ht = min{st, h˜}.
There are two groups with population proportions β,1 − β and skill shares
s1t ,s
2
t . For every individual a proportion η of peers is from the group he belongs to
(this is the correlation ratio) and he has a ability drawn from G(a) with support
[0,∞).
1In Schelling [2006] a retrospective account of how this primitive agent based model arose from
manually running the model on paper is provided.
2Detailed on page 636, proposition 2.
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Segregation is σit = ηs
i
t + (1− η)st. Cost of human capital is function c(a, σ)
which assuming no discrimination and no discounting there will be a threshold level
of ability above which individuals in each group will acquire the human capital.
This framework results in a dynamic specified by
sit = G(a˜(δ(st), σ
i
t−1))
where δ(st) is anticipated future wage differential. Depending on initial level of
inequality and level of segregation we get different (persistent) outcomes.
In Mookherjee et al. [2010] looks at both the model from Bowles et al. [2009]
that we have just examined and a model of the authors. In their model roughly
speaking there is a 1-dimensional continuum geography which locally determine
agents’ behaviour. A location determines cost of investing in skills; this is a com-
bination of global and local factors. There are global wages for low and high skills
(determined by the fraction at each skill level). At each location there will be
a resultant skill proportion (the proportion of agents at that point with skills).
The resulting equilibrium can be symmetric (they use the term unsegregated) or
asymmetric (where the geography is split into alternating regions of investing and
non-investing). In a somewhat similar approach in Ray and Robson [2010] the idea
of status is examined using this kind of model.
In Hanaki et al. [2011] a model of car parking is studied, as an example of
situation where agents may learn to be ‘lucky’. The basic idea is that there is a
group of workers, a one-way street where you can choose a point a which to take
the next available parking space (it is assumed you cannot look ahead); so their
strategy is some k ∈ K, where K is the set of spaces3. If no parking spaces are free
you end up in car park paying a fixed cost, whereas if you find a space you pay a
cost proportional to the distance from the workplace.
Initially this model is analysed from a Nash equilibrium perspective. There
may be both symmetric Nash equilibria (the details depend on the model, but a
one might be where all agents take the first available space) or most interestingly
asymmetric equilibria where agents may be in ‘lucky’ groups or ‘unlucky’ groups;
that is there are some that because they expect a better result are in fact more likely
to obtain it; there may in fact be a totally asymmetric equilibrium where agents
1, . . . , N have strategies to park in spaces that are some permutation of (1, . . . , N);
that is they each end up with a particular space, and if they defect there is some
probability of ending up in the car park such that their expected utility is worse
3There may be more or less spaces than agents.
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that settling for their own space, however bad it might be.
The model is then formulated as a dynamic one with agent learning. In each
period there is a fixed probability of an agent entering or leaving the city and there
is a set of period t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Depending on the model parameters regions where
symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are stable can be identified. This kind of model
is attractive as it should be applicable to a wide range of important situations where
you can’t go back on a choice, such as a job offer or dating. Interestingly it suggests
that instead of supposing internal and heterogeneous risk appetites, the response to
risk may be learned.
6.3 Our model
In our model agents are given the choice of whether to put in effort or to remain at
the status quo. It is a strategic model, as the probability of success depends on the
choices of other agents. In this section we precisely define the general form of the
model then consider three major types of the model, carrying out an equilibrium
characterisation for each. In this section we focus on a continuum version of the
model with homogeneous agents as it makes the concepts involved clearer. We
develop a discrete version of the model with heterogeneous agents in a later section.
Our economy E consists of a continuum of individuals. Each agent has a
base utility ul, if they put in effort there is cost e and if they succeed (as determined
by a economy wide probability of success) they attain utility uh. That is for an
agent i:
ui =

uh − e if i attains high status
ul − e if i aspires to high status but fails to attain it
ul if i doesn’t aspire to high status
We assume that uh − ah > ul (and ul > ul − ah). Let the probability of success for
an agent be a function q(mh), where mh ∈ [0, 1] is the measure of agents who do
put in the effort e.
6.3.1 Complementarity model
First we consider the case where effort by one’s peers is complementary to one’s
own effort, that is q is increasing in mh. Consider the linear form of qm (or course
we could consider more complex increasing functions but qualitatively the same
conclusions would hold, at least generically with respect to the Nash equilibrium
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characterisation). Let qm = ρmh, where ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Then if the agent puts in effort
e
E(u) = ρmhuh + (1− ρmh)ul − e.
otherwise
E(u) = ul
As uh > ul, for suitable values of ρ we have the situation illustrated in figure 6.1
q
1 1
u
Figure 6.1: The left hand graph just shows the probability of success given effort
as it increases with the fraction of agents mh putting in effort e. The right hand
figure shows the expected utility depending on the choice of the agent, given the
measure of agents putting in the effort. The constant utility is for no effort, the
linearly increasing line if effort is expended. When these lines do not intersect the
outcome will be trivial.
There are up to three qualitatively distinct Nash equilibria: mh = 0, mh = 1
and an unstable Nash Equilibria where mh =
e+ul
ρ(uh−ul)+ul . The third is clearly
unstable, as any additional non-zero fraction of agents expending effort eh will make
the choice of effort eh optimal for all agents. The second equilibrium is a strict Pareto
improvement on the first, though if ρ is small relative to uluh this equilibrium may
not exist.
6.3.2 Competitive model
Now consider the case where effort by one’s peers is competitive with one’s own
effort, that is q is decreasing in mh. Consider the linear form of qm (once more it
should be noted that while we could consider more complex decreasing functions
qualitatively the same conclusions would hold, at least generically with respect to
123
the Nash equilibrium characterisation). Let qm = β − ρmh, where β, ρ ∈ (0, 1] and
βuh − e > ul. Then if the agent puts in effort e:
E(u) = (β − ρmh)uh + (1− β + ρmh)ul − e.
otherwise
E(u) = ul
As uh > ul, for suitable values of β, ρ we have the situation illustrated in figure 6.2
q
1 1
u
Figure 6.2: The left hand graph just shows the probability of success given effort as
it decreases with the fraction of agents mh putting in effort e. The right hand figure
shows the expected utility depending on the choice of the agent, given the measure
of agents putting in the effort. The constant utility is for no effort (maintaining
status quo), the linearly decreasing line if effort is expended. When these lines do
not intersect the outcome will be trivial.
In this case there is one Nash equilibrium where our two alternative actions
intersect, that is mh =
β(uh−ul)−e
ρ(uh−ul) . Where they do not intersect there is a trivial
equilibrium.
6.3.3 Benchmark model
We turn now to the basic form of what will be our benchmark model. We want to
incorporate both competition and complementarity in our model and our benchmark
case is that of an inverted u-shaped probability of success curve. The idea here is
that if no other, or only a small number of other agents are putting in effort then it
makes it highly unlikely that any agent will succeed. As more agents put in effort
the probability of success increases. However, once a certain threshold is crossed
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the probability decreases. This idea could include a wide variety of situations,
particularly with respect to eduction of a group and its effect on attainment within
a wider society which is competitive.
The most interesting of the qualitative variations of such a model is illustrated
in figure 6.3 (as when there are fewer intersections we are either in a trivial case or
in one of the previous two cases). You can see that in a local sense we include the
equilibria of the previous models: there is the Pareto suboptimal Nash equilibrium
with mh = 0, a Pareto optimal equilibrium with positive mh < 1. And again there
is an unstable Nash equilibrium.
In order to be more precise let us consider the purest form of this model in
figure 6.4. Here we have a linearly increasing probability of success with increasing
participation until some threshold after which the probability linearly decreases.
We analyse this form, though the results obtained could be applied to any func-
tional form of probability of success which is initially strictly increasing, then after
a threshold is strictly decreasing. Here we have some threshold proportion of agents
n such that:
q(mh) =
ρmh if mh < nβ − ρmh if mh ≥ n
where ρ ∈ and β = n(ρ+ ρ), that is for consistency we require nρ = β − ρ. For this
scenario there are up to three Nash equilibria. There is a stable Nash equilibrium
where mh = 0 as at this point the expected utility of making effort eh is ul−eh < ul.
There may be an additional stable Nash equilibrium if β − ρ < ul. In this case
mh =
β(uh − ul)− eh
ρ(uh − ul)
is that Nash equilibrium. There is an unstable Nash equilibrium, as in the comple-
mentarity case, of
mh =
eh + ul
ρ(uh − ul) + ul .
6.4 Finite set of agents
Assuming a continuum of agents makes the intuition clearer and is in keeping with
related work such as Bowles et al. [2009]. However, as the population of agents
under consideration may be a school class, a village or some other such population,
the model’s applicability to discrete, finite populations is an important matter. In
this section we analyse the finite analogue of the model presented in the previous
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q1 1
u
Figure 6.3: The left hand graph just shows the probability of success given effort as
it varies with the fraction of agents mh putting in effort e. The right hand figure
shows the expected utility depending on the choice of the agent, given the measure
of agents putting in the effort. The line of constant utility is for no effort, the other
shows how expected utility varies with the proportion putting in effort.
q
1 1
E(u)
Figure 6.4: This figure is the linear special case of figure 6.3. It allows for clearer
analysis but, at least in terms of equilibria, the results should be qualitatively the
same.
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section.
We assume that we have agents i ∈ {1, . . . , I} and as before the probability
of success q depends on the fraction of agents who put in effort eh. Letting this
fraction be rh we explore the finite versions of our model. In the below analysis we
assume we have a sufficient number of agents for the model to be meaningful; so we
have strictly positive fractions of agents in each partition (as required for identifying
Nash equilibria).
6.4.1 Complementarity and Competitive scenarios
The complementarity scenario is now straightforward. Generically we cannot have
a fraction of agents rh putting in effort h such that rh =
e+ul
ρ(uh−ul)+ul ; so the unstable
Nash equilibrium will not exist. This leaves us with up to two Nash equilibria which
will be on the boundaries, that is rh = 0 and rh = 1. The later exists if ρuh ≥ ul.
The competitive model is more interesting for a finite set of agents. Assuming
uhβ > ul and ul > uh(β − ρ) then generically there exists a least proportion r˜h of
agents strictly larger than β(uh−ul)−ehρ(uh−ul) .
Proposition 5. The proportion r˜h is the unique Nash Equilibrium for the compet-
itive model, when uhβ > ul and ul > uh(β − ρ).
Proof. At r˜h there are two classes of agents, those currently putting in effort eh
and those not. Consider unilateral deviations for each class. For those putting in
effort eh their expected utility is (β − ρr˜h)uh > (β − ρmh)uh = ul. That is their
current expected utility is greater than if they deviate. Now consider an agent
with effort e = 0. Their current (expected) utility is ul; if they deviate it will be
(β−ρ(Ir˜h+1)/I)uh but by definition r˜h is the least proportion of agents larger than
β(uh−ul)−eh
ρ(uh−ul) so the expected utility upon deviation will be less than ul. Therefore r˜h
is a Nash equilibrium.
For any rh > r˜h the expected utility upon deviation for those agents who
do put in effort eh is strictly larger than their current utility (so it cannot be a
Nash equilibrium) and for rh < r˜h the same holds for agents who are not putting
in effort eh. Therefore r˜h is the unique Nash equilibrium when uhβ > ul and
ul > uh(β − ρ).
6.4.2 Benchmark scenario
We turn now to our benchmark model for a finite set of agents. For this we will
have up to two Nash equilibria. Again, generically, the unstable Nash equilibrium
will not exist (as it would require a specific proportion of agents to be possible). As
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with the complementarity case we will have a Nash equilibrium at rh = 0. There
may be a further Nash equilibrium when I is large enough and uhβ − nρ2 > ul and
ul > uh(β − ρ2). Generically there exists a least proportion r˜h of agents strictly
larger than β(uh−ul)−ehρ(uh−ul) , this is a second Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6. For the finite version of the benchmark model with large enough I
there are up to two Nash equilibria. One where rh = 0 and a second at r˜h.
Proof. The rh = 0 case is straightforward as we only need to consider deviations of
any agent from no effort to eh. But for I large enough the expected utility upon
deviation ρ1uh + (1− ρ1)ul − eh < ul.
Now consider r˜h. The key point to note is that for Nash equilibrium char-
acterisation we consider only unilateral deviations. For I large enough we are con-
sidering a situation that is locally similar to that in proposition 5; so in terms of
unilateral deviations (and hence Nash equilibrium) the same result holds.
6.5 The long run behaviour of the economy
In both our benchmark case and in the complementarity case multiple stable Nash
Equilibria arise. Using more sophisticated dynamic models it may be possible to say
more; indeed we pick up this thread in section 6.7. However using the criterion of
stochastic stability, see Young [1993, 2008], we can analyse the long run behaviour
of the model. Instead of calculating the Nash Equilibria we ask in which states the
economy spends most of its time when agents play best responses to a sample of the
history of the system and there is a small probability of making a mistake.
We consider a version of our economy with N agents. In each period a single
agent is drawn and with probability 1− plays their best response to a sample of the
history of the economy. With probability  they experiment and play a strategy at
random; in our case this means that with probability 2 they play their best response
and with 2 a strategy which is not.
Let us consider a sample size and history size of N (so we sample the entire
history)4. Let the the number of agents in that history ht at period t who have
chosen eh be nh. The agent chooses the best response BR(nh) and this is added
to the history. So we either have a transition from nh to nh − 1, nh or nh + 1. At
4Keeping a sample history size of N is in keeping with the idea of an agent responding to the
behaviour of the population as a whole. One could consider a more complex model where all
N players simultaneously make a choice but such a model would be both subject to switching
behaviour and, aside perhaps from very small values of N , intractable. If one wishes to pursue a
more complex dynamic approach then one is probably better using numerical techniques as we do
in section 6.7.
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the boundaries of 0 and N only two of these will be possible. This is illustrated in
figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5: This figure shows the Markov chain for an economy of size N , with
history and sample size N and (above it) how this relates to the best response
dynamics for the system with a continuum of agents. In each period an agent
plays their best response to the last N strategies. For this scenario there is only
one Nash equilibrium and the dynamics are entirely deterministic as the economy
moves towards this Nash equilibrium. We could include experimentation but this
would not change the basic behaviour.
Shortly we consider two cases: versions of the complementarity case and the
benchmark case from before. We do not analyse the competitive case in this way
as it has only a single, stable Nash equilibrium so any such process should result in
long run behaviour which spends essentially all of its time at this equilibrium.
6.5.1 Complementarity case
Consider the complementarity case with base utilities for high and low achievement
of uh and ul respectively, fix parameters ρ and eh. Index agents by 1, . . . , N and let
n˜ be the largest index such that uh(ρ
n˜
N ) + ul(1− ρ n˜N )− eh < ul.
Proposition 7. For large enough N , if e+ulρ(uh−ul)+ul >
1
2 then N is stochastically
stable, whereas if e+ulρ(uh−ul)+ul <
1
2 then 0 is stochastically stable.
Proof. We have set of states {0, 1, . . . , n˜, . . . , N}, that is the number of agents who
put in effort eh in our history of length N . We have a finite irreducible aperiodic
5
Markov chain so it must be ergodic, that is there will be a long run probability µi
of being in state i which is independent of our starting state.
In order to determine stochastic stable states we do not need to precisely
calculate this long run probability, instead we characterise it to orders of . The
5Recall that we can have transitions from a state to itself, though we have omitted these from
the figure for clarity.
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Figure 6.6: This figure shows an example realisation of our dynamic process which
we consider from the angle of stochastic stability. Here we have set  at a high value
(0.1) so there is quite a lot of noise but the state, after an initial transition from our
starting state, seems to remain close to a Nash equilibrium of the model.
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Figure 6.7: Here we consider the complementarity case. We do not label transitions
from a state to itself, but label the dominant transitions in black. Transitions only
possible via experimentation (or mistakes) are labelled in grey. Analogously to the
continuum system (included above the finite system) we have two boundary Nash
equilibria and similar dynamics. The long run behaviour (with experimentation or
mistakes) will however depend on the details of the system and is characterised in
proposition 7.
Markov chain is one dimensional so we know that the probability of being in a state
i is proportional to the product of probabilities on edges of the directed tree of
transitions towards state i. So if we let Rn be the probability of a right-transitions
from state n and Ln be the probability of a left transition from a state n. Then the
long run probability of being in state i is proportional to∏
n<i
Rn
∏
n>i
Ln.
So consider the probabilities of being in each of the Nash equilibria, which
for this case are 0 and N , to orders of . So µ0 ∝
∏
n>0 Ln. That is µ0 ∝ N−n˜+1
whereas µN ∝
∏
n<N Rn, that is µN ∝ n˜. The stochastically stable state(s) is the
Nash equilibrium which in the long run the process spends almost all of its time at.
So for this case if n˜ < N−12 then N is stochastically stable, whereas if n˜ >
N−1
2 then
0 is stochastically stable.
If we are considering large values for N then can neglect the −1 constant
term, so essentially we must consider the value of e+ulρ(uh−ul)+ul . From the above it
follows that if e+ulρ(uh−ul)+ul >
1
2 then for large enough N , N is stochastically stable.
Similarly if e+ulρ(uh−ul)+ul <
1
2 then 0 is stochastically stable for N large enough.
6.5.2 Benchmark case
Consider the benchmark case with base utilities for high and low achievement of uh
and ul respectively, fix parameters ρ, ρ and eh. Index agents by 1, . . . , N and let n1
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be the largest index such that
n1
N
<
eh + ul
ρ(uh − ul) + ul .
And let n2 be largest index such that
n2
N
<
eh + ul
ρ(uh − ul) + ul .
In this system states 0 and n2 correspond to the Nash equilibria.
Figure 6.8: Here we consider our benchmark case. Again we do not label transitions
from a state to itself and label the dominant transitions in black. Transitions only
possible via experimentation (or mistakes) are labelled in grey. Analogously to the
continuum system (included above the finite system) we have two Nash equilibria
and similar dynamics (when there are a large enough number of agents). The
long run behaviour will depend on the details of the system and is characterised in
proposition 8.
Proposition 8. Let m1,m2 be the unstable and stable interior Nash equilibria of
the benchmark model for a continuum of agents. For N large enough if m1 < m2
then n2 is stochastically stable. And if m1 > m2 then 0 is stochastically stable.
Proof. Similarly to proposition 7 we have set of states of our Markov chain {0, 1, . . . N},
that is the number of agents who put in effort eh in our history of length N . We
have a finite irreducible aperiodic Markov chain so it must be ergodic, that is there
will be a long run probability µi of being in state i which is independent of our
starting state.
Once again in order to determine stochastic stable states we do not need to
precisely calculate this long run probability, instead we characterise it to orders of
. The Markov chain is one dimensional so we know that the probability of being
in a state i is proportional to the product of probabilities on edges of the directed
tree of transitions towards state i. As in the proof of proposition 7 let Rn be the
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probability of a right-transitions from state n and Ln be the probability of a left
transition from a state n.
We consider the relative probabilities of each Nash equilibrium up to orders
of . So µ0 ∝
∏
n>0 Ln. That is
µ0 ∝ n2−n1+1.
For the other Nash equilibrium, µn2 ∝
∏
n<n2
Rn
∏
n>n2
Ln, that is µN ∝ n1 . The
stochastically stable state(s) is the Nash equilibrium which in the long run the
process spends almost all of its time at. So for this case if n1 <
n2−1
2 then n2 is
stochastically stable, whereas if n1 >
n2−1
2 then 0 is stochastically stable.
If we are considering large values for N (and thus n1, n2) then we can neglect
the constant term, so essentially we must consider the relative values of n1, n2 and
N or analogously the interior Nash equilibria (of the continuous system). Let
m1 =
eh + ul
ρ(uh − ul) + ul
the unstable Nash equilibrium of the benchmark model and
m2 =
β(uh − ul)− eh
2ρ(uh − ul)
the stable interior Nash equilibrium of the benchmark model. So for N large enough
if m1 < m2 then n2 is stochastically stable. And if m1 > m2 then 0 is stochastically
stable.
6.6 Agent heterogeneity
So far we have assumed homogeneous agents, however it is fairly natural to consider
heterogeneity with respect to cost of effort, which we do in this section. There are
perhaps two more obvious ways of framing heterogeneity. We could think of an
agent i as having a particular intrinsic skill level si in which their cost of effort
decreases. Alternatively, and perhaps more satisfactorily we can think of variation
in the cost of human capital acquisition, say some ci, which determines the cost of
effort. Depending on the issue under consideration either may be the more natural
framing, but as we can consider cost of effort as either ehsi of ehci the are essentially
equivalent.
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6.6.1 Continuum of agents
If we have a cost of effort e we introduce a new cost of effort for individual i of
ei =
e
si
where si is the skill of that individual. To simplify matters we consider
a continuous distribution of skill with full support over some range in skill6. The
result of a change in skill is to shift the expected utility upon effort up or down.
While this may be problematic out-of-equilibrium, in equilibrium we can assume
that agents are in a sense ordered, as the following result shows.
Proposition 9. For the model with a continuum of agents, in equilibrium there
exists two disjoint subsets (one possibly empty) of total measure 1, such that the
skill of any agent s1 in the first set S1 is greater than the skill of any agent s2 in
the other set S2 and where agents in S1 put in effort e and agents in S2 do not.
Proof. Let S1 and S2 be the sets of agents putting in effort and not putting in effort
respectively. If we have a boundary equilibrium the result holds trivially (one of S1
or S2 is empty) . Assume we have an interior equilibrium and let s3 ∈ S1 be an agent
with skill strictly greater than some agent s4 ∈ S2. In equilibrium both agents must
not benefit from unilateral deviation, so when p is probability of an agent succeeding
we require puh + (1 − p)ul − ehs3 ≥ ul and ul ≥ puh + (1 − p)ul − ehs4. That is
s4 ≤ s3, a contradiction. Therefore we must have the ordering result.
6.6.2 Sub-economies
Figure 6.9 illustrate how we can deal with more general cases within this framework.
For the preceding results we are only really interested in those parameter regimes
where reserve utility ul line is crossed (perhaps multiple times) by the expected
utility given a proportion of agents putting in effort curve. If there is a particular
proportion of agents, such that for any such agent i with a skill level such that
q(mh)uh+(1−q(mh))ul−ehci > ul for all mh or q(mh)uh+(1−q(mh))ul−ehci < ul
for all mh (or the analogous finite situation) then we can simply remove this portion
from consideration as their decision is independent of others. Of course if we were
considering policies which might reduce or increase the cost of effort for these agents
then they once more can be explicitly considered within the model.
6.6.3 Finite set of agents
Assume we have a set of I agents indexed by i with the cost of human capital
acquisition ci of each agent drawn from the distribution of human capital acquisition
6We will look at this again when considering discrete agents.
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1E(u)
1
E(u)
Figure 6.9: When considering behaviour there may be a proportion of agents whose
behaviour is unaffected by the proportion of agents putting in effort. We can remove
this proportion from consideration as we can take it to be fixed.
in the continuous form of the model. In propositions 5 and 6 we identified the Nash
equilibria for the finite model. While introducing heterogeneity may mean that we
do not obtain such a clear characterisation we can still obtain an analogous result to
proposition 9 as long as the variation in cost is large relative to the variation driven
by the economy wide probability of success.
Without loss of generality re-index agents such that ci < cj for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ I
and let
∆qmax = max
i∈1...I−1,j=i+1
{|q(mj)− q(mi)|}
and let
∆cmin = min
i 6=j
{|ci − cj |}
that is let ∆qmax be the largest change in probability of success from a change of
one agent’s effort and let ∆cmin be the smallest variation in cost between any two
agents. As agents are ordered we only need to consider consecutive pairs of i, j.
Now let the distinguishable cost condition be
(uh − ul)∆qmax < eh∆cmin.
Proposition 10. For a finite set of agents, in equilibrium there exists two disjoint
subsets (one possibly empty) of total proportion 1, such that the cost of any agent
c1 in the first set C1 is less than the cost of any agent c2 in the other set C2 and
where agents in C1 put in effort eh and agents in C2 do not, if the distinguishable
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cost condition holds.
Proof. The distinguishable cost condition means that for agents with costs c1 < c2
if e1 = 0 then e2 = 0 as c1 − c2 > ∆cmin, so by the distinguishable cost condition
the change in q is sufficiently small to implies that our two sets are ordered in the
sense of this proposition.
The distinguishable cost condition is sufficient, but not necessary. In partic-
ular forms of the model a weaker condition could replace it.
6.6.4 The marginal agent: equilibrium characterisation for hetero-
geneous agents
The important thing to consider for a particular measure of agents putting in the
effort is the marginal utility over agents. Figure 6.10 illustrates this.
1
u
1
u
skill
marginal
skill
Figure 6.10: The left hand figure illustrates how the expected utility varies with cost
of human capital acquisition (it shifts up or down). When considering the macro
behaviour the relevant consideration is the marginal agent’s expected utility. We
are considering the expected utility of the lowest skilled agent who is putting in
effort or the highest skilled agent who is not.
In moving from the expected utility curve of the agent with the lowest cost
of effort to the curve for the marginal agent the effect is that of adding a decreasing
function to this curve. This is straightforward in both continuum and finite cases.
It is clear that the curve for the marginal agent will have the same qualitative form
as that for any particular agent; so our original results hold.
However things get more complex for our complementarity and benchmark
models. Restricting our attention to the models with a continuum of agents and
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equilibrium existence we can make a number of observations. Firstly, for the bench-
mark model, the equilibrium characterisation for the decreasing portion of the ex-
pected utility curves is as before (as each of the individual curves are decreasing, the
marginal agent’s curve must also be decreasing). Essentially we only need to focus
on the increasing portion of the agents’ expected utility curves (that is to focus on
the competitive model).
Here we can, if skill is sufficiently stratified with respect to the expected
utility curve, we can get additional pairs of unstable and stable Nash equilibria as
‘gaps’ in skill create differentiated layers of skills. This is illustrated in figure 6.11.
While the precise form of any such model will be very dependent on the distribution
of skill; when skill is sufficiently evenly distributed and the probability of success
of certain forms this kind of differentiation will not occur, as the following example
(Example 6.6.4) illustrates.
1
E(u)
1
E(u)
Figure 6.11: Here we can see how layers of equilibria may occur. The bold line is the
expected utility of the marginal agent and the other lines are representing regions
of the skill interval with greater probability (or in the finite case actual skill levels).
Example Consider the complementarity case, with cost of human capital acquisi-
tion distributed uniformly on an interval [c1, c2] such that ul − ehc1 < ρuh + (1 −
ρ)ul− ehc2; this entails that the lowest skilled agent’s expected utility upon putting
in effort (when the rest of the agents are putting in effort) is strictly larger than the
highest skilled agent’s expected utility upon putting in effort when a measure 0 of
the rest of the economy is also putting in effort.
The marginal agent will have expected utility upon effort eh of
uhρmh + (1− ρmh)ul − (c2 − c1)mheh.
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The key term is the −(c2 − c1)mheh; while is decreasing in mh, which could be
problematic if it decreases faster than the uhρmh + (1 − ρmh)ul increases (and it
decreases sufficiently such that the expected utility having gone above ul once more
goes below it). The first derivative with respect to mh of expected marginal utility
is
ρ(uh − ul)− (c2 − c1)eh
so we want to know7 if ρ(uh − ul) > (c2 − c1)eh. But this follows immediately from
our example definition.
6.7 Endogenous Segregation or Polarisation
In this section we consider a variation on our dynamic model, whereby there is
only one type of agent, but we have local learning. We use this as a way of think-
ing about endogenous segregation. In contrast to say the model of segregation in
Schelling [1971] or more recent work mentioned in the introduction to this chapter,
the segregation, if it arises, would be fully endogenous (rather than as a result of
membership of pre-existing communities).
We extend our benchmark model to a lattice of agents, each of which is in
one of two states (low and high). Each knows what it and its neighbours did in the
last m periods, where m is a memory length. In particular it can form an estimate
of its probability of success based on assumed similarity to it and its neighbours
experiences in previous periods. A basis for thinking about similarity based learning
can be found in Gilboa et al. [2010] but in our model we take a very simple form;
the average of the all the experiences. In our model we either put in effort or not;
so only those periods where an agent and its neighbours put in effort are counted
and of these we establish an individual estimate of the probability of success. From
this estimate and knowledge of the cost of effort e, the reserve utility ul and high
status utility uh the agent can decide on the basis of maximising expected utility
whether to put in effort or not.
The aggregate outcome is determined as before: depending on the fraction
putting in effort there is a global probability of success which is applied to each
agent. There is no advantage conferred for being in a high status position in the
current period, though of course such an addition would be a natural extension of
the model. At an aggregate level this will look much as before as an example run
in figure 6.12 makes clear. There is more noise, because of the more rapid updating
7While in this example this is relatively straightforward, this is the key question for all cases,
that is considering the marginal agent’s expected utility’s crossing of the ul line.
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(simultaneous actions) in this model, but the overall picture is similar with the
economy being roughly at the competitive equilibrium.
Figure 6.12: In this figure we see the total number of agents putting in effort (in
blue) and total number achieving high status (in red). Agents base their actions on
their own past success and that of their neighbours. We see something that at an
aggregate level looks quite like a Nash equilibrium. At an individual level things are
more interesting as can be seen in figure 6.13.
What we are interested in asking is whether agents can learn to put in effort
and whether they might form segregated regions of high and low effort (and thus
high and low status) and from looking at the average across many periods we see
that this is the case. In figure 6.13 we see on the left the average effort put in and on
the right the average resulting state (where low status is given weighting 0 and high
status weighting 1 and the mean calculated for each individual). Similar patterns
appear when we vary the number of agents and when we consider different numbers
of periods to average over.
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Figure 6.13: In this figure we see the average effort and average status of agents over
1000 periods. We have a lattice with toroidal boundaries; so the coloured regions
represent a kind of endogenous segregation between high effort/high status and low
effort/low status regions.
6.8 Discussion
In this chapter we have developed a set of strategic models of development which
non-trivially relate individual effort and global outcomes. We have developed ver-
sions which capture the idea of competition in development, cooperation and our
benchmark case where both effects occur. For these models the Nash equilibria were
characterised. A version of the model was developed for finite sets of agents and
again Nash equilibria characterised. Using the criterion of stochastic stability we
analysed the long run behaviour of a dynamic version of this economy. We intro-
duced agent heterogeneity both for the continuum model and for the finite model.
We showed how our solutions may still hold when some agents have particularly
high or low skill.
In the final section we looked at a spatial version of the model. This is
a version of the model on a lattice and we show how we may obtain a kind of
endogenous segregation; where certain regions learn to aim high and other to aim
low, despite no agent actually having any advantage in terms of the cost of effort or
probability of success. This model is of relevance to a wide variety of situations where
agents learn from their peers/neighbours. Any discrimination would exacerbate
the effects of segregation, beyond that observed in our model which assumes that
outcomes are only related (stochastically) to one’s effort.
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6.9 Future Work
Economic opportunities for individuals (which may be rational for those individuals
to pursue) may lead to outcomes which make some, or perhaps all, individuals worse
off. This is a repeated theme in game theory and is one area the models presented
above are of relevance to.
In this section we sketch how versions of our model can be of use in addressing
a specific set of concerns in development economics of forced inclusion: it allows us
to formally capture a process by which a group of individuals acting in their own
interest can end up in a situation that is worse for everyone because of reduction in
the availability of some non-market good. This, of course applies more generally to
other areas of polarisation or segregation.
We can think of public goods, such as a community way of life or other
community resource which either require a certain number of individuals to maintain
or which degrade as fewer individuals engage with them. A concrete example is
the possibility of migration from a rural village to urban environment in search
of employment. There is a cost to migration and uncertain reward (which may
be affected by other individuals from the village: a very small number of other
individuals may not be helpful, but as the number increases it may make finding
employment easier; though beyond a point this may have diminishing and eventually
negative returns to the individual). As individuals migrate away from the village
the quality of communal life or utility provided by another key public good may
decrease.
1
E(u)
1
E(u)
Figure 6.14: Here we consider two examples of forced inclusion for our benchmark
case. As we can see, when the interior Nash equilibrium exists it now results in a
lower utility level for all agents than the alternative mh = 0 equilibrium.
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Formally we need to make one further alteration to the model. Previously if
an agent put in effort eh but failed to attain the higher outcome the resulting utility
would be ul − e, now it should be a variable u˜l − eh; but by altering the cost eh to
include ul − u˜l we are left with a vertically shifted curve for the expected utility for
those agents who do put in effort eh.
1
E(u)
1
E(u)
Figure 6.15: Where forced inclusion effects are significant there may be unintended
consequences to policy changes. On the left we see the effect of a reduction in the
cost of putting in effort; the non-trivial Nash equilibrium outcome now has lower
utility for all agents. On the right is the effect of a general improvement to the
public good; this may discourage effort.
In figure 6.16 we consider the idea of a threshold effect. This is particularly
relevant when considering say the quality of communal life in a village or when
thinking about maintaining other public goods.
The corresponding more optimistic scenario is that of “positive inclusion”:
while many individuals may fail to actually attain the improved status, job or so
on which they might prefer, there may be spillover effects which benefit their com-
munity. notes for example that while failing to complete secondary education
may mean that the child is unable to escape the village to become a teacher, the
education may in fact lead to improved productivity in their life as part of the com-
munity. Banerjee and Duflo [2011] for example stresses the empirical observation
that there are significant increases in average lifetime earnings to any additional
years of education.
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Figure 6.16: In this figure we consider the possibility of a threshold effect, whereby
ul remains constant (or approximately constant) until a threshold of agents putting
in effort is crossed. The result will either be qualitatively as with decreasing utility
but there may be more dramatic changes or the introduction of an additional Nash
equilibrium.
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Figure 6.17: Positive inclusion for each of our three main models. In the first there is
essentially no effect (as the boundary complementarity equilibria still hold). In the
second, competitive case, and the third, benchmark case, the positive externalities
of effort improve the interior Nash equilibrium.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis has developed several models and approaches that contribute towards
out-of-equilibrium economic modelling. In chapters 3 and 4 we developed models of
exchange which relaxed many of the typical economic assumptions such as foresight
and strong assumptions on knowledge. We showed that under certain conditions
both the random matching and network-matched models will asymptotically re-
sult in Pareto optimal allocations. Numerically we went further and conclude that
for our model, which with respect to informational aspects is pessimistic, coordi-
nation on this outcome is unexpectedly fast. We further showed that changes in
wealth, considered from an a posteriori, realisation dependent, perspective can de-
pend substantially on the network structure. Extending this basic model we see how
endogenous network formation reveals agents preferences for moderately-connected
trading partners and how agents might use a ‘worthless good’ for exchange when
that is widely available and where endowments and utility functions are highly het-
erogeneous.
Following this theoretical work on out-of-equilibrium modelling we turned
to models in a more practical sense. We developed a prototype of an agent-based
modelling framework which shows how several key ideas from contemporary software
engineering can be incorporated into agent-based modelling work. We built an
internal domain specific language for agent-based modelling, including additional
ideas such as version control, testing and a more holistic view of an agent-based
modelling project than is typically taken. We demonstrated that such an approach
has many benefits and offers a more efficient way of building agent-based models
than many existing approaches. We identified key lessons of general relevance and
suggest ways the framework could be developed further.
Finally in chapter 6 we looked at a set of ‘complex’ models where aggregate
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outcomes are determined from individual decisions in a non-trivial way. We inves-
tigated three classes of models: cooperative, complementary and our benchmark
case which incorporated both cooperative and complementary effects. We identified
Nash equilibria solutions to these models viewed strategically. We developed a finite
population version of these models. Using the criterion of stochastic stability we
characterised the long run behaviour of the resulting economies. Finally we drew
together several stands of the thesis in developing a model of development with local
learning and aggregate outcomes. We use the framework from chapter 5 to build
this model and show how a kind of endogenous segregation may occur.
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Appendix A
Decentralised Exchange
Implementation
A.1 Numerical Implementation
The numerical model was implemented using the Java programming language. The
implementation explicitly models individual agents via an Agent class. Each in-
stance of the class stores the agent’s current bundle of goods, the parameters of its
utility function and its current marginal rates of substitution. Each agent can make
or consider offers, carry out trades and reset itself for another realisation of trading.
The following subsections outline the details of the models and implementa-
tion. The key source files are contained in appendix A.2 below.
A.1.1 Cautious Trading
Two files contain the key parts of the implementation of Cautious Trading: the
Agent and CautiousEconomy classes. The former implements agents with Cobb-
Douglas utility functions, random initial endowments and specifies the mechanics of
trade proposals and trades. The later creates a collection of these agents and carries
out simulated runs of the economy.
A.1.2 Scarf Example
A modified version of the Agent and CautiousEconomy classes was created to study
the behaviour of an economy which in many settings may not converge. The imple-
mentation is broadly similar to the original, the main changes being to the endow-
ments and utility functions.
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A.1.3 Experimentation
The CautiousEconomy has been augmented with the possibility of experimentation.
Essentially the ExperimentingEconomy class adds experimentation to CautiousEc-
onomy via a scaling parameter to proposed trades. To be more precise an initial
level of allowable experimentation is selected and the allowable level decreases lin-
early until it ceases. The probability of experimentation is fixed at an initial level
and this too decreases over time.
A.2 Source Code
This section contains the key source code files; many more were actually used to
model the cautious economy. The code is arranged into four distinct levels: agent,
economy, experiment and simulation. The first two play obvious roles, the ex-
periment code provides general code to investigate the cautious economy and the
simulation code runs experiments and does some processing of results. Figures in
this report were then produced using Matlab.
A.2.1 Agent Code
The below code is for the basic form of the Agent class.
lstinputlisting../../Developer/eclipse-workspace/CautiousExchange/src/com/porter/cautious/model/Agent.java
A.2.2 Cautious Economy Code
The below code presents the basic abstract economy class, which all economies
subclass.
Listing A.1: Cautious Economy source code
1 package com . por t e r . caut i ous . model ;
2 import java . i o . ∗ ;
3 import java . u t i l . ArrayList ;
4 import com . por t e r . u t i l . ∗ ;
5
6 /∗∗ The c l a s s Economy c o n s i s t s o f a c o l l e c t i o n
7 ∗ o f independent Agents , who trade
8 ∗ v ia Cautious Trading .
9 ∗/
10 public abstract class Economy{
11
12 public ArrayList<Agent> agents ;
13
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14 public int s i z e ;
15 public int nGoods ;
16 public int trades , per iod , round ;
17
18 /∗∗ Reset the economy i . e . g ive each agent a random
19 ∗ a l l o c a t i o n and u t i l i t y func t i on .
20 ∗/
21 public void r e s e t ( ) {
22 for ( Agent a : agents ) {
23 a . r e s e t ( ) ;
24 }
25 re se tCounte r s ( ) ;
26 }
27
28 /∗∗
29 ∗ Restore o r i g i n a l s t a t e o f economy
30 ∗/
31 public void r e s t a r t ( ) {
32 for ( Agent a : agents ) {
33 a . r e s t a r t ( ) ;
34 }
35 re se tCounte r s ( ) ;
36 }
37
38 protected void r e se tCounte r s ( ) {
39 t rade s = 0 ;
40 per iod = 0 ;
41 round = 0 ;
42 }
43
44 /∗∗
45 ∗ Return the t o t a l u t i l i t y o f a l l Agents in the Economy .
46 ∗/
47 public double t o t a l U t i l i t y ( ) {
48 double t o t a l = 0 ;
49 for ( int i = 0 ; i < this . agents . s i z e ( ) ; i++) {
50 t o t a l += agents . get ( i ) . c u r r e n t U t i l i t y ;
51 }
52 return t o t a l ;
53 }
54 /∗∗
55 ∗ Attempt one exchange per member o f the economy
56 ∗/
57 public abstract void round ( ) ;
58
59 /∗∗
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60 ∗ Carry out mul t ip l e rounds o f t rad ing
61 ∗ @param n Number o f rounds to run
62 ∗/
63 public void runRounds ( int n) {
64 for ( int i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) {
65 round ( ) ;
66 }
67 }
68 //
69 // pub l i c void outputTota lUt i l i t y ( F i l eWr i t e r w r i t e r ) {
70 // try {
71 // w r i t e r . wr i t e (” Total U t i l i t y : ” + t o t a l U t i l i t y ( ) ) ;
72 // }
73 // catch ( IOException e ) {
74 // e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
75 // }
76 // }
77
78 /∗∗
79 ∗ @param per i od s The number o f pe r i od s
80 ∗ @param r e p e t i t i o n s The number o f r e a l i s a t i o n s to average over
81 ∗ @throws IOException
82 ∗ ∗/
83 public double [ ] a v e r a g e U t i l i t y ( int per iods , int r e p e t i t i o n s ) {
84 double r e s u l t s [ ] = new double [ p e r i od s ] ;
85 Proce s s ing . i n i t i a l i s e A r r a y T o Z e r o ( r e s u l t s ) ;
86
87 for ( int r = 0 ; r < r e p e t i t i o n s ; r++) {
88 for ( int i = 0 ; i < pe r i od s ; i++) {
89 round ( ) ;
90 r e s u l t s [ i ]+= t o t a l U t i l i t y ( ) ;
91 }
92 r e s t a r t ( ) ;
93 }
94 for ( int i = 0 ; i < r e s u l t s . l ength ; i++) {
95 r e s u l t s [ i ] /= r e p e t i t i o n s ;
96 }
97 return r e s u l t s ;
98 }
99
100 /∗∗
101 ∗ @param per i od s The number o f pe r i od s
102 ∗ @param r e p e t i t i o n s The number o f r e a l i s a t i o n s to average over
103 ∗ @throws IOException
104 ∗ ∗/
105 public double [ ] [ ] manyUti l i ty ( int rounds , int r e p e t i t i o n s ) {
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106 double r e s u l t s [ ] [ ] = new double [ rounds ] [ r e p e t i t i o n s ] ;
107 Proce s s ing . i n i t i a l i s e A r r a y T o Z e r o ( r e s u l t s ) ;
108
109 for ( int r = 0 ; r < r e p e t i t i o n s ; r++) {
110 for ( int i = 0 ; i < rounds ; i++) {
111 round ( ) ;
112 r e s u l t s [ i ] [ r ] = t o t a l U t i l i t y ( ) ;
113 }
114 r e s e t ( ) ;
115 }
116 return r e s u l t s ;
117 }
118
119 public double [ ] [ ] manyUti l ityFixedIC ( int rounds , int r e p e t i t i o n s ) {
120 double r e s u l t s [ ] [ ] = new double [ rounds ] [ r e p e t i t i o n s ] ;
121 Proce s s ing . i n i t i a l i s e A r r a y T o Z e r o ( r e s u l t s ) ;
122
123 for ( int r = 0 ; r < r e p e t i t i o n s ; r++) {
124 for ( int i = 0 ; i < rounds ; i++) {
125 round ( ) ;
126 r e s u l t s [ i ] [ r ] = t o t a l U t i l i t y ( ) ;
127 }
128 r e s t a r t ( ) ;
129 }
130 return r e s u l t s ;
131 }
132
133 /∗∗
134 ∗ Measure the ra t e o f s u c c e s s o f Cautious Trading .
135 ∗ @param rounds
136 ∗ @param i n t e r v a l s
137 ∗ @return An array o f the numbers o f t rade s tak ing p lace in a
s e r i e s o f i n t e r v a l s
138 ∗/
139 public int [ ] measureRateOfSuccess ( int rounds , int i n t e r v a l s ) {
140 int r e s u l t s [ ] = new int [ rounds / i n t e r v a l s ] ;
141 r e s u l t s [ 0 ] = 0 ;
142 int tradesSoFar ;
143
144 for ( int p = 0 ; p < rounds / i n t e r v a l s ; p++) {
145 tradesSoFar = trade s ;
146 for ( int i = 0 ; i < i n t e r v a l s ; i++) {
147 round ( ) ;
148 }
149 r e s u l t s [ p ] = t rade s − tradesSoFar ;
150 }
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151 return r e s u l t s ;
152 }
153
154 public double [ ] [ ] getsAverageMRS ( ) {
155 double [ ] [ ] mrs = new double [ nGoods ] [ nGoods ] ;
156 Proce s s ing . i n i t i a l i s e A r r a y T o Z e r o ( mrs ) ;
157
158 for ( Agent a : agents ) {
159 Proce s s ing . add2dArrayInPlace ( mrs , a . getMRS ( ) ) ;
160 }
161 return mrs ;
162 }
163 }
A.2.3 Experimenting Economy Code
The below code shows how the above economy has been expanded to include the
idea of experimentation. We were able to utilise much of the functionality of the
CautiousEconomy superclass. The key changes are to the round method and to the
counters which are now of type double for efficiency purposes as we would otherwise
need to cast integers to doubles to calculate experimentation scaling in each round.
Listing A.2: Experimenting Economy source code
1 package com . por t e r . caut i ous . model ;
2
3 /∗∗ The c l a s s Economy c o n s i s t s o f a c o l l e c t i o n
4 ∗ o f independent Agents , who trade
5 ∗ v ia Cautious Trading . ∗/
6 public class ExperimentingEconomy extends CautiousEconomy {
7 public double acceptab le , propens i ty , decay ;
8 public double doubleEndDecay , doubleRoundCount ;
9 public double base l ineExper imentat ion ;
10 public int endDecay ;
11
12 /∗∗An Economy i s o f s i z e no . o f agents each
13 ∗ o f whom dea l with nGoods no . o f Goods .
14 ∗ @param s i z e Number o f agents in economy
15 ∗ @param nGoods Number o f goods in economy
16 ∗ @param a c c e p t a b l e l o s s p r o p o r t i o n The propor t ion o f average
i n i t i a l
17 ∗ abso lu t e u t i l i t y that i s i n i t i a l l y
18 ∗ acceptab l e to l o s e in a trade .
19 ∗ This d e c l i n e s u n t i l 0 at endDecay . Obviously the re are schemes
which are
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20 ∗ more a n a l y t i c a l l y s a t i s f y i n g , t h i s one i s a compromise between
t h i s and ease o f computation .
21 ∗ @param propens i ty to expe r iment How o f t en to experiment
22 ∗ @param endDecay The po int at which exper imentat ion s tops
23 ∗ ∗/
24 public ExperimentingEconomy ( int s i z e , int nGoods , double
a c c e p t a b l e l o s s p r o p o r t i o n , double propens i ty to exper iment , int
endDecay )
25 throws I l l ega lArgumentExcept ion {
26
27 super ( s i z e , nGoods ) ;
28 //Check va lue s o f parameters
29 i f ( 0 . 0 > a c c e p t a b l e l o s s p r o p o r t i o n | |
a c c e p t a b l e l o s s p r o p o r t i o n > 1 .0
30 | | 0 .0 > propens i ty to expe r iment | | propens i ty to expe r iment > 1 .0
31 | | 0 > endDecay ) {
32 throw new I l l ega lArgumentExcept ion ( ” Values must be in range ( 0 , 1 ]
f o r Acceptable , Propens i ty and p o s i t i v e i n t e g e r f o r endDecay”
) ;
33 }
34
35 this . p ropens i ty = propens i ty to expe r iment ;
36 this . endDecay = endDecay ;
37 this . doubleEndDecay = ( f loat ) endDecay ;
38
39 this . base l ineExper imentat ion = ca l cu l a t eBase l i n eExpe r imenta t i on
( a c c e p t a b l e l o s s p r o p o r t i o n ) ;
40 }
41
42 /∗∗
43 ∗ No exper imentat ion ve r s i on o f Economy , should perform as Cautious
Economy
44 ∗ @param s i z e
45 ∗ @param nGoods
46 ∗ @param acceptab l e
47 ∗ @param proport ion
48 ∗ @throws I l l ega lArgumentExcept ion
49 ∗/
50 public ExperimentingEconomy ( int s i z e , int nGoods ) throws
I l l ega lArgumentExcept ion {
51 this ( s i z e , nGoods , 0 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 0) ;
52 }
53
54 protected double ca l cu l a t eBase l i n eExpe r imenta t i on (double
a c c e p t a b l e l o s s p r o p o r t i o n ) {
55 return a c c e p t a b l e l o s s p r o p o r t i o n ∗ c a l c u l a t e A v e r a g e A b s o l u t e U t i l i t y
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( ) ;
56 }
57
58 protected double c a l c u l a t e A v e r a g e A b s o l u t e U t i l i t y ( ) {
59 double t o t a l = 0 . 0 ;
60 for ( int i = 0 ; i < s i z e ; i++) {
61 t o t a l += Math . abs ( agents . get ( i ) . c u r r e n t U t i l i t y ) ;
62 }
63 return t o t a l /(double ) s i z e ;
64 }
65
66 @Override
67 public void round ( ) {
68 double a l l owab l e expe r imenta t i on = this . base l ineExper imentat ion ∗
69 ( 1 . 0 − doubleRoundCount/doubleEndDecay ) ;
70 int r ;
71
72 for ( int i = 0 ; i < s i z e ; i++) {
73 r = gen . next Int ( s i z e ) ;
74
75 // get another agent at random
76 while ( r == i ) {
77 r = gen . next Int ( s i z e ) ;
78 }
79
80 i f ( this . round < endDecay && gen . nextDouble ( ) < propens i ty ∗
( 1 . 0 − doubleRoundCount/doubleEndDecay ) ) {
81 i f ( agents . get ( i ) . propose ( agents . get ( r ) ,
a l l owab l e expe r imenta t i on ) ) {
82 t rade s++;
83 }
84 }
85 else {
86 i f ( agents . get ( i ) . propose ( agents . get ( r ) ) ) {
87 t rade s++;
88 }
89 }
90 per iod++;
91 }
92 round++;
93 doubleRoundCount++;
94 }
95
96 @Override
97 protected void r e se tCounte r s ( ) {
98 super . r e s e tCounter s ( ) ;
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99 doubleRoundCount = 0 .0 f ;
100 doubleEndDecay = 0 .0 f ;
101 }
102 }
The code for networked economies can be found in the source files; but it is
omitted here as it functions more or less as the above code.
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Appendix B
A technical overview of Ambl
The following appendix (appendix C) explains how to get Ambl on your own system;
in this section we focus on giving a technical overview and filling in some of the
details that were omitted from chapter 5 as that focused on methodological issues
and examples.
B.1 The design of the Ambl implementation
In chapter 5 we related Ambl to existing work in agent-based modelling, here we
focus on some of the more precise technical details. Ambl is a set of libraries for
agents based modelling, together with a way of structuring projects and a set of
classes that allow programming in an internal domain specific language style. The
current implementation is a prototype, so lacks some of the features that should be
in a ‘full’ framework; however it follows a fairly conventional Ruby style as regards
the project/library structure.
Figure B.1 shows the overall structure. In its prototype form both library
and project are included in one folder (these should really be split apart once more
fully developed). There is a doc folder for documentation, a lib folder for libraries
and a log folder for recording of logs. The model, output, project, result folders
are where it diverges from more typical projects. The model and project folders are
‘special’; if you define models and projects here Ambl ‘knows’ about them and will
include them in the project running application. The output folder is where Ambl
generates its various outputs (see section B.3 for more on these). The result folder
is where results from each run of each simulation in each experiment in each project
are automatically saved (see figure B.4).
The remainder of the major folders include a spec folder where the RSpec
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Figure B.1: The overall structure of the current Ambl project.
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tests are contained (we remark further about testing in chapter 5). The script folder
contains a number of scripts (command line programs) which perform tasks such
running projects.
The template folder contains a set of templates which could be used to gener-
ate basic agents, worlds, simulations and experiments (if you supply the appropriate
information). This is not fully implemented (and given the conciseness of the Ambl
domain specific syntax) and not so important, but a script to do this can be found
in the util folder of the lib folder. The files in the base folder include a .gitignore file
for version control and a Rakefile (which uses the Ruby build tool Rake to perform
various tasks such as running tests and generating documentation).
Figure B.2: Ambl model components should typically be saved in these folders.
Figure B.2 shows the model subfolders. Each performs the obvious role. An
important point to make is that you can have many agents, worlds, simulations and
experiments in each folder and they can interrelate in non-trivial ways. Ambl will
load files from lower to higher levels of the agent, world, simulation, experiment,
project hierarchy so lower level components can be included directly in higher level
components files for convenience.
B.2 Ambl Libraries
Figure B.3 shows the main libraries folder and subfolders. The typical Ruby con-
vention is to have one file named after the library which loads all of the other files
and this is the case here (the ambl.rb file). Most of the core libraries are essential
complete (though you may wish to augment them for specific purposes, something
which Ruby makes very easy with its ability to ‘reopen’ classes).
Additional folders include a set of visualisations (in vis), various utility classes
and helpers in util and a graphical user interface framework in swingfaster. We now
look at key components of Ambl in more detail. This section attempts to summarise
the key methods and abilities of the classes; chapter 5 goes through examples of
usage of these classes.
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Figure B.3: The main library folder for Ambl.
B.2.1 Agents
The Agent and World classes share a some functionality, which is contained in the
AmblBase parent class. A snippet from it is shown below as it illustrates the kind
of techniques used frequently by these core Ambl classes. In addition to defining
instance methods and attributes we also take advantage of Ruby’s flexibility in
defining class level methods and attributes. The syntax is a little strange but each of
these methods below is defined at a class level (and when subclassed these attributes
will be distinct for each subclass i.e. for each Agent or World class).
Listing B.1: Snippet from Base class
1 module Ambl
2 class AmblBase
3 class << s e l f
4 a t t r a c c e s s o r : name , : d e s c r i p t i o n , : o b s e r v a b l e l i s t , : method l i s t
, : setup method
5
6 def add name (n)
7 @name = n
8 end
9
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10 def a d d d e s c r i p t i o n (d)
11 @desc r ip t ion = d
12 end
Line 1 sets up a module (use for namespacing). Line 3 is the interesting part:
this functionality allows you to add behaviour at a class level, or technically to the
‘eigenclass’. If you want to learn more about this kind of sophisticated technique
see Perrotta [2010]. Using this kind of method we can allow for a natural domain
specific way of describing a model. The agent class allows us to:
• Add a list of variables
• Add a list of parameters
• Give a list of methods for the Agent
• Give a list of ‘observable’ properties of the Agent
• Add a variable
• Add a parameter
• Declare a relationship with another Agent
• Declare a relationship to a set of other Agents
These concise declarations allow us to quickly ‘sketch out’ a model, filling in the
details later. They also allow Ambl to ‘understand’ the model and to automatically
set up various things for us and to output meaningful descriptions.
B.2.2 Worlds
The World class is similar in many respects to the Agent class. There are two im-
portant additional concepts: collections and updates. A collection is a set of agents
and an update is something which happens in each period. It allows the specifi-
cation of a list of updates via has updates and the description of a collection via
has collection. Each update is a Ruby function so has the flexibility to accom-
plish various levels of sophistication from a simple update of a variable to calling
a method for each agent and beyond. The collection is initialised via a specified
function and will typically draw either on a built in Ruby collection or on one from
the Ambl Collections module. The examples contained with Ambl should make the
above clear.
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B.2.3 Simulations
The Simulation class is relatively simple from the point of view of the Ambl modeller:
it has a single world, can have a description and so on. However, the main elements
are specifying which results to collect and in what way to run the simulation. Ambl
offers support for the collection of results at every time period, every n time periods
or at the end. It allows running for a fixed time period or while/until a condition is
true.
When it is run it collects together the results which can then be processed
by ‘higher up’ parts of Ambl. It also has an additional benchmark mode which can
provide an estimate of how long a simulation will take to run.
B.2.4 Experiments
The Experiment class is fairly simple for the user. The idea here is that it defines
an experiment which can involve running simulations, comparing simulations or
varying a parameter in a simulation. Furthermore it can specify a certain number
of repetitions of the simulation(s).
B.2.5 Projects
The Project class is quite complex; however, for the user it is very simple. You sim-
ply specify a description, author and title; along with perhaps multiple experiments
and other content. Finally you should also specify what ‘outputs’ it has, for example
LATEXpaper or HTML (see will look in more detail at these below). From just this
Ambl will run all the experiments, process the results, generate default visualisa-
tions and pull together all of these, generated summaries of model components and
additional content into ‘outputs’.
B.3 Ambl Outputs
We consider two types of output upon the running of Ambl projects: results and
generated outputs.
B.3.1 Results
An important part of any agent-based investigation will be the recording and pro-
cessing of results from realisations of the model. Ambl automatically saves your
results, sorting them by simulation and by date as shown in figure B.4.
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Figure B.4: An example of a result which has been automatically exported in a
standard format (.csv) to a suitably titled folder.
B.3.2 Generated Outputs
Ambl as it currently stands includes four kinds of ‘output’ which can be automati-
cally generated:
• LATEXreport: a ready-to-compile LATEXversion of your project, including vi-
sualisations converted to a suitable format, summaries of the components of
your project and other content.
• HTML report: similar to the LATEXreport but formatted for the web (presum-
ably the future of scientific publishing) and ready to import to Microsoft Word
and similar programs.
• Presentation format: a 3d-effect presentation format based on your project,
using the reveal.js1 library.
• Summary viewer: a simple graphical application which summarises your project.
But importantly it is easy to create your own outputs: simply create a new ‘proces-
sor’ (see the processor.rb file for the current output processors).
B.4 Future work
There are a multitude of additions which could be made to Ambl, but perhaps
the most important issue, if Ambl is to be developed further, is to identify a core
set of libraries and functionalities which form ‘core Ambl’ and then providing this
restricted collection as Ambl, allowing users to easily customise and extend elements
for their own projects.
1http://lab.hakim.se/reveal-js/
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Appendix C
Getting Started with Ambl
A link to download the latest version of Ambl will be made available on my Warwick
site1. Ambl is currently set up as a (J)Ruby project; to develop it further as a
standalone agent-based modelling platform this will need to be transitioned into a
globally available library (basically the contents of the lib directory and some of the
scripts) and a individual project structure to use for actual Ambl work (basically
this would include the current folder structure along with project specific libraries
and models).
Ambl has been tested using JRuby 1.6.52 using the Ruby 1.9 mode 3 on both
Windows 7 and Mac OS X Lion (and works without modification on both platforms).
It should work fine on Linux (using the same JRuby version). It will mostly work
with other versions of Ruby, though the graphical user interface elements will not be
supported (as they explicitly require JRuby). It does use some of the new features of
Ruby 1.9 such as require relative and improved syntax for things like processing
a list. However, with some small modifications and additions it could be altered to
support JRuby in 1.8 mode and Ruby 1.84.
At the time of writing the JRuby project appears to be close to releasing
JRuby version 1.7 which should both make explicitly invoking the 1.9 mode un-
necessary and, by taking advantage of new features of the Java 7 virtual machine,
significantly improve performance.
1http://www.warwick.ac.uk/go/jamesporter
2http://jruby.org
3Either supply the flag −−1.9 at the command line or configure your editor/IDE appropriately.
4If for some reason you have no choice over which version of Ruby to use.
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C.1 Installation Guide
In order to install Ambl you should download the latest version via my site5. You
should also install JRuby 1.6.5 from http://jruby.org. There are various down-
load options for different operating systems including easy to use installers.
Ambl uses the rspec ruby library for testing which can be installed via the
command: jgem install rspec. It also uses the Apache open source SVG toolkit
Batik6 which is already included with Ambl. This is used for image format conver-
sion and isn’t really a core part of Ambl; but if you want to use this you will need a
working Java installation. Finally, you should extract Ambl to the folder you wish
to work within.
C.2 Testing and Using Ambl
To confirm that Ambl is working on your system you should run the command rake
spec from the directory you extracted it to. This will run all of the rspec tests. This
tests the core parts of the framework and a full example project. You may also wish
to run jruby --1.9 scripts/run.rb which will run all of the projects included
with the Ambl download. If both of these work then Ambl is almost certainly fully
working on your system.
To run a project you should use the supplied project runner (see figure C.1)
which allows you to choose from all Ambl projects it finds and run them. This
project runner runs each project on a new thread (so you could run multiple projects
on multiple computer cores simultaneously) and something like this should probably
form part of an ‘Ambl Assistant’ application to make Ambl easier to use for those
unfamiliar with command line usage. Alternatively (for those who are happier using
the command line) to run a particular project you simply supply the project class
name as a command line parameter to the run script.
C.3 Creating a project
Ambl includes several example projects and it is probably best to look at these when
getting started. In addition the previous appendix B gives an explicit overview of
what is possible and chapter 5 presents several actual examples. For convenience it
is worth pointing out that Ambl loads files from lower to higher levels of the agent,
world, simulation, experiment, project hierarchy, so initially it may be easiest just to
5http://www.warwick.ac.uk/go/jamesporter
6http://xmlgraphics.apache.org/batik/
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Figure C.1: The graphical user interface for running projects. The list of available
projects appears on the left, a description and run button on the right.
work with a single project file containing (one or more) agents, worlds, simulations
and experiments7. To see an example of this look at the example project.rb file
in the project folder. This uses most of the key features of Ambl so is a good place
to start.
7Unlike many languages (J)Ruby doesn’t demand that individual components be split into in-
dividual files.
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Appendix D
An example automatically
generated output from Ambl
Abstract
An example project which illustrates the key ideas of using the Ambl framework.
Introduction
This is a simple project which uses all types of experiment for a simple world/sim-
ulation. In learning Ambl it is a good place to start.
Experiment: Simple
An example experiment which runs in the default way.
Simulation: One
A simulation of the world with agents performing a random walk (possibly with bias
:beta)
ExampleProjectWorld
A simple example world containing many ExampleAgents. A parameter :beta con-
trols the bias of the random walk of the agents
Parameters: beta
Observable values: total utility, minimum utility
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ExampleProjectAgent
A simple example agent with two parameters. It has some energy level, which is
determined by a random walk of step size :delta. The utility of the agent is the
energy level multiplied by :alpha
Parameters: alpha, delta
Variables: x
Methods: deplete energy, increase energy
Observable values: utility
Experiment: Comparison
An example experiment which compares two simulations.
Simulation: Low beta
A simulation of the world with agents performing a random walk (possibly with bias
:beta)
ExampleProjectWorld
A simple example world containing many ExampleAgents. A parameter :beta con-
trols the bias of the random walk of the agents
Parameters: beta
Observable values: total utility, minimum utility
ExampleProjectAgent
A simple example agent with two parameters. It has some energy level, which is
determined by a random walk of step size :delta. The utility of the agent is the
energy level multiplied by :alpha
Parameters: alpha, delta
Variables: x
Methods: deplete energy, increase energy
Observable values: utility
Simulation: High beta
A simulation of the world with agents performing a random walk (possibly with bias
:beta)
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ExampleProjectWorld
A simple example world containing many ExampleAgents. A parameter :beta con-
trols the bias of the random walk of the agents
Parameters: beta
Observable values: total utility, minimum utility
ExampleProjectAgent
A simple example agent with two parameters. It has some energy level, which is
determined by a random walk of step size :delta. The utility of the agent is the
energy level multiplied by :alpha
Parameters: alpha, delta
Variables: x
Methods: deplete energy, increase energy
Observable values: utility
Experiment: Varying a parameter
An example experiment which repeats a particular simulation while varying a pa-
rameter
Simulation: Three
A simulation of the world with agents performing a random walk (possibly with bias
:beta)
ExampleProjectWorld
A simple example world containing many ExampleAgents. A parameter :beta con-
trols the bias of the random walk of the agents
Parameters: beta
Observable values: total utility, minimum utility
ExampleProjectAgent
A simple example agent with two parameters. It has some energy level, which is
determined by a random walk of step size :delta. The utility of the agent is the
energy level multiplied by :alpha
Parameters: alpha, delta
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Variables: x
Methods: deplete energy, increase energy
Observable values: utility
Experiment: Simple repeated
An example experiment which runs some repetitions of a single experiment.
Simulation: One
A simulation of the world with agents performing a random walk (possibly with bias
:beta)
ExampleProjectWorld
A simple example world containing many ExampleAgents. A parameter :beta con-
trols the bias of the random walk of the agents
Parameters: beta
Observable values: total utility, minimum utility
ExampleProjectAgent
A simple example agent with two parameters. It has some energy level, which is
determined by a random walk of step size :delta. The utility of the agent is the
energy level multiplied by :alpha
Parameters: alpha, delta
Variables: x
Methods: deplete energy, increase energy
Observable values: utility
Experiment: Comparison repeated
An example experiment which compares two simulations (carrying out repetitions
of each).
Simulation: Low beta
A simulation of the world with agents performing a random walk (possibly with bias
:beta)
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ExampleProjectWorld
A simple example world containing many ExampleAgents. A parameter :beta con-
trols the bias of the random walk of the agents
Parameters: beta
Observable values: total utility, minimum utility
ExampleProjectAgent
A simple example agent with two parameters. It has some energy level, which is
determined by a random walk of step size :delta. The utility of the agent is the
energy level multiplied by :alpha
Parameters: alpha, delta
Variables: x
Methods: deplete energy, increase energy
Observable values: utility
Simulation: High beta
A simulation of the world with agents performing a random walk (possibly with bias
:beta)
ExampleProjectWorld
A simple example world containing many ExampleAgents. A parameter :beta con-
trols the bias of the random walk of the agents
Parameters: beta
Observable values: total utility, minimum utility
ExampleProjectAgent
A simple example agent with two parameters. It has some energy level, which is
determined by a random walk of step size :delta. The utility of the agent is the
energy level multiplied by :alpha
Parameters: alpha, delta
Variables: x
Methods: deplete energy, increase energy
Observable values: utility
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Experiment: Varying a parameter repeated
An example experiment which repeats a particular simulation while varying a pa-
rameter and repeating for each
Simulation: Three
A simulation of the world with agents performing a random walk (possibly with bias
:beta)
ExampleProjectWorld
A simple example world containing many ExampleAgents. A parameter :beta con-
trols the bias of the random walk of the agents
Parameters: beta
Observable values: total utility, minimum utility
ExampleProjectAgent
A simple example agent with two parameters. It has some energy level, which is
determined by a random walk of step size :delta. The utility of the agent is the
energy level multiplied by :alpha
Parameters: alpha, delta
Variables: x
Methods: deplete energy, increase energy
Observable values: utility
Conclusion
Hopefully these examples have been helpful. Good luck with your own project(s).
Visualisations
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Figure D.1: Automatically generated figure for total utility0. You will probably
want to customise.
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Figure D.2: Automatically generated figure for total utility11. You will probably
want to customise.
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Figure D.3: Automatically generated figure for total utility22. You will probably
want to customise.
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Figure D.4: Automatically generated figure for total utility33. You will probably
want to customise.
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Figure D.5: Automatically generated figure for total utility34. You will probably
want to customise.
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Figure D.6: Automatically generated figure for total utility45. You will probably
want to customise.
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Figure D.7: Automatically generated figure for total utility56. You will probably
want to customise.
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